Tarique Rahman, likely the Prime Minister-in-Waiting, has a chance at redemption.
He must enforce zero tolerance toward extortion, rent-seeking behaviour, and other muscle-power-driven crimes being committed by BNP activists, while preparing to implement an evidence- and needs-based, national interest–driven public policy agenda -- certainly not a rinse-and-repeat of 2001 to 2006.
For all intents and purposes, the BNP -- as the largest and only active political party with prior experience in steering the ship of state -- now stands as the government-in-waiting.
With Bangladesh seemingly on the election track, voters are slated to elect a government of their choice for the first time since 2008.
This must mark the beginning of a chapter in which a government -- chosen via an electoral mandate by the sheer will of the people -- attempts to break free from the embedded authoritarian structures normalized under the watch of the now-deposed AL regime.
These crooked systems continue to permeate every sphere of public life, even under the Dr. Muhammad Yunus-led interim government.
Elements of the BNP’s activist base are progressively mirroring the same condemnable acts of extortion, intimidation, violence, land-grabbing, and muscle power-driven coercion that they decried as the principal opposition over the past 15 years.
One can debate the scope and scale of these abuses relative to those committed during the AL era, but they are nonetheless among the very practices that previously damaged public perception of the BNP, alongside a plethora of public safety failures during its last tenure in government.
The upcoming transfer of power from a transitional administration to an elected government with a defined, time-bound mandate is no ordinary affair.
It is an inflection point -- a fragile lifeline or a narrow window of opportunity to initiate both the practice and principles of representative government, constitutional accountability, and liberal, pluralistic, multiparty parliamentary norms -- ideals that had been driven to the deathbed by the previous regime.
No stakeholder bears a greater burden in the post-uprising environment than the BNP.
The country stands wounded, and its long road to recovery now hinges on whether the BNP can break from its own troubled past and present -- including its failure to rein in party workers who continue to commit crimes even today -- and emerge as a self-disciplined, nation-building force, one capable of governing with integrity, restraint, and a commitment to the bigger picture of Bangladesh over narrow partisanship.
Who is Leading the BNP?
At the centre of this moment is Tarique Rahman, Acting Chairperson and de facto supremo of the BNP, whose return to the frontlines of national politics -- both symbolically and operationally -- has positioned him as the next Prime Minister of Bangladesh.
Once viewed through the lens of dynastic succession, corruption, and abuse of power during the 2001–2006 BNP government led by his mother, former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, Mr. Rahman now appears -- at least rhetorically or on the surface -- to have undergone a significant political evolution during his years in exile in the United Kingdom: More sombre, more measured, more progressive ideologically, more democratic in posture, and demonstrably sharper in tone, public policy vision, and political acumen.
The reality is that the BNP remains a strong entity, even after more than a decade of enduring the worst forms of repression by the AL.
Mr. Rahman, contrary to his earlier public reputation, has played a quiet but critical role from behind the scenes in ensuring that his party not only remained relevant and durable but also did not fracture into multiple factions, especially in the absence of Begum Zia -- first imprisoned in 2018 through a series of shoddy judicial rulings influenced by the whims of her arch-nemesis, Sheikh Hasina, later confined to her home under restrictive conditions, and steadily weakened by deteriorating health.
Only time will tell whether this change -- or incremental evolution -- in Mr. Rahman is real, whether he will put substance behind his words, or whether he remains the same figure Bangladesh turned away from, for legitimate reasons, two decades ago.
For now, the BNP’s greatest threat remains internal.
No rerun of Awami League
Expectations are immense -- and not only from traditional BNP supporters, representing, as per historical election data from four relatively fair and competitive elections between 1991 and 2008, 30 to 40 percent of the voting population.
Millions of Bangladeshis, including many who never previously aligned with the party, now seem poised to lend it conditional support -- not out of trust, faith, or optimism, but because, in the current landscape, no other party has a history of running a government, established ties with international partners, both allies and adversaries, and the ability to command some degree of confidence from investors and the business community.
The BNP must also contend with a surge of first-time voters -- a volatile bloc with no clear loyalties.
The votes of the 18 to 30 age group are up for grabs. But the BNP is neither engaging with their priorities to the extent required nor demonstrating -- especially at the ground level -- that it can meet their expectations for what a new Bangladesh should look like.
This generation is not monolithic. Their concerns vary across gender, class, income levels, and urban–rural divides. There exists no reliable data to assess where that allegiance might land, as they have never voted in previous elections.
Across all groups, support appears guarded and perhaps transactional. The public mood is not one of enthusiasm or renewal, but of careful calculation.
Every decision by the BNP -- from high-level policy choices made by its Standing Committee to the conduct of its activists -- is being judged against the scale of what the country has experienced since independence.
