Not long ago, on March 15 last year, Hasnat Abdullah, a top leader of the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), made a striking post on Facebook: “The Awami League’s chapter is closed.”
A little more than a year has passed since that declaration. Yet with the passage of time, it appears that far from being “closed,” the Awami League has become an open topic.
Less than two years have passed since the party was ousted from power, but it now occupies a peculiar position in Bangladesh’s political landscape. The party itself is absent from the political arena, yet political discourse remains dominated by discussions about it.
There are no Awami League representatives on television talk shows, yet debates about the party continue. No Awami League leaders are writing columns or giving interviews in newspapers and magazines, yet news reports, opinions, and analyses about the party appear relentlessly. This article itself is proof of that reality.
On May 10, 2025, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus banned all political activities of the Awami League through an executive order. To provide a legal basis for the ban, an ordinance was issued amending the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009. The ordinance was subsequently approved by the 13th National Parliament, where the BNP enjoys a two-thirds majority.
In other words, the BNP also believes that preventing the Awami League from engaging in political activities is the correct strategy.
Perhaps the BNP accepted this course under pressure from Jamaat-e-Islami and its ally, the NCP. Or perhaps the party genuinely believes that the absence of the Awami League from the political field benefits the BNP. They may hope that every election will resemble the victory festival of the paddy sheaf witnessed in February 2026.
Zahed Ur Rahman’s remarks
The debate over the Awami League gained a new dimension following comments by Prime Minister’s Information Adviser Dr Zahed Ur Rahman regarding local government elections.
Perhaps his remarks were misunderstood, or perhaps some people sought hidden meanings where none existed. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that his comments injected fresh energy into an already active debate.
At a press conference, Dr Rahman said: “If someone associated with the Awami League wishes to contest local government elections in a personal capacity and fulfils all legal requirements, there will be no obstacle.”
Many interpreted this as a glimpse into a possible government plan to facilitate the Awami League’s return to political life.
However, Dr Rahman later rejected that interpretation on his YouTube channel. He reiterated that the ban on the party’s activities would remain in force until the completion of the trial of the Awami League as a party before the International Crimes Tribunal, a position consistent with the Yunus government’s official stance.
One thing, however, became clear from his remarks: There is little difference between the BNP’s position on the Awami League and those held by the Yunus government, Jamaat, and the NCP.
For Jamaat and some religious extremist groups, the aspiration for an Awami League-free Bangladesh is rooted in ideology. They have never forgiven the Awami League for leading the movement that resulted in the breakup of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh.
The student-led uprising of 2024 provided these groups with what they viewed as a historic opportunity to bury the Awami League permanently.
Where does the BNP’s interest lie?
The case against the Awami League in the International Crimes Tribunal was initiated during the Yunus administration. In many respects, the BNP government has maintained continuity with the policies of the interim administration, and the proceedings before the tribunal are perhaps the clearest example.
The question, however, is whether the lawyers appointed by the BNP government are also following the same path. To many observers, the lawyers representing the state in the tribunal appear motivated less by justice than by vindictiveness.
The BNP’s position cannot be explained solely through ideology. The Awami League is its principal political rival, not its ideological enemy.
There are profound disagreements between the two parties over the Liberation War, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and General Ziaur Rahman’s declaration of independence. Yet it remains difficult to understand why a party founded in 1978 would want to rewrite the history of 1971.
For the Awami League, meanwhile, 1971 is inseparable from its identity and political legitimacy as the party that led the liberation movement and the Liberation War.
Since the BNP has effectively decided that discussion of the Awami League’s future can only take place after the tribunal’s verdict, an important question arises: How does it want the case to end?
Regardless of how often people speak of judicial independence and the rule of law, it is impossible to deny that government interests exert considerable influence in politically sensitive cases.
Dr Zahed Ur Rahman is not merely the Information Adviser; he is also the Prime Minister’s adviser on policy and strategy. His remarks therefore reflect government thinking.
Another implication of his comments is that the government has effectively placed a major political question in the hands of the courts. The reason may simply be that the BNP itself remains uncertain about what it ultimately wants.
According to BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, the BNP is a “liberal democratic party.” Yet banning a major political party is neither a liberal nor a democratic act.
At the same time, lifting the ban on the Awami League would invite the wrath of Jamaat, the NCP, and their allies.
The court as an excuse
The BNP now appears to be using the courts as a political shield.
The parallel with Sheikh Hasina’s abolition of the caretaker government system in 2011 is difficult to ignore. She justified that decision by citing a High Court verdict.
Yet the introduction of the caretaker system had itself been a political decision, born of an acknowledgement by politicians that free and fair elections could not be guaranteed under partisan administrations. Hasina used the court’s verdict to avoid taking political responsibility for dismantling that arrangement.
Today, the BNP appears to be following a similar path.
The executive order banning the Awami League, the ordinance, and its parliamentary approval were all political decisions. Yet the ultimate question of whether the Awami League should permanently return to politics has been deferred to the courts.
The BNP’s concern is that a judicial verdict alone cannot resolve the issue.
The Awami League is not a party that emerged overnight. Bangladesh itself was born under the leadership of this 77-year-old political organization.
If the court rules in favour of the Awami League, there will be little justification for continuing the ban. The BNP would then have to confront the opposition of Jamaat, the NCP, and other groups.
Under such circumstances, clashes between supporters of the Awami League and those of Jamaat-NCP may become difficult to avoid.
It remains unclear how the Awami League will defend itself before the tribunal, or whether it will actively participate in the proceedings at all.
What seems certain, however, is that the party will continue trying to strengthen its organizational presence on the ground, regardless of whether its activities remain banned.
Proof of organizational capacity
As long as the ban remains in place, public political activity will carry significant risks for Awami League leaders and activists.
On one side lies the threat of police action and arrest. On the other is the possibility of attacks by BNP or Jamaat-NCP supporters operating under the protection, or at least the tolerance, of law enforcement agencies.
If the Awami League wishes to send a meaningful political message to the BNP, it will have to navigate these risks carefully. In some respects, that message is already being delivered.
Several senior Awami League leaders, including the once-fiery orator Tofail Ahmed, recently passed away. Many observers were surprised by the large crowds that attended their funerals despite the absence of state sponsorship or media promotion.
Those crowds may reflect continuing support for the Awami League. Alternatively, they may simply represent respect for deceased political figures. Either interpretation remains possible.
Even after 55 years of independence, Bangladeshi politics is ultimately shaped less by parliament or the courts than by control of the streets.
And, when necessary, by the cantonments.
Yet the political upheavals of 1990 and 2024 demonstrated that even the cantonments ultimately take their cues from the mood of the streets.
As Touhid Hossain, foreign affairs adviser to the interim government, recently remarked: “The deep state never goes against the tide.”
Questions remain about the Awami League’s organizational strength and its standing among the public. Until those questions are answered, it appears unlikely that other political parties -- or the cantonments -- will take the prospect of an Awami League comeback entirely seriously.
