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Fraudulent activity

Update : 24 Dec 2014, 06:03 PM

I was visiting a former colleague at Banco Nacional de Mexico in Mexico City. Following a large-scale loan fraud in Banamex, a wholly owned subsidiary of Citigroup, he was pulled by nobody less than his group CEO from Tokyo, where he was posted just few months ago. He was given a marching order to fix the process and bring order to this highly profitable and renowned Citi entity. I asked the gentleman what had happened.

It was a loan fraud of more than $500m, committed by an oil pipeline maintenance company, Oceanographia, the supplier to the state-owned oil corporation Pemex. It was a receivable financing for the bank, where the company forged the documents and withdrew large chunks of money year after year with mounting credit exposures. There was, of course, a process guide for these transactions, but officials involved didn’t follow them and the supervisers kept their eyes shut. Oceanographia collapsed on February this year.

Subsequent regulatory investigations revealed that the Banamex staff stopped calling Pemex to verify invoices submitted by Oceanographia, thus reducing the level of scrutiny they were supposed to do. This particular incident was alleged to have happened due to a middle manager being fired in 2012, which also saw 12 of its employees getting the axe and the CEO resigning. Regulator CNBV (commission nacional bancaria y de valores) resolved this to be bank’s institutional failure to have proper control in place and fined Banamex 30m pesos ($2.2m).

Citigroup CEO Mike Corbat, known and respected for his brilliant work regarding distressed assets management, recently announced a $1.5bn investment over the next four years to improve technology systems at Banamex. My friend, while accepting this to be an outcome of inadequate controls and violations in lending rules, also lamented about reducing number of bank officials with “end to end” processing knowledge these days.

What does it mean to us? Too much of external focus on running after profits on the part of bank seniors or CEOs is not allowing them to focus on their core activities: To ensure a robust internal control, process sanctity to avoid any surprises from the market, therefore avoiding embarrassment by the shareholders, and most importantly, reprimand from the regulators.

The distinguished governor, and his senior colleagues at the then Bangladesh Bank, who authored the “core risk management guidelines” would have been very perturbed to know how few commercial banks could still avoid putting up a “process guide” for transactions. More shocking for them would have been to see how central bank inspectors can be hoodwinked by branch managers or their seniors at the head offices of commercial banks.

Go and see the “top bosses” at commercial banks. They will tell you about the importance of “audit trail,” “transaction monitoring,” the presence of a “maker-checker” process, verification of a transaction instruction, or large debits through subsequent calls (as well as the recording of the conversations), or relevant indemnities held.

On the other hand, they will miserably fail in their senior “hindsight” of the large transactions and, more shockingly, most of them do not have a “transaction process guide” in their banks to ensure the integrity of officials involved in transactions. On many occasions, the banks do not have the right people performing internal control, audit trail, or transaction verification.

People are frequently dumped into these jobs or, most of the time, these people are sent after a single bout of training, but they are not allowed to ensure a better “control environment” in their banks. Installations of the latest technology and have also added to the laxity in commercial banks, where junior, computer literate people can take their seniors, but not IT-friendly people, “for a ride.” Most commercial banks in Bangladesh do not put necessary importance on internal audit and, even more importantly, internal control.

Not exclusive to local commercial banks, large foreign commercial banks have also been victims of serious frauds committed by the staff, where clients’ accounts were debited and their staff accounts with another bank credited, wrong debits in the client accounts or transactions not in conformity with clients’ instructions or as per delegated authority.

There is also increasing evidence of trade fraud, cheque fraud, or forged documents in connivance with the junior and senior staff of the banks. At times, the ignorance, or knowledge gap, of the officials, including the “top gun,” put the bank on the dock resulting in the loss of clients’ trust.

These cases aren’t just about financial loss, as they have serious implications on the banks’ reputation as well, due to lack of control or breach of control. Detection of such forgeries does impact the share price, and banks in many cases are forced to pay hefty penalties for such “lack of control.” Control lapses make clients jittery about their bank – an institution totally built over trust.

It is therefore high time that seniors in the Bangladesh’s banking industry focus more on a “robust control environment” for their respective banks. Supervisors should be trained well, so should the managers. There should be a “Chinese wall” maintained between the transaction processors and the transaction approvers.

CEOs should engage in risk management, including operations risk management as their prime responsibility, not the public relations. A bank’s board must ensure the existence of a proper “risk management guideline” covering credit risk, market risk, and operations risk.

The audit committee should do regular reviews of large transactions and ensure compliance with set guidelines. Regular training and up-skilling can only help avoid surprises as well as undesired losses in commercial banks. I know for certain that Bangladesh Bank would also want this. A tighter, forward-looking control environment is the only recipe for a better bank management. 

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