It is being evaluated against the memory of what the AL became and against the skeletons that remain in the BNP’s own closet, including its tainted record of politicizing public institutions, enabling patronage networks, and allowing lawlessness to flourish under the guise of party loyalty.
Suffice it to say, a parliamentary majority -- even a two-thirds majority -- looks likely for the BNP.
But so does a public eager, even desperate, not to witness a rinse-and-repeat of 2001–2006, or anything resembling the AL -- an entity that the BNP, and for many years a defiant and politically isolated Begum Zia alone, had waged a solitary battle against before broader opposition coalesced.
New challenges
The first challenge confronting the BNP is to prove that it intends to follow through on what it has already agreed to -- not just through manifestos or commitments on paper, but through tangible action, especially as it will likely be at the wheel of implementing many of the reform agenda items it signs onto in the upcoming National Charter.
Simply put, there can be no reforms without the buy-in of the BNP.
The party has already signaled support for several important reforms under the auspices of the interim government’s National Consensus Commission, endorsing a 10-year cumulative limit for any future Prime Minister, agreeing to amend Article 70 to allow MPs greater legislative independence, supporting the full separation of the judiciary from executive control, and committing to strengthen the capacity and oversight functions of parliamentary standing committees.
These positions represent meaningful departures from the concentration of power that defined the previous authoritarian regime and must be acknowledged as such.
Yet the BNP has struggled to clearly and consistently communicate this agenda. Internal contradictions, with different leaders offering conflicting messages, have undercut the leadership’s narrative.
This communication vacuum has allowed critics to frame the party as either uninterested in reform or silently resistant to it -- a portrayal that is factually incorrect but politically damaging. Unless the BNP begins to speak with the clarity and discipline expected of a governing party, explaining its reform platform and the reasoning behind each position, it risks ceding control of the narrative, particularly to more social media–savvy actors targeting younger voters.
Beyond what has already been agreed to, the BNP should take the lead in areas where consensus is still emerging and strategically approach these decisions with an even more self-sacrificing, flexible, and accommodative mindset than other smaller, less powerful stakeholders, given its current political strength.
This includes decisions on the structure of a proposed bicameral legislature, particularly reaching agreement on moving forward, ideally, with a proportional representation system for electing members to the proposed Upper House, to ensure a balanced distribution of power, and on the method for electing future Presidents.
These are not peripheral matters but foundational choices that will shape the rules of the game for decades to come. The BNP cannot afford to remain reactive or ambiguous. If it seeks to lead a democratic transition, it must think not only as a government-in-waiting but also as a future parliamentary opposition, because if not in the next five years, then eventually, it too will sit on the opposition benches.
The second -- and arguably more urgent -- challenge is the growing disconnect between the national leadership and the behaviour of party activists on the ground.
While the top brass -- namely Begum Zia, Mr. Rahman, and Standing Committee members including Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir -- have projected statesmanlike and disciplined messaging in the months following Ms. Hasina's fleeing to India, that alignment has not yet taken hold at the grassroots level.
In numerous parts of the country, media reports have surfaced of rent-seeking behaviour and the reactivation of local patronage networks, with self-identified BNP operatives now engaging in the same extortion and control over marketplaces and transport hubs that AL activists previously carried out.
It is simply a new set of actors collecting illegal payments under a different banner. These actions are not merely liabilities. In the current environment, they are disqualifying. For a party that claims to represent a clean break from the lawlessness of the AL era, it cannot allow such conduct to fester under the guise of transition and democratic restoration.
The BNP’s challenge here is complex and, in reality, difficult to address in the short run. As a large mainstream party that is both voter-driven and activist-based, with extensive geographic reach, it does not exercise tight command and control over its activist base, unlike smaller, more centralized, and ideologically cohesive Islamist or leftist parties.
Still, its size cannot be used as an excuse. Discipline must become part of its organizational culture, not just a tool for damage control.
What worked?
The party has taken some positive steps, including publicly suspending 4,000 to 5,000 members implicated in extortion or against whom formal complaints have been raised, but these actions remain piecemeal.
What is needed now is systematic accountability -- getting its own house in order before assigning blame elsewhere, as it is tending to do, and cooperating with law enforcement agencies to demonstrate that the rule of law will not be selectively applied.
To that end, Mr. Rahman’s continued absence from the country -- now a full year since the July–August 2024 uprising -- has become gradually difficult to justify. The party is fractured in several districts, local leaders are competing for influence without clear direction, and activist misconduct continues to surface in the press. Restoring control requires his direct, hands-on, in-person involvement.
He must return to tour the country, grasp the scale of the problems firsthand, and take responsibility for a party that, without him, risks squandering the brief window of public sympathy it was granted for having endured massive human rights abuses under the AL.
For all their many shortcomings, his father, freedom fighter President Ziaur Rahman, and his mother, Begum Zia, never led from afar, and the gravity of this historical moment demands the same from him.
