The mutual belligerence among the major powers with respect to the crisis in the Caucasus, Syria, and recently in Ukraine, raises questions whether the cold war symptoms are truly gone forever. Over the last one and half decades, a clear pattern of competition between the Western powers and Russia can be recognised. The same can be said about the China and the US in case of East and South China Sea stretching up to the crucial Indian Ocean region.
There are natural quests about the post-communist polarisation; especially why there are still serious issues between the West and Russia. The China vs the West and allies (led by the US) tension, almost perpetual, regardless of China’s gradual embracing of capitalism and free market and some grassroot level electoral practices is also an issue worth examining .
During the fall of communism, Russia became somewhat democratic and progressively opened its market. Capital became largely free of state control, in a way. After the fall of Soviet Russia, the overwhelmingly biggest member of the abolished union inherited the superpower legacy of the erstwhile communist confederation, although practically it became more of a Eurasian regional power as most of its global clout diminished.
A couple of decades has passed since, but even today there is a consistent detachment between core Europe and Russia, and also a bitter rift between the US and the latter. Russia, very much a European nation, by most measures, isn’t welcomed in Europe or in its union.
No one has even ever talked about the latter, despite periphery countries like Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria – serious contenders in the pipeline. The EU is expanding rapidly in the Slavic east but never cast their eye with any good demeanor on the perpetual big brother of the Slavs – the Russians.
There are some explanations in favour of the European scepticism about Russia notwithstanding Russia’s transformation from socialism. Russia is not a proper democracy as per Western measures. It holds elections regularly and perhaps without direct rigging, yet the nation hasn’t so far embraced the ideals of liberty that prevails in Western Europe and North America.
There seems to be a shadow state inside the visible edifice of body politik and a strongman in the person of Vladimir Putin rules with an iron fist. He calls the shots almost singularly on all important matters and often political institutions, civil society, media – all these instruments of modern checks and balances seem immaterial.
His grip over his party, the state establishment, and so on is so strong that when he had to vacate the position of the president for a term due to constitutional obligations, after his initial two terms, he took over as prime minister and everyone knew where the power centre lied.
Interestingly, the Russians themselves don’t seem too dissatisfied with the state of affair of their political system and the unquestionable clout of the modern era czar Putin. To grasp a correct picture, one needs to understand that Russia was in turmoil after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In those years, there was no stable political order, nor any established party system – essential for modern democracy.
There were infightings between the presidency and the Duma, the Russian parliament, and bloody secessionist struggles in the Caucasus. The Russians, already depressed with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and their relegation from the status of a global superpower, were terrified about the prospect of further tearing up their vast federation. Also, the economy was in shambles, and life for ordinary citizens became real hard.
Putin, the former KGB operative, after taking over the presidency, gradually brought things back in order, to some extent, at the cost of liberal democracy. That’s where his acceptability within Russia and unacceptability in the West lurks. Russia hasn’t become part of the new world system sufficiently. Both politically and economically and still retain some strategic free play.
Again, Russia still has disproportionate sums of strategic arsenals and a correspondingly strong military mostly due to its Soviet legacy and the aspiration for restoring lost pride. She may not be a global superpower in the old way, but certainly a Eurasian power with considerable strategic clout. That’s another source of unease of the West.
Also, there is no great urge amongst Russian people to be a part of Europe – