One of the most brutal massacres in the country's history took place on February 25-26, 2009, at the then BDR (now BGB) headquarters in Pilkhana, Dhaka.
In the BDR massacre, 74 people, including 57 army officers, were killed. Over time, various discussions have emerged about the motives behind this massacre.
After the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government on August 5, following student and public protests, many former army officers have spoken out about the Pilkhana mutiny.
Several have alleged that Sheikh Hasina and her party leaders were the masterminds behind the killings. Now, former army chief Moeen U Ahmed has also broken his silence on this brutal event.
Moeen U Ahmed, a key figure of the "One-Eleven" era, shared his account on his YouTube channel on Thursday.
For the first time, he spoke about "Operation Restore Order" and the BDR mutiny while currently residing abroad.
The former army chief said: "Since the fall of the autocratic government on August 5, some witnesses and family members of those affected by the BDR mutiny have shared their experiences. I also want to clarify my role."
He also mentioned that he has written a book on the BDR mutiny, which will be published soon.
Moeen U Ahmed recalled that when he ordered an investigation into the BDR mutiny, he was told: "When the government is already investigating this matter, why do we need another one?"
He further claimed that the army did not receive the necessary support from the government for their investigation.
The army's investigation committee, led by Lieutenant General Jahangir Alam Chowdhury (now the home affairs adviser), could not complete their work properly because many of those involved were in jail, and it was impossible to question them. Additionally, key individuals connected to the mutiny through various discussions could not give statements.
Moeen U Ahmed expressed hope that since Jahangir Alam Chowdhury would be able to reorganize the committee now and bring the culprits to justice.
Moeen also said that he had requested this after forming the government.
What happened that day in Pilkhana?
Recounting the events of that day, Moeen U Ahmed said that on the morning of February 25, 2009, at 7:30am, he was preparing to go to work as usual at the army headquarters.
At this time, his Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lieutenant General Sinha Ibne Jamali came to him and said: "We have some mortars that the army does not use. It's difficult for us to store and maintain them. But the BDR uses them. If they take them, it will be helpful for us."
Moeen said: "I spoke with General Shakil, the DG of BDR, and he agreed to take them. I believe at that point, he knew nothing about the impending mutiny. After that, CGS and I went to a meeting, which started at 9am. We became busy with the meeting. At around 9am, my principal secretary, Colonel Firoz, entered the room and informed me that something was happening in Pilkhana and that my instructions were needed. Shortly afterward, I tried to contact the former prime minister (Sheikh Hasina), but her phone was busy."
Moeen U Ahmed said: "Military intelligence informed me about the situation. Realizing the severity of the situation, I immediately ordered another army brigade to prepare for an operation without waiting for directives. The operation was named Operation Restore Order."
He said: "At 9:47am, I was able to reach the DG of BDR, Shakil, on the phone. He told me, 'During the Darbar, two armed soldiers entered the hall, with one standing behind me. Then gunfire started from outside. The soldiers in the hall left immediately. This seems to be planned, and everything is going according to the plan. I have sent the sector and battalion commanders to bring them back.' I informed him about the operation at that time."
Moeen U Ahmed further said, at 9:54am, he managed to contact the former prime minister. By then, she had received a lot of information about the mutiny.
When he informed her about the operation, she asked how long it would take to prepare the brigade. After being informed, she gave her approval. Despite some delays, the 46th Brigade started moving within an hour.
Meanwhile, the mutineers had set up defensive positions around the gates of BDR with rocket launchers, mortars, and other weapons.
When the first vehicle of the 46th Brigade approached the main gate at 11am, the mutineers launched a rocket attack on a pickup truck, killing the driver on the spot.
According to Lieutenant Colonel Shams, between 10:30am and 11am, the DG, deputy DG, Colonel Anis, Colonel Kaiser, and several other officers were shot dead. Our team reached the location after 11am.
The former army chief criticized the live coverage by private television channels during the mutiny, saying that the media's live coverage played a negative role in spreading the mutiny.
Moeen mentioned that Captain Shafik and his team of 355 RAB members arrived at Pilkhana before 10:00 am. However, despite requesting permission to enter Pilkhana, he was denied. Moeen believed that if permission had been granted, the situation could have been managed more effectively, and the damage would have been less severe.
Moeen said that at 11:45am, the PSO of AFD informed him that the government was trying to resolve the situation politically. The mutineers demanded that the army withdraw before any negotiations. If negotiations failed, a military operation would be conducted.
At 12pm, the PSO called Moeen and urgently requested him to meet the former Prime Minister at Jamuna. At around 1pm, former Minister Jahangir Kabir Nanak and Whip Mirza Azam went to Pilkhana for negotiations.
He also said that about an hour after he arrived at Jamuna, the Air Force and Navy chiefs were called.
After they arrived, they were informed that Jahangir Kabir Nanak and Whip Mirza Azam were bringing a group of mutineers to Jamuna, and the mutineers wanted a general amnesty.
The former prime minister (Sheikh Hasina) asked them to convey a message to the mutineers.
Moeen replied: "Many people have been killed. Their demands cannot be accepted."
He advised her to tell the mutineers: First, the killing of officers must stop immediately. Second, all detained officers must be released immediately. Third, the mutineers must surrender with their weapons. And fourth, there can be no talk of a general amnesty.