A third axis of complexity lies in the BNP’s relationship with the two forces that have long dominated Bangladesh’s strategic and political environment: the AL and India. Regarding the AL, the BNP has been hesitant -- to say the least -- to pursue an outright ban via executive order on Ms. Hasina’s party.
Such moves rarely succeed in countries that aspire to be democracies, especially when pluralism is non-negotiable for moving forward.
A party of that size and historical significance -- one that ultimately became authoritarian but was also the principal political architect of the nationalist movement of the 1960s, which laid the foundation for the independence struggle -- cannot simply be legislated out of existence.
As things stand, it is not the AL as a political entity that has been banned, but its activities have been suspended pending the outcome of ongoing trials -- a distinction that matters. This suspension was imposed largely in response to intense pressure by the NCP following the July–August 2024 uprising, with more than a hint of mob sentiment behind it.
BNP’s role in AL Judicial proceedings
What the BNP can -- and must -- do is allow judicial proceedings against AL members to continue and, if it forms the next government, remain entirely removed from the process.
The law must be allowed to take its own course.
These trials must not become instruments of political vengeance or retribution, as was the case when the AL was in power and the BNP in opposition. What would best serve the country -- and offer a measure of closure -- is for the BNP, if elected, to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission modeled on post-apartheid South Africa, a body that enables further documentation of the pattern of authoritarian excesses over the past 15 years, while also creating space for possible acknowledgment by the AL of its wrongdoings, even if it has shown no remorse thus far.
The BNP must rise above the impulse for retaliation and take the higher ground. Look, this is no easy task. The BNP cannot be seen as rehabilitating the AL, but it also cannot be seen as failing to internalize the externality that is the AL -- or as failing to ensure that, in the absence of formal political space, the party does not re-emerge as an underground force.
The point about the status of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is important. The national memory of him was reshaped and imposed by Ms. Hasina, who turned him into a god-like figure portrayed as incapable of ever making a mistake.
That narrative was not widely embraced. His place in history was already secure -- people, even those opposed to the AL, either acknowledged or admired him as an iconic nationalist under whom East Pakistanis united in the pursuit of emancipation, even while recognizing his administrative shortcomings and the authoritarian turn between 1972 and 1975.
But Ms. Hasina weaponized his image to build a character cult and justify her own personalized autocracy -- and Bangabandhu’s name itself became synonymous with her ambition to establish a one-party state, an idea the country devotedly rejected in 2024.
This came at the expense of other national icons -- not in contrast, but in parallel -- figures the AL has intentionally sidelined during its successive terms, including General Zia, Maulana Bhashani, Tajuddin Ahmed, General M.A.G. Osmani, and others. Recognizing their contributions is part and parcel of moving beyond the Sheikh-versus-Zia lens that continues to dominate national politics.
The best thing the BNP can do is acknowledge all of these leaders -- including Bangabandhu -- together, based on history rather than political bias, and move on. At the same time, as a party founded by a freedom fighter, the BNP must push back against efforts to downplay or distort the standing of the Liberation War in Bangladesh’s history.
There are already forces attempting to do just that, particularly by drawing false parallels between the 2024 uprising and 1971. This kind of revisionism is dangerous -- not only to the meaning of 2024, but to the country’s future. It may not seem urgent now, but if left unchecked, it will eventually do real damage when the dust settles.
India’s influence lingers
India presents a different challenge. A large portion of the Bangladeshi electorate -- including many traditional BNP supporters -- view New Delhi’s foreign policy toward Dhaka during Ms. Hasina’s premiership as hegemonic and emblematic of foreign interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. There is ample evidence to suggest that this perception is very well-founded. The BNP cannot afford to ignore this sentiment.
It must re-engage with India, but on principled terms -- as a sovereign equal, not a satellite state. That will require precision and firmness on issues such as border security, trade asymmetries, and water-sharing agreements, coupled with a tone of diplomatic maturity that avoids both jingoism and the subservience that have defined past approaches.
The BNP must separate the AL’s leader-centric, party-based relationship with India from the broader question of national interest, and a good place to start would be by rebooting people-to-people engagement on commercial and tourism fronts, as well as through track two or three diplomatic forums.
A reset in relations is both possible and necessary -- but it must be done with spine. On that front, the BNP need not invent a playbook. Few have challenged Indian overreach as unswervingly -- or as boldly -- as Begum Zia has over the past thirty-five years. What must change now are the rules of engagement.
Both countries’ interests and expectations must be clearly laid out at the table, candidly and transparently. A functional partnership will require willingness on both sides. It takes two to tango, and the ball is just as much in India’s court as it is in the BNP’s.
