A quiet but deliberate signaling of being a pragmatic political force defines the current messaging of the BNP. Its communication to the public is straightforward: The BNP is the rational powerbroker in the post-mass uprising arena and will function as such.
Politics solely based on dynastic allegiance, mobilizing activist-centred gatherings, and lacking internal democratic mechanisms from the ground up to elect -- rather than select by acclamation -- party officeholders is a strategy lacking foresight. Such a strategy will inevitably backfire, as the modus operandi of a new citizenry -- more opinionated and restless than at perhaps any other moment since the independence of Bangladesh -- has fundamentally shifted in recent years.
While not a full acknowledgment, there is recognition at the highest levels of the BNP, including its standing committee, that the way the party conducted politics in the past needs to change. The BNP has a moral obligation to align with both the aspirations and the needs of a very young electorate -- a disproportionate majority of whom will be voting for the first time in their lives.
Three fraudulent elections stifled the democratic rights of a nation whose demographic dividend remains its potent strength. A large cross-section of society has condemned the politics of yesteryears to a death sentence, airing grand ambitions for how they want Bangladesh to transform. The BNP’s job will be to temper those expectations without sidelining them, invest in and execute feasible public policy reforms, and remain attuned to the political pulse of the day.
The double-edged legacy of the Zia dynasty
On the surface, Tarique Rahman seems to be, for lack of a better phrase, a much wiser operative. Supporting this notion could be seen as an act of cautious optimism, driven by his recent rhetoric and promises of reform. Yet, his notorious track record during his youth -- some exaggerated by the Awami League but some rooted in reality -- means that many view him not with unreserved trust but because he leads a mainstream political party that has not only survived the trials and tribulations imposed by an authoritarian regime but has come out on top.
Voters are inclined to conclude that the absence of an alternate functioning entity with the reach and organizational strength of the BNP de facto makes it the party of mass appeal and, therefore, likely to win an overwhelming parliamentary majority. There is no way of knowing whether the BNP’s acting chairperson will follow through on his promises until he takes the helm of government -- a scenario that seems increasingly likely after the upcoming election.
The BNP’s matriarch, Khaleda Zia, remains resolute and respected. Notwithstanding her frailty and sickness, she continues to command attention in both local and international media. She has demonstrated one undeniable truth: whether one approves or disapproves of her terms as Prime Minister, she has emerged triumphant in her 42-year battle with her arch-nemesis, the now-deposed Sheikh Hasina. Begum Zia confronted authoritarianism, choosing not to flee abroad despite knowing she would face the brunt of a politically orchestrated judicial sentence.
And she was right. The BNP frames her detention as a sacred, personal sacrifice for the pursuit of democracy -- a fight she undertook knowing that the only way she would be exonerated was through some form of popular revolt against the Awami League. Much of the anti-democratic trajectory she warned that Hasina was steering Bangladesh toward has become the reality that young people today are echoing, aligning with the narrative promoted during July and August.
When the decorated freedom fighter Ziaur Rahman took the reins of the state apparatus following the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, he managed to stabilize the country, earning widespread approval. General Zia benefited from the post-1975 vacuum and formed the BNP with politicians and subject-matter experts who opposed the Awami League. This included right-wingers, left-wingers, communists, and Islamists -- a coalition of convenience rather than ideology. General Zia also initiated economic liberalization measures to attract foreign direct investment and promote private sector growth. Agricultural advancements, including investments in irrigation facilities and modern farming techniques, were well-received.
General Zia was assassinated in 1981. His legacy remains contentious for three reasons. First, he turned a blind eye after being informed by some of Mujib’s killers about their plan to murder Bangladesh’s Commander-in-Chief. Second, his government carried out the execution of over 1,100 military personnel following a series of attempted coups. Third, he authorized anti-liberation forces to participate in national politics. BNP supporters view this as his attempt to restore a competitive, multi-party democratic culture. This move led to the return of both Jamaat-e-Islami and the Awami League, the party that had led the political wing of the liberation struggle but was disbanded by Mujib in favour of a one-party system, BAKSAL. General Zia was a complex character, and both his supporters and detractors present valid arguments.
