To say that the South Asian is a more emotional creature than its peers elsewhere is to state the blatant obvious. The good thing about that high quotient of emotionalism is it helps form intense bonds of family and friendship.
The bad thing about the same trait is that it locks policymakers into conspiracy-laced rhetoric where saving face becomes far more important than solving problems.
More often than not, the symptoms of the problem are analysed to death while the substance is rarely touched. It is a classic instance of avoiding problem-solving in favour of position taking … a phenomenon that is all too familiar to those of us who went through rigorous MBA programmes.
The conundrum of fair polls at the next general election in Bangladesh is precisely a case in point.
The opposition is rightfully afraid, given the history, that a political government simply cannot ensure fair general elections. The symptom of this fear is digging heels over the caretaker government argument.
At the same time, the ruling party is legitimately concerned that any caretaker set up may lead to the involvement of the armed forces, an element of the state with which, for a myriad of reasons, the ruling party has never been particularly comfortable.
I strongly support the idea of non-partisan caretaker governments simply because only such governments have been able to execute any reforms worth the name in Bangladesh.
That said, the simple fact is that the Supreme Court has declared such non-political administrations unconstitutional. It is a dilemma, but hardly unsolvable. In fact, the models of Indian and Pakistani elections provide a tested way out of that dilemma.
The simple, but certainly not easy, solution is to both strengthen and liberate the Election Commission (EC). Amendments to current law can be easily made by the government’s crushing majority in parliament so that the members of the EC are appointed only with the consensus of all parties represented in the national legislature, and the commission itself is given plenary powers to veto any promotions/transfers in the civil service within a 90-day period before a general election.
Furthermore, the financial autonomy of the EC should be made absolute along with its power, during a 90-day window before the election and for another 90-day window after the elections, to call up and deploy any assets of the republic to ensure fair polls in any constituency.
In other words, during the interregnum between the lead-up to the election and the counting/certification of the results, the EC becomes the undeterred and unfettered authority for the management of the entire polling exercise – subject only to the traditional appeals in equity to the higher judiciary.
The most recent self-immobilising measures of the EC have not been particularly encouraging in regards to the suggestions made above. Rather than being discouraged by the same, however, such bizarre actions should become opportunities for seeing the big picture: unilaterally appointed commissions, no matter how august their titles and responsibilities, simply cannot function as neutral umpires.
Our political and social culture will simply not allow such autonomy, notwithstanding what is written on paper. Why not learn, then, from the best practices of neighbours who have been fraught with the same cultural baggage and made for respectable, cogent, indigenous solutions?
My mother, a science teacher for a quarter of a century, is very fond of the proverb “Where there is a will there is a way,” as long as we all adhere to the realities of a problem’s context. The way out of the fair election dilemma is there for sure; the question is one entirely of bi-partisan political will.
