Elections for a new government in India have begun, and all opinion polls are unanimous in their expectations of the Bharatiya Janata Party, led by Narendra Modi, emerging as the largest party. The Congress, it is expected, will fare badly, with several polls having predicted its worst performance ever.
Whether the BJP’s numbers will be sufficient for it to form a government is still in some doubt, but the polls suggest that it will get enough seats to be able to find allies, and form a coalition.
A year ago, this would have appeared unlikely. The party was going through an open leadership tussle between Modi and his erstwhile mentor LK Advani. It was also facing the challenge of expanding its areas of influence.
In the last parliamentary polls in 2009, the BJP got 116 seats to the Congress’ 206. In several of the biggest states, it drew a blank, which was not unexpected, as it had no real presence in those places to start with. So, for example, it got zero in the following: Andhra Pradesh, which has 42 seats, Tamil Nadu, which has 39 seats, and Kerala, which has 20 seats. It got one seat in West Bengal out of 42. In the electoral heartland of India, the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which together have 120 seats, it got only 22.
The Congress, in contrast, managed to pick up seats from around the country. Its total for Uttar Pradesh and Bihar was only 23, but it pulled ahead thanks to good performances in Rajasthan, Kerala, and especially, Andhra Pradesh.
This time around, the tables are expected to turn in Rajasthan. Kerala continues to remain a battle between the Congress and the Left. However, Andhra Pradesh, which gave Congress 33 seats last time, is expected to be a disaster for the party this time. The state has been divided into two smaller states, Seemandhra and Telangana, and the division has decimated the Congress party there.
What will make the real difference, though, is if either of the major national parties can make a comeback in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Both of these states have been dominated since the 1990s by regional parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party of Mayawati, and the Janata Dal and its offshoots, the Samajwadi Party of Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Rashtriya Janata Dal of Lalu Prasad Yadav, and the Janata Dal (United) of Nitish Kumar.
The opinion polls say, the BJP is about to steal a march over these regional leaders in their own fortresses in the coming elections. This is remarkable; and if it happens, it may ensure a Modi government as the party has plenty of headroom to grow in these states.
With anything over 200 seats for the BJP in the house of 545, a Modi government is almost certain. However, if the party emerges as the single largest party but falls short of majority by a wide margin, its search for allies will have to go further. If Modi’s hardline image becomes a hurdle at that point, the party will have to choose between putting forward a more moderate face, and sitting in opposition.
What would a Modi government mean?
The country, and the world, is already eager about what a Modi government might mean. The BJP is typically described as “Hindu-nationalists” in most dispatches by foreign correspondents, and Modi himself is generally referred to as the man who was the chief minister of Gujarat when thousands of Muslims died in the 2002 riots.
Both of these statements are true, yet inadequate to explain the complex realities. In brief, the descriptor of “Hindu-nationalism” perhaps conceals more than it reveals in the present context. Modi has denied having any role in the 2002 riots, and consistently claimed he did his best to stop them. The truth of this remains contested and uncertain. He has been cleared by an investigation ordered by India’s Supreme Court, but there are allegations that the process had serious loopholes.
In the years since 2002, Modi has made sustained efforts to project himself as the man for development, and gradually played down his Hindu-nationalist image. What he has done, though, is reposition himself as a nationalist Hindu.
The party’s manifesto, which bears Modi’s image, was released belatedly on April 7. It starts and ends, on the first and last pages, with a promise of “sabka saath, sabka vikas,” which means, “with everyone, development for all.” It states clearly: “the only philosophy and religion of a government should be India first. The only epic of a government should be India’s constitution.”
In the last line, it explains that, “India First simply means nurturing and protecting all the elements which India is made of. It does not exclude anyone or anything.”
The manifesto includes a section titled “Minorities: Equal Opportunity,” that says “BJP is committed to the preservation of the rich culture and heritage of India’s minority communities alongside their social and economic empowerment.” It includes a promise of madrasa modernisation, which is being met with suspicion. However, there is already an existing madrasa modernisation scheme under the current government, and it was part of Manmohan Singh’s programme for the welfare of minorities.
It also reiterates two old BJP promises that have been contentious. One is a single line saying: “BJP reiterates its stand to explore all possibilities within the framework of the constitution to facilitate the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya.” The construction of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya has been a routine part of every BJP manifesto since 1998, when the BJP came to power under Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
The second is a commitment towards a uniform civil code. This is one of the directive principles enshrined in the Constitution of India, but it has never been implemented, except in Goa, where it has long been in force.
Narendra Modi presented the manifesto saying: “I want to make three promises personally – I will never be found wanting on hard work, I will not do anything for myself and I will not do anything with bad intent.”
