The failure of the erstwhile Bangladesh Rifles’ authorities to realise the depth and seriousness of the grievances – both long-term and short-term – among soldiers and address those were one of the reasons that led to the bloody mutiny in February 2009.
In 1991, members of the erstwhile Bangladesh Rifles revolted at a border outpost, placing a list of 19 demands. They distributed leaflets with their demands, and threatened to oust army officers from the force. The situation was resolved by sentencing the mutineers with light punishment.
In 2009, authorities at the BDR’s Pilkhana headquarters had come to learn about the jawans’ demands as they distributed leaflets, but they did not take the matter seriously.
The lessons from recent history were forgotten, resulting in the deaths of 74 people, including 57 army officers, in the mutiny at Pilkhana on February 25-26, 2009, a court has observed recently.
The court handed down death sentences to 151 former BDR personnel and a civilian on November 5 last year for murder and torture.
It said the prime intelligence agencies of the country – the Special Branch of police, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence and BDR’s own Rifles Security Unit – had shown negligence in dealing with the conspiracy and conspirators before the mutiny broke out. A few RSU members had links with the rebels and the officers failed to keep them under watch.
After the RSU members had found a leaflet in Pilkhana on February 21, they informed the officer concerned about it who in turn informed the BDR Director General. The DG ordered them to prepare counter-leaflets within a day and distribute them.
However, no such leaflets were ever made.
In its observation, the court said: “The BDR members had both rational and irrational demands. This court does not understand what made the authorities think that merely distributing counter-leaflets would resolve the problem.”
“Spreading leaflets was not a new technique for soldiers to air their grievances, especially before the annual parade. But it is true that the leaflets distributed before the 2009 mutiny contained clear threats to the officers. The authority failed to realise and evaluate the depth of those threats.”
The BDR authority also did not let other intelligence forces know about the leaflets and the threats. Some RSU members had connections with the rebellions.
The court said the paramilitary force had been commanded by army officers for 218 years and there had been a gap between the officers and soldiers since the very beginning. It was clear that the commanding officers did not trust their divisional BDR officers. A vested interest group used the dissatisfaction and mistrust to spread anger against the officers.
The court also identified some loopholes which had helped the rebels revolt. It said the BDR authority had acted unprofessionally in containing the mutiny and the rescue process. The BDR and the home ministry had lacked coordination, supervision and accountability.
Some jawans also tried to give their demands a political twist, while some former BDR members in the neighbourhood, their relatives and businessmen also helped the mutineers.
The court recommended that the authority should bring changes to its recruitment and promotion system.
A grade III employee, who is a soldier with an educational qualification including SSC, gets the chance to become a grade I officer as deputy assistant director but their educational background remains the same. They cannot cope up with a Captain who comes from the army on deputation. As a result, they suffer from psychological insecurity. Their salary structures also do not match.
The court recommended opportunity of higher education for soldiers and a probationary period for becoming a grade I officer. There should also be posts of second class officers.
The court also suggested 100% ration for the members of the Border Guard Bangladesh similar to what the army gets, and keeping the BGB members away from any monetary work like the Dal Bhat programme. To upgrade their mentality, the jawans should be trained properly and all BGB members should be provided housing inside Pilkhana.
“The practice of contacting with the force members by political leaders before elections should be banned. Thus political leaders cannot use them, and they cannot use political leaders. Their demands should be placed through proper channels, not through the political leaders.”
The retirement age should be refined and the yearly parade should be stopped. The army officers should be trained before they were posted in the BGB,” it said.
The government should check if there is any deep dissatisfaction in any force like the BDR.
