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The devil will be in the detail

Update : 27 Jan 2018, 06:53 PM
Analysts have noted that close cooperation between the UK and the EU in the area of foreign and security policy is expected to continue after Brexit. This will be so because the UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a member of NATO, the G7 and G20, and also is the sixth largest global economy. On the other hand, some have suggested that UK’s very likely weakened economic and financial situation would impact on resources for its armed forces and development assistance. Furthermore, it is also likely that UK might become embroiled in internal constitutional, political, economic, and social disputes for the foreseeable future. In this context, it has been noted that the question of a second Scottish independence referendum hangs in the air while the Irish question may also resurface. There might, therefore, be less time and energy for foreign and security policy.More paperwork?It is clear that the matrix will be complex. It is however also true that in principle, the EU wishes to maintain a close relationship with the UK not only on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) but also on matters of common security and defense policy (CSDP). It is being suggested that existing treaties might be used to craft a new partnership agreement. The devil will however be in the detail. Much will depend on the overall atmosphere of the Brexit negotiations. An acrimonious divorce might have consequences across the board while an amicable parting of ways would lead to a more cooperative relationship, including in CFSF/CSDP. The UK, it needs to be remembered, since the 1990s, has been a major troop provider in stabilisation missions in the Balkans, an early supporter of the EU’s role in the Iran negotiations and has pushed for a tough EU response to Russia after the annexation of Crimea. Presently, it tends to support the EU role more in the immediate neighbourhood (Balkans, North Africa) than further afield. The UK, once in a while also prefers to align itself with the US, Australia, Canada, and Malaysia. It may be recalled that during the Brexit referendum campaign, there was little reference to foreign policy. Proponents of Brexit made much of alleged plans for a European army but there was little serious discussion of the potential implications for the UK operating on its own outside the EU framework. Nevertheless, during her visit to the US, Prime Minister May said Britain would take on an “even more internationalist role, where we meet our responsibilities to our friends and allies, champion the international cooperation and partnerships that project our values around the world, and continue to act as one of the strongest and most forceful advocates for business, free markets, and free trade anywhere around the globe.” In her letter of March 2017 that triggered the procedure for the UK to leave the EU through Article 50, Theresa May also repeated UK’s wish to see a strong and secure EU and later stated that the UK was unconditionally committed to maintaining European security. The desired nuance was reflected in UK’s position on foreign and security policy paper published in mid-September. It stated that the UK wanted “a deep and special partnership” across the board in external relations that “goes beyond existing third country arrangements.”
An acrimonious divorce might have consequences across the board while an amicable parting of ways would lead to a more cooperative relationship
It trumpeted the UK’s major role in providing for European security and defense and stated that “this will continue, and UK interests will also be served, through strengthened bilateral relationships.” This suggests that the UK “would contribute military assets to EU operations, cooperate on sanctions, and agree joint positions on foreign policy” as part of a Brexit deal. There also exists in today’s UK the thinking that Brexit will open new trading opportunities. Such a mercantilist foreign policy might, however, mean not only less willingness to support the EU’s already weakening normative agenda but also a risk of a reduced commitment to the development agenda. According to some economists, in the short term, there is also likely to be a preference for trade promotion over development aid.Still partners?It is true that there has been no detailed official guidance on Britain’s future foreign policy cooperation with the EU but the paper in this regard disclosed in September that the UK and the EU should remain “close partners” in foreign policy issues and this could be done “through regular dialogue and specific cooperation.” It is also clear that the UK would like to collaborate with the European Defense Agency (EDA) and participate in the Commission’s various research programs related to priority areas like cyber security, development policy, and migration. In this context, former Foreign Secretary William Hague has suggested that Britain should seek to keep its seat as an observer on the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and also second experts to the European External Action Service (EEAS), share intelligence, and continue to participate in CSDP operations. Some analysts have also proposed that the UK could copy the Norwegian model as it enjoys a regular dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy via the EEA agreement and usually aligns itself with EU positions and declarations. It may also be mentioned here that Norway has an agreement which permits it to engage in CSDP operations and also cooperate with the European Defense Agency. All these facets tend to indicate the possibility of the UK eventually entering a Norway Plus arrangement. This would be consistent with the long UK involvement in EU policy-making in general and its foreign and security policy fields in particular. This will mean that UK will seek to act autonomously, while being a close partner of the EU or as the junior transatlantic partner to the US. The second factor will depend on developments within the EU itself. The connotation arises from the question as to whether in a post-Brexit world, the EU will form a more cohesive and effective foreign and security policy or whether it will remain divided as it was on evolving situations in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. We have seen many European leaders pushing for a stronger EU in security and defense matters. However, recent events have also indicated that the EU nearly always finds great difficulty in moving forward in this sensitive arena. The differences in outlook that are being created through populism and ultra-right fundamentalism are now beginning to become significant. One thing is quite clear. It will be difficult to separate the future UK-EU relationship in foreign and security policy from the final elements that will constitute the Brexit divorce settlement. An amicable separation will create goodwill towards constructive engagement and cooperation. A controversial parting of the ways might however impact on foreign and security policy.Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador is an analyst specialized in foreign affairs, right to information, and good governance. He can be reached at [email protected]
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