This may well be true, but his intent is not the only factor to consider. In Modi’s case, how he reacts has been more important to how he acts.
Foreign policy: The great mystery
The Indian subcontinent is a troubled space, and is currently awaiting a major transition in Afghanistan. The good news is that Afghans voted enthusiastically, and there are prospects of a stable government being formed under a capable leader. The bad news is that independent assessments predict growing Taliban attacks, including one by a US based think tank working for the Pentagon.
The study by CNA, a non-profit research and analysis organisation, which was presented to the US Congress in February, says: “We conclude that the security environment in Afghanistan will become more challenging after the drawdown of most international forces in 2014, and that the Taliban insurgency will become a greater threat to Afghanistan’s stability in the 2015–2018 timeframe than it is now.”
Instability in Afghanistan will rub off on Pakistan, where extremists are already gaining ground. The relations of Pakistan’s “deep state” with such extremists are old and well known. That India has long been a target of attacks from Pakistani extremist groups is also old hat.
It is impossible to predict what might happen if there is a major terrorist attack on India with Narendra Modi at the helm.
If this scary eventuality is avoided, it should be business as usual. Modi has shown himself to be very keen on trade and investment and it is likely to extend to his foreign relations as well. The BJP in general is friendly towards business, and has major support from traders and industrialists.
The party’s manifesto promises: “Equations will be mended through pragmatism and a doctrine of mutually beneficial and interlocking relationships, based on enlightened national interest.” It adds: “Instead of being led by big power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond. In our neighbourhood, we will pursue friendly relations. However, where required we will not hesitate from taking strong stands and steps. We will work towards strengthening regional forums like the Saarc and the Asean.”
It is likely that any BJP foreign policy will be based on pragmatism and realism. It will also be shaped by a suspicion of the United States, at least initially. Modi has never visited the US, which had denied him a visa in 2005. He has however been to China and Japan, and is likely to expand ties with both of those countries, apart from other rising powers such as Brazil and South Africa.
Foreign policy in places where a domestic political angle exists is likely to be more complicated. This is the case with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In the case of Sri Lanka, Seshadri Chari, the head of BJP’s external affairs cell, recently expressed support for the Indian government’s move to abstain from a UN vote sponsored by the US condemning human rights violations against Tamils. However, the party’s state unit condemned the move.
In the case of Bangladesh, the complicating factors are West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee and migration from Bangladesh into India, apart from the possibility of Bangladesh territory being used by terrorist groups that target India. Attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh could also cast a shadow.
Mamata is politely described as a maverick here. She may prove to be beyond even Modi’s capacity to tackle, though he is a lot more assertive than Manmohan Singh, who she famously ditched on a trip to Dhaka.
Alleged illegal immigration from Bangladesh has long been a political issue in north-eastern India, and this is unlikely to change. The BJP president in Assam, Sarbananda Sonowal, is among those who cut their teeth in the “foreigners’ issue” agitation which was aimed at turfing out illegal migrants into that state.
The realities and myths of migration are something credible that Bangladeshi and Indian scholars ought to study jointly, to establish once and for all whether there is any illegal migration or not, and if yes, what the numbers are like.
The end of a dynasty?
In case Narendra Modi does come to power, Bangladesh and India’s minorities will have far less to worry about compared to his political rivals. The Congress is fighting these polls under the leadership of Rahul Gandhi, the son of Sonia and Rajiv Gandhi. If it hits a historic low, the Gandhi family’s grip on the party may loosen. There could be substantial defections. Rahul is keen to bring in his own people and methods, but is up against an entrenched old guard that bows low before him even as it quietly trips him. A bad defeat would probably bring some of this hidden opposition out into the open. It could potentially change Indian politics.
The rise of the Aam Aadmi Party as a national alternative is currently a work in progress. The party is unlikely to make too much of an electoral dent this time around, but it is establishing a nation-wide presence very rapidly. If the BJP becomes the natural party of power, it will be left to the AAP and Congress to fight for the opposition space at the national level.
Another set of people who would fear an outright Modi victory are the old guard in the BJP itself. Jaswant Singh, a former foreign minister and a senior party leader, has already been expelled. LK Advani and former party chief MM Joshi have been sidelined.
Even the extremist fringes of the Sangh Parivar would have cause for concern. In Gujarat, Modi has successfully marginalised the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and its leaders such as Pravin Togadia and Ashok Singhal. He is said to hold more influence on the RSS there than vice versa.
The Left liberal elites and the minorities are probably not the only ones hoping Modi falls short of his aspirational target of a simple majority for the BJP. A Modi sarkar would mess with established power equations in more ways than one.
