Bangladesh’s global reputation and strategic importance are quickly evolving. It is now recognized not just as a poor or disaster-prone nation but as a country full of potential and opportunities.
The July Uprising of 2024 played a significant role in this transformation when the London-based The Economist named Bangladesh the ‘Country of the Year’ for 2024.
This major political shift led to a free and fair election and a peaceful transfer of power on February 12, 2026, marking a key democratic milestone. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won the election with widespread public support, as anticipated.
In its election manifesto, BNP introduced the policy of “Bangladesh Before All,” which advocates for a foreign policy rooted in “equality, fairness, pragmatism, and mutual interests.” The outline of its key objectives and priorities can be summed up in the following manner:
- The motto ‘Friends, Yes; Masters, No’ as the basis of its foreign policy, highlighting reciprocity and mutual benefits to ensure a win-win outcome;
- Emphasis on economic diplomacy to rebuild the nation, supports
- A swift and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya to Myanmar;
- Advocating for revitalizing regional organizations while focusing on Bangladesh’s unique positionality connecting the South and Southeast Asia as well as on the mouth of the Bay of Bengal;
- Developing a modern defense system to protect the country’s territorial integrity.
What is ‘Bangladesh Before All’?
Bangladesh has long been labeled a small state, not only due to its size but also because of its limited ability to shape agendas.
With nearly 180 million people and a demographic dividend, it cannot truly be considered a ‘small’ country. While its capacity to assert itself and develop strategies that prioritize its interests gradually increased, there was inertia and a lack of initiative.
Without political leadership, changing this outlook was impossible. In discussions on Bangladesh’s foreign policy, the common excuse of being a ‘small’ country persisted, even though foreign analysts now see Bangladesh as an ‘aspiring middle power’.
While the Interim Government aimed to change this mindset and advocated for Bangladesh’s foreign policy grounded in mutual faith, trust, and reciprocity, the BNP’s declaration of ‘Bangladesh Before All’ aimed to reposition Bangladesh as an active participant in global politics with a focus on creating win-win outcomes.
BNP’s strategy was officially confirmed as ‘Bangladesh Before All’ in the Joint Communiqué released after the Bangladesh-China bilateral meeting on June 26, although it is often also known as a ‘Bangladesh First’ policy.
Within weeks of assuming office, however, BNP faced challenges imposed by forces beyond its control -- the Iran crisis and the Hormuz blockade. Its immediate priority shifted towards ensuring the safety of its citizens living in the Middle East and the Gulf region, and simultaneously, ensuring a steady supply of energy from multiple channels. In the next several sections, I outline the key developments of BNP’s foreign policy.
Political and diplomatic rebranding
Bangladesh has been able to offer a revitalized nation and win international acceptance after securing election as the 81st president of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for a one-year term beginning in September 2026.
It was after 30 years that Bangladesh achieved such a diplomatic success. The country was also elected unanimously as Vice-President of the 114th International Labour Conference (ILC), based in Geneva, Switzerland, and as a member of the Executive Committee (ExCo) of the Commonwealth Board of Governors for the 2026-28 term.
Bangladesh’s success at the global level reflects its image and results from its tireless diplomacy. Tied with this is how Bangladesh is viewed and assessed at the international stage. Amid the Iran War, it was Bangladesh’s ships that were first granted permission for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz it being considered among Bangladesh’s six ships were the first to be granted permission to cross, as they were on Iran’s list of “friendly nations”, while the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs S Paul Kapur began his South Asia trip in Bangladesh. The country’s carefully calibrated diplomacy projected an image of being willing to advance its national interests in a manner that left its image untarnished.
During the funeral of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, each participating country was given a verse. The verse given to Bangladesh was from Surah Al Ahzab 33:23, saying, “Among the believers are men who have proven true to what they pledged to Allah. Some of them have fulfilled their pledge with their lives, others are waiting their turn. They have never changed their commitment in the least.” This indicated honoring those who remain loyal and steadfast to their commitment against all the odds, as Bangladesh showed in its resolve.
Bangladesh’s growing interconnectedness with the rest of the world is evident in its swift and relentless diplomatic efforts. One fly in the ointment, however, is how to make regionalism work. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was originally BNP’s brainchild. The dream to see a South Asian identity was offered by Bangladesh, which, due to the lack of political trust, has not been realized.