Since 1982, Khaleda Zia has been the binding glue keeping the BNP both electorally relevant and broadly acceptable. She was thrust into a leadership role at the request of her husband’s colleagues. She rose to the occasion and became a people's champion by challenging the autocrat HM Ershad, earning the tag of being uncompromising when it came to democracy, fighting hand in hand with Mujib’s daughter, Hasina. After Ershad was ousted from office and, contrary to predictions, Begum Zia defeated Hasina and became Bangladesh’s first female prime minister. Her most historic achievement has been the restoration of the Westminster-style parliamentary form of government in 1991, transitioning the country out of military rule.
Like her husband, Begum Zia pushed for export-oriented industrialization. Another success was her contributions to public education. From 1991 to 1996, her government expanded access to primary education in rural Bangladesh and introduced fiscal policies to promote female schooling, the benefits of which citizens continue to reap today. These measures have had dynamic multiplier effects, such as enabling women to join the mainstream workforce, particularly in the textile industry, while laying the footing for a robust remittance sector.
The BNP’s term in office from 2001 to 2006 was a disaster. Under Begum Zia, who began ceding control to her eldest son, the party became synonymous with corruption. Elite-level graft dominated public discourse. The infamous August 21 attack, which claimed over 20 lives, shattered the BNP’s credibility. The country also faced concerns over domestic terrorism and anti-minority attacks, creating a pervasive sense of insecurity. Basic issues like power outages compounded public frustration. By 2006, the BNP’s unpopularity had peaked, and Begum Zia’s sustained alliance with Jamaat was generally viewed as the darkest mark on her career.
Ironically, the Awami League’s maltreatment of Khaleda Zia has helped the BNP regain public compassion, if not confidence. The Awami League misused state machinery to evict her from her Cantonment residence in 2010, placed sand trucks outside her Gulshan home before the 2014 general election, repeatedly prevented her from conducting political activities, harassed her on numerous occasions, and kept her on edge with politically-motivated judicial charges. These actions were not well received by a sympathetic public and were seen as executive overreach, driven by a personal vendetta that Sheikh Hasina harboured against Begum Zia.
A senior citizen, Khaleda Zia was sent to jail, then hospitalized during the pandemic, and later placed under house arrest, all while being denied treatment abroad -- a move most observers claimed violated her constitutional right to healthcare access. These actions aided the BNP in playing the victim card, initially demotivating party activists but later inspiring them, as each day Begum Zia remained in detention transformed her into a symbol of resistance. BNP activists, whose role in ousting Hasina cannot be overlooked, also endured substantial human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.
Today, the BNP’s 31-point reform plan, derived from Begum Zia’s Vision 2030, provides a good starting point for a future government. The proposals include balancing power between the president and prime minister, establishing term limits for their tenures, reforming the judiciary from the ground up, and introducing a bicameral legislature. These proposals are similar to what is being touted by the various commissions set up by the interim government. On paper, these ideas reflect a party committed to strengthening a multiparty liberal democratic ecosystem with institutional guardrails to prevent the country from descending into a one-person autocracy.
The many skeletons in the BNP’s closet cast doubt on the extent to which these proposals will ever morph into actionable reforms. This translates into a continued absence of faith in the BNP for many, who fear that the same script used in the past will be leveraged again, and words will remain just that: Words. Equally acute is the need to penalize the conduct of BNP grassroots activists, who, since August 5, have been involved in land grabbing, syndicate businesses, and mob-styled acts of revenge -- the very practices it condemns in the Awami League. If this persists, the BNP will alienate uneasy voters in a new Bangladesh who are disillusioned with the entrenched realities of a hostile, client-patron-based, divisive political environment.
There are a few older unresolved questions the BNP must address if it seeks to lead under the overarching umbrella of a new, inclusive democratic polity. The party must confront head-on its responsibility for the circumstances that allowed the August 21 attack to occur. It cannot forget that it was the party in power when this attack took place. Closing this chapter is a demand of the times. There can be no way around it. Frankly, an independent judicial process should be pursued. Tarique Rahman himself should admit to his party’s failings in 2004, especially if he has nothing to hide. On democracy, too, the BNP must reflect on its two specific shortcomings.
