Let us take a historic lens to analyze how Bangladesh's relations with the US, China, and India have evolved since Bangladesh's emergence as an independent country in 1971.
Although more than 50 years have passed, this historical lens is important because even in contemporary geo-politics, how Bangladesh interacts in the US-China-India strategic triangle is primarily shaped by the way in which the country was established.
First, India
India-Bangladesh relations are deeply rooted in Bangladesh's independence struggle. India's assistance in the Bangladesh Liberation War was instrumental. Of course, it was also India's “self-help act” given the threat it encountered from Pakistan being located on India's east and western flank.
The liberation of Bangladesh resolved India's number one security threat.
Nevertheless, India's assistance accelerated Bangladesh's independence. However, India's policy towards Bangladesh shifted significantly soon after independence. Whereas India's support for the Bangladesh Liberation War was generous and unconditional -- India's policy in the subsequent years was driven primarily by three main objectives.
First, India's policy aims to keep Bangladesh in its sphere of influence. Second, limiting Bangladesh's foreign and defense policy choices. Third, controlling Bangladesh's political and social life in a way that advanced India's regional interest.
India uses a mix of incentive and coercive tactics to compel Bangladesh to accept its demands, whether it is a transit route or helping Delhi uproot the separatist movement in its northeast. Bangladesh is a big market for Indian products and culture. Bangladesh is also the fourth largest remittance source for India.
On the other hand, even after decades of negotiation, India has yet to sign the Teesta water-sharing pact or stop the killing of Bangladeshi citizens by Indian border guards.
Historically, Bangladesh's incumbent political party, Awami League, is more inclined towards Delhi. Evidence suggests Dhaka has been more forthcoming in adapting a Delhi-friendly policy when AL is in power.
Although the government was able to make some long-standing deals -- such as the India-Bangladesh land boundary agreement in 2015 -- the prevailing view in Bangladesh is that the AL is giving in to India too much and has failed to stand up to Delhi when it must.
AL views India's support as crucial for the government's continuation. A number of ministers and party leaders made such public statements on various occasions. The common perception is that to appease India, Dhaka has signed unfavourable deals.
The latest example of it is an energy deal with the Adani group where Washington Post and other news reports suggest Dhaka caved into India's pressure to pay more than it should have.
In turn, Delhi continues to support the current government. After the last two controversial elections, the US-led Western coalition is now pressuring the government to hold a free, fair election. Indian officials, seemingly contradicting the West, have publicly stated that they have full confidence in the current government.
Second, Bangladesh's relations with China
At the height of the Cold War in the 70s, thanks to China's ties with Pakistan, Beijing neither supported Bangladesh's independence struggle nor extended its assistance in the subsequent years. China-Bangladesh relations remained largely strained for a long period of time due to this historic animosity but also China's own inward-looking policy.
China-Bangladesh bilateral relations started taking off only after Deng Xiaoping's “reform and opening up” policy in the early 90s. But the relationship has been limited to low politics, such as trade and investment.
It was only in the early years of this century, as Bangladesh was facing a number of security challenges along its border, such as the escalation on the Bangladesh-Myanmar and Bangladesh-India border, that Dhaka started to perceive Beijing as a remote strategic cushion for its entanglement in the borderland.
China-Bangladesh relations take a new height in light of China's Belt and Road Initiative. After BRI, Bangladesh saw renewed interest from Beijing, leading both countries to upgrade the bilateral relations to a strategic partnership.
In the current bilateral relations, I would argue that the defense cooperation between two armed forces has played an instrumental role, due to both countries' converging threat perception with respect to India.
However, the pandemic and the repercussions of China-funded projects in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and elsewhere in Asia have served as cautionary tales for Dhaka. Bangladesh now appears to be more cautious in taking Chinese loans.
One point that needs to be highlighted here is that the relationship with India is often seen through the lens of partisan politics in Bangladesh.
There is rising anti-India sentiment in the country, especially among the newer generation of Bangladeshis. Bangladesh's relations with China have not yet suffered this kind of characterization.
Last, the United States
One of the key characteristics of Bangladesh's foreign policy is Dhaka's enthusiasm for increasing its interaction with the outside world. The problem has always been the little understanding of Bangladesh's geo-political and economic value in the outside world. Bangladesh, for its part, has failed to convey what it can offer to the world and why Dhaka deserves attention from great powers.
Cold War reality also contributed to the bumpy start of the US-Bangladesh relations in 1971, when Bangladesh's founding political party, AL, was also a Soviet Union-leaning party. Therefore, it was hard for both capitals to find a common ground given their divergent political ideology.
But despite the US government's stance, the American people, in general, supported Bangladesh's independence struggle. After independence, Dhaka's attempt to create a socialist country further strained the US-Bangladesh relationship.
In the subsequent years, the bilateral relations in terms of trade, investment, and people-to-people connection have increased enormously. Bangladesh's recent economic success is primarily thanks to its RMG industry and remittance. The US is the largest market for Bangladeshi readymade garments and the largest source of remittance.
In the current context, US-Bangladesh relations also have a Myanmar dimension. Facing genocide in Myanmar, over a million of Rohingya are sheltered in Bangladesh with no visible solution. As Myanmar has now returned to military rule, any solution towards this end seems unlikely. In addition, the Bangladesh-Myanmar border is becoming increasingly tense and hostile.
Considering all, Myanmar poses an existential threat to Bangladesh's national security, but Bangladesh is not receiving the desirable assistance from its regional partners, including India, China, and Japan.
All these regional players are prioritizing realpolitik and are perceiving their interests better served by aligning with Tatmadaw -- leaving Bangladesh no option but seeking the assistance of extra-regional powers.
The US recently passed the Burma Act which may enable Washington to play a robust role in stabilizing Myanmar. The US provided unequivocal support to Bangladesh in sheltering over a million Rohingya population; thus, there is an emerging strategic convergence in US-Bangladesh bilateral relations in the security realm.
An enhanced US-Bangladesh strategic partnership would also help Dhaka to reduce its dependency on China, which has proven unhelpful to Bangladesh's problem with Myanmar.
There are two major obstacles to improving US-Bangladesh relations further. One is the political party in Bangladesh and the second is India's opposition.
India perceives that Bangladesh's extensive engagement with any major powers will displace its monopolized prominence in Bangladesh. In recent years, China opened an opportunity for Bangladesh to diversify its partners, but Delhi views China-Bangladesh relations at its own expense.
India, being resource constrained and facing unfavourable sentiment among Bangladeshis, welcomes US, Japan or even Russia to outcompete China in the areas where Delhi is unable.
But India does not welcome US presence in Bangladesh to any degree in which the US will appear as Bangladesh's number one strategic partner, displacing India's own preeminence in the country.
Finally, to understand Bangladesh's foreign policy, it is crucial to understand political parties' dynamics and preferences. Because Bangladesh, in its 51 years of existence, has failed to articulate any state policy as its foreign policy. The over-cited statement of so-called “friendship to all, malice to none” can't be counted as a policy by any means.
This one-sentence statement doesn't provide any policy goals, strategic planning, or modus operandi. At best, it can be counted as an unrealistic dictum. Therefore, in the absence of a state policy, all foreign policy decisions have been undertaken on an ad-hoc basis -- based on the political party's preference.
In sum, in the coming years, how Bangladesh will interact with China-India or the US will largely depend on what political party is in power. Unless Bangladesh can reach a national consensus on the question of core national interests, politicization of foreign and defense policy will continue at the expense of the nation.
Anu Anwar is a fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, and a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