While Bangladesh may have options to move beyond the region and connect to Southeast Asia via land routes, as I shall discuss later, South Asia remains its primary region. In a hurry to catch the dream of the ASEAN -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- Bangladesh should not sacrifice SAARC.
Strategic considerations
In an era of plurilateralism and short-term alliances, Bangladesh has also prudently diversified its options, without losing faith in its original partners or hesitating to forge new ones. Bangladesh’s decision to move beyond the India-China binary and prioritize its national interest was reflected in its choice of Malaysia as the first country for Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s bilateral visit.
While one might find that the visit to Malaysia served as a strategic distraction for this purpose, one must also dispassionately consider that it was one of the first steps in Bangladesh’s endeavor to diversify its labour market towards Southeast Asia from its traditional market in the Middle East and the Gulf region. The next destination for the PM was China, where he not only participated in the Summer Davos and held bilateral talks with Premier Li Qiang and President Xi Jinping but also opened up new tangible areas of cooperation.
The bilateral relationship between the two countries saw a steady development from being a ‘Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership’ (2008), ‘Closer Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation’ (2010), ‘Strategic Partnership of Cooperation’ (2016), and ultimately to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership’ (2024). Bangladesh PM’s visit to China is set to elevate the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership by building a Bangladesh-China community for the long-term tangible sustainability of the bilateral relationship. There are two other distinct long-term milestones of this visit: connectivity and a new model for developing a bilateral relationship -- the 2+2 model.
In modern international politics, while locations are important, what is more significant is the strategic use of the location. Connectography is the buzzword, and Bangladesh is not lagging behind, as aptly demonstrated in its relationship with China.
The older Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) has turned into not only a thing of the past but also strategically improbable. As the Hormuz crisis reemphasized the need for multiple lanes of communication -- land or sea -- to ensure an uninterrupted flow of trade and commerce, China has offered a new proposal for Bangladesh to expand its connectivity to the east via Myanmar.
The overland connectivity among the three countries would not only ensure China’s easy access via a 1,700-kilometer road to the Bay of Bengal but also reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca; for Bangladesh, it would provide much-needed access to Southeast Asian markets and an opportunity to recalibrate its bilateral relationship with Myanmar, although a formal decision on the part of Bangladesh is still pending.
The 2+2 is an interesting formulation in the parlance of diplomacy, in which foreign and defence are seen as interconnected domains, and policymakers therefore adopt a conjoined approach. Since introducing the policy, China has offered to remodel its bilateral relationship with Bangladesh using this framework, making Bangladesh the third country.
Bangladesh-United States (US) economic, political, and strategic relations under the BNP government are seen as ‘pragmatic’ and reflect a ‘Bangladesh Before All’ strategy with ‘trade realism’.
While the Reciprocal Trade Agreement (RTA) remains controversial, Bangladesh’s lawmakers remain positive that the deal would bring positive benefits for Bangladesh in the long run. The US also sees a shift in its strategy towards Bangladesh from aid to boosting trade and investment. Bangladesh’s growing young workforce provides an opportunity for skill development, and the growing consumer market has not escaped the US’s attention either.
The two nations have agreed in principle to enhance defense cooperation and may work toward negotiating and signing key treaties, such as the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). India and Pakistan have already signed the ACSA, while Pakistan is included in GSOMIA. Bangladesh will need to proceed cautiously before officially signing both agreements.
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations are also seeing new heights with the defense relationship solidifying and people-to-people contact increasing. The resumption of direct flights, the easing of the visa regime, and the offer of scholarships to students are certainly beneficial for both countries. Bangladesh no longer sees itself confined to South Asia and has sought to diversify its relations on the international stage. It has already developed strong relationships with countries such as the UK, the EU, Japan, Australia, and Türkiye, and continues to seek new partners.
Global instability and ensuring energy security
Following the Iran crisis just two weeks after BNP’s takeover, Bangladesh's immediate priority was to ensure energy security amid severe power outages and the shutdown of fertilizer plants due to gas shortages.
While global media predicted that Bangladesh might soon run out of fuel, the government responded with a range of internal and external strategies. Its oil diplomacy expanded to include importing diesel and electricity from India, sourcing hydropower from Nepal, and purchasing crude oil from Russia -- refined in India before reaching Bangladesh -- under a 60-day US waiver.