In 1996, Begum Zia introduced the caretaker government system into the Constitution after holding a one-sided election -- a move some interpreted as grace under pressure, while others saw it as an inability to withstand opposition demands. In 2006, the BNP’s push for President Iajuddin Ahmed to serve as Chief Advisor of the caretaker government backfired, further corroding trust in its commitment to electoral fairness. The BNP shares some of the blame for bringing Bangladesh to the bad state it is in today.
The bottom line is that the BNP has also indisputably -- though not to the same extent as the Awami League -- undermined democratic institutions. While its actions may pale in comparison to the Awami League’s systematic attacks on democracy and the rule of law since 2009, the BNP cannot be given a blank cheque without admitting to and addressing its complicity. The time to do so is now more than ever.
The need for mature leadership
It is easy to label the BNP and Awami League as two sides of the same coin. However, differences exist. For instance, BNP governments allowed greater press freedom compared to their peers, with newspapers openly criticizing Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman. On leadership, Begum Zia will likely be remembered as flawed yet defiant. Though her last tenure was marred by public sector corruption and her soft spot for her son -- a weakness that proved extremely costly for Bangladeshis -- she has never lost an election in any constituency she contested, resisted authoritarianism, and defied experts and pundits by keeping her party intact.
In contrast, Hasina, by August 2024, had become a dangerous embodiment of authoritarianism, sanctioning state-sponsored terror that many argue bordered on crimes against humanity. Her vengeful politics -- a byproduct of the trauma from her family’s brutal assassination -- exacerbated the worst tendencies of her predecessors and overshadowed any positive policy moves she undertook as head of government. History is likely to be kinder to Khaleda Zia than to Sheikh Hasina, not for what the former accomplished, but for what she refrained from doing, while the latter’s legacy will be defined more by her actions than by her omissions.
The BNP is a centrist party. It is currently the largest active political force in Bangladesh. Enjoying organic mass appeal does not absolve it from its duty to confront the many sins of its past. It must do so vocally and visibly.
Often perceived as a conservative entity due to its previous alliances with Islamist groups, much of the BNP’s policy agenda during its nearly 15 years in government was not inherently Islamist. In fact, with a few exceptions, it leaned more toward right- or left-of-centre ideals. However, from 2001 to 2006, the party became too closely associated with Jamaat, making it easy to conflate the BNP’s ideology with Jamaat’s. This is a relationship the BNP must continue to distance itself from in the lead-up to the next election.
The BNP’s primary imperative will be to allow new political clusters, such as the party expected to be led by convenors of the student-led, people-powered movement that ousted Hasina, to function as vigorous pressure groups and, ultimately, a viable parliamentary opposition. The BNP must display maturity and a generosity of spirit, rising above petty politics to become a unifying force. Failure to do so will pave the way for domestic conflict that the deposed regime and its backers will exploit.
Politics has changed for the better since August 5, and if the BNP flops in its attempts to connect with the rhythm of reform and public sentiment that has swept the country -- as it failed to do from 2001 to 2006 -- it will falter, for the public will not mince words in holding it accountable, not only at the ballot box but also in the streets if necessary.
The self-proclaimed Gen-Z convenors of the movement that ousted Hasina, now positioned within or around the interim government, are clashing with the BNP on several issues, including the 1972 Constitution and whether the events of July and August were a mass uprising or a revolution. These rifts are set to deepen as Muhammad Yunus works to forge consensus on a mutually acceptable way forward.
The BNP, as a seasoned political force, must show discipline, self-sacrifice, and a readiness to prioritize national interests over partisan goals. They must assert themselves as the stabilizing force in this tumultuous landscape -- failure to do so risks navigating Bangladesh toward self-destruction and a dark, gloomy, and unstable future.
Mir Aftabuddin Ahmed is a Toronto-based public policy columnist for Bangladeshi and Canadian media outlets and policy platforms. He can be reached at [email protected]. Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