Finally, the BNP must decide what kind of ideological space it wants to occupy. The collapse of the AL, the NCP’s drift toward the centre-right, and the rising assertiveness of Islamist parties have left Bangladesh’s political spectrum fluid. Within that fluidity lies opportunity -- especially for a party capable of fusing economic pragmatism, national sovereignty, and democratic pluralism into a coherent political agenda. Begum Zia once described the BNP as standing left of right and right of left.
That flexibility served a purpose -- it gives the party room to manoeuvre. A deliberate pivot toward a centre-left orientation -- especially on economic issues -- would allow the BNP to reclaim ground vacated by the AL.
This means moving away from elite-led growth narratives anchored in urban mega-projects which led to mega corruption, and toward a governing vision that prioritizes rural development, universal health care delivery, and mass-scale education reform -- from curriculum redesign and depoliticization to infrastructure, teacher training, and tertiary access.
BNP’s economic policy
Social safety nets must be expanded as fully costed and budgeted commitments. Achieving this will require confronting Bangladesh’s outdated and regressive tax system.
Revenue generation must become a cornerstone of the BNP’s fiscal policy, with an evidence-informed focus on expanding the direct tax base instead of continuing to rely heavily on indirect taxation. The party must also adopt a rights-based approach to governance.
That includes advancing women’s rights, Indigenous rights, and labour rights, especially for communities facing uncertainty and vulnerability during this post-uprising transition. On secularism, the BNP has a clear opportunity to reclaim ground long surrendered to the AL.
The AL weaponized secularism to divide Bangladeshis into pro- and anti-liberation camps, turning the concept itself into a controversial label for political opponents. But separation of religion from state power does not mean hostility toward faith. It means ensuring equal protection under the law for all communities. That idea is sacrosanct.
Bangladesh’s Hindu population -- long treated by the AL as a secured vote bank -- must instead be engaged as equal stakeholders in the republic. That requires more than symbolic gestures. It means protecting them from land-grabbing, enabling access to employment opportunities, and ensuring the delivery of basic services.
These are needs that matter to all Bangladeshis -- whether Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, or atheist -- but they must be supported by concrete safeguards for minorities, given the country’s recurring history of aggression toward Hindus during periods of political upheaval. Equally pressing is the need to ensure that the private sector can operate free from coercive state interference.
An economy where business decisions are shaped by political loyalty or mafia-style dominance cannot deliver the kind of welfare-oriented outcomes or employment growth needed to address rising joblessness and prevent future cycles of unrest.
The BNP should adopt an investment-driven approach to generating sustainable, people-focused growth -- one in which the state creates a stable, rules-based environment and the private sector is allowed to operate at arm’s length from political power. This requires reducing bureaucratic red tape, streamlining regulations, and establishing one-stop investment facilitation channels so that investors no longer have to navigate a maze of government offices just to get started.
For too long, the AL treated economic growth as a matter of borrowing and printing money. What Bangladesh needs now is continuous capital investment -- both domestic and foreign. The country already possesses the core factors of production that make doing business in Bangladesh theoretically attractive: a large workforce, strategic geographic location, and expanding infrastructure. But without a steady and depoliticized investment climate, these assets remain underutilized.
Business owners must be able to operate liberally, without being forced -- or, in other cases, incentivized -- to enter politics to protect their interests, a dynamic that intensified over the past four parliaments, during which many business leaders became MPs. That boundary must be reestablished. The BNP must also ensure that the banking sector is protected from partisan interference and shielded from politically induced liquidity crises.
Civil service reform -- particularly in policing, recruitment, and performance management -- must be treated as a foundational element of good governance, not as routine administrative housekeeping.
The BNP’s checkered past should not be forgotten: the 2004 grenade attack on AL leadership, the 2005 wave of 500 coordinated bomb explosions across 63 districts, the corruption allegations against Mr. Rahman and his associates, and the party’s brazen attempt to manipulate the caretaker government process after its term ended in 2006.
Through it all, public blame fell more heavily on Mr. Rahman than on Begum Zia -- and the party’s eventual decline was tied, rightly or wrongly, to his reputation above all else. Over the years, he has shown signs of evolution, at least in his public posture. But whether that change is genuine -- and whether it will be enough -- remains to be seen.
Bangladesh is not an easy country to govern. One hopes the BNP has absorbed the lessons of its past, because the country’s collective aspirations -- battered but unextinguished -- may soon rest in its hands. Some of the challenges have been outlined here, but many more remain, and others will appear.
The most consequential reform, however, will be inward-looking: Whether Mr. Rahman is prepared to fundamentally transform the BNP’s political culture, and whether he avoids becoming the version of himself that the country decisively rejected two decades ago.
Mir Aftabuddin Ahmed is a Toronto-based public policy columnist. He can be reached at [email protected]. Views expressed are the author’s own and are not associated with any institution or organization affiliated with the author.