After the initial shock subsided, fuel prices increased. To manage the energy crisis, Bangladesh secured USD 2 billion in emergency funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Although a bipartisan 10-member committee was established to handle the crisis, experts warned that domestic energy policy needs a comprehensive overhaul to address internal gaps and focus on long-term goals rather than just immediate responses.
Economic and development diplomacy -- A fresh perspective
Economic diplomacy is a phrase from an earlier time. Bangladesh has quietly but gradually expanded its economic diplomacy towards a “development diplomacy.” Since its economy now relies on trade rather than aid, the country needs to invest in infrastructure and capacity building. It has carefully identified key stakeholders and their expertise, establishing a unique development partnership.
Rather than conducting open international tenders for strategically important infrastructure projects, Bangladesh depends on the expertise and commitments of its development partners. Plenty of examples exist to illustrate this point.
When it came to building its deep-sea port, metro rail (MRT) project, and expanding the third terminal at its national airport, Bangladesh chose Japan. Bangladesh is one of the four countries to which Japan has extended its overseas security aid (OSA) -- a significant shift in Japan’s foreign policy outlook. Bangladesh’s sole nuclear energy source, soon to be operational, is being built by Russia at Ruppur.
China is aiding Bangladesh’s defense sector by transferring technology for local arms manufacturing, potentially enabling Bangladesh to export arms once it meets its own requirements. As part of Bangladesh-Türkiye defense cooperation, a drone factory is set to be established soon. Investments are also flowing into Chittagong port from Sweden, Denmark, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.
Investment has become a priority in Bangladesh, which is actively exploring new sources. China has emerged as a potential partner, as Bangladesh announced plans to establish its first foreign investment office in Beijing. The era of private investment, introduced by President Xi Jinping’s visit to Bangladesh in 2016, reached its full potential in 2026, when the private sector committed to invest about $9 billion.
China is also set to establish its first economic zone in Chattogram, a plan first mooted during President Xi’s visit and slated for 2026. Consequently, Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed to establish a China-Bangladesh Mongla Port Economic Zone and a Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram, boosting investment opportunities from China.
For trade, Bangladesh has expanded its diplomatic outreach to Africa, where new markets are being explored, as well as its trademark work in the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces (UNPKOs).
Critical challenges to monitor
Bangladesh shares the world’s fifth-largest land border with India, and it has its perks for both countries. Bangladesh-India relations has seen its ups and downs, but never before had it experienced such a rocky ride as with the ousting of the Awami regime in August 2024.
The Indian polity has yet to fully assess and comprehend Bangladesh’s reality. The geographic proximity often led to an automatic understanding of Bangladesh without checking its ground realities. Developing functional bilateral relations poses a significant challenge for the current government. However, it is important to recognize that neighboring countries cannot easily ignore each other. Shared rivers, cultural ties, and history mean that proximity also offers various mutual advantages.
In the economic sector, Bangladesh faces several key challenges. It must diversify both its export products and its trading partners. As exports of ready-made garments (RMG) to traditional markets decline, the country needs to focus on exploring new markets.
Additionally, Bangladesh has begun seeking new labor markets due to political instability in its usual destinations, such as the Middle East and the Gulf. Easing business conditions for new investment is yet another challenge for the current government. The Rohingya issue remains one of the key challenges, given that the source of aid is reducing, and Bangladesh needs to find a sustainable solution soon.
The maritimity of the Bay of Bengal
The BNP has taken power at a time when the world is going through a profound shift. Old ties and friendships are being reevaluated, and newer bonds are being forged. Many are invoking the Gramscian warning to situate the current order using his words: “[t]he old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”
Bangladesh faces a challenging period but benefits from its maritime access to the Bay of Bengal. The importance of maritimity in the 21st century is well recognized, and with Bangladesh’s open access to the Bay, major powers are increasingly paying attention to it.
As its maritime identity strengthens, Bangladesh becomes more central to accessing South Asia. The country’s expanding political, economic, and strategic relationships with the US, UK, EU, China, Japan, Australia, and Turkey exemplify this growing engagement. In its 55 years of foreign relations, Bangladesh has hedged and balanced, but the time has come to promote its strategic interests with a Bangladesh Before All approach.
Lailufar Yasmin is Professor and former Chair at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
