Since Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago, most of the fighting has been on land. However, there has also been a less visible – but crucial – maritime dimension to the war across the full spectrum of tactical, strategic, economic and diplomatic considerations.
After land troops crossed the Ukraine border on February 24 2022, the Russian navy quickly secured control of the north-western Black Sea. This meant it could contribute to the air campaign against Ukraine by launching cruise missiles from the sea. This diversified Russia's attack vectors, thus increasing the chance of penetration by overwhelming Ukraine's air defence systems.
But Russia failed to translate this early dominance into strategic effects by opening a new front in Odesa. This has been attributed to the navy's subordination to the objectives of Russia's land forces, whose focus was elsewhere.
For its part, Ukraine was without an operational navy able to engage the Russian navy at sea directly. Its position was made all the more insecure due to the inability of its western allies to intervene at sea – because of the closure of the Turkish Straits and the risk of escalation in the case of any direct involvement of Nato ships.
But despite all this, Kyiv managed to undermine Russia's naval dominance by demonstrating innovation and initiative.
Sinking the Moskva
Its first major victory was sinking the cruiser Moskva on April 14. In addition to the prestige of sinking the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, this exposed the shortcomings of Russia's air defence onboard its surface ships.
The sinking of the Moskva demonstrated that the Russian navy could not operate safely near Ukraine's coast due to the threat from anti-ship missiles – both the Ukrainian-developed Neptune and western-supplied Harpoon missiles.
Creative opportunism
Things began to move faster in August as Kyiv launched counterattacks, especially in the south. As part of this shift in momentum, Ukraine adopted a bold strategy of harassing Russian naval assets. This included an attack on the Black Sea fleet's air arm at the Saky airbase in Crimea on August 9, followed on August 20 by a drone attack on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.
Maritime drones were then used on October 29 to target Russian warships in Sevastopol, highlighting the constant state of insecurity of the Russian navy, which was put in full “defence mode.”
The maritime supply chain
Russia's denial of the north-western Black Sea has been enough to prevent the shipment of grain and other agricultural products. This has led to increased food prices, hurting many developing nations. But Russia's own lack of control over global supply chains has also contributed to the effectiveness of sanctions targeting its military-industrial base.
All major shipping companies bar the Chinese have suspended their operations to and from Russia. But this significant collective effort has come at a cost to shipping companies. Declining trade with Russia and the ban on Russian flagged, owned or operated ships has also affected business in western ports.
So, while the war's maritime dimension is limited, it still demonstrates that Kyiv can seize opportunities created by Russia's weakness at sea. And in a lengthy war – as in other lengthy conflicts – this could eventually tip the scales in Ukraine's favour.
Basil Germond is Professor in Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University. A version of this article previously appeared in The Conversation UK and has been reprinted under special arrangement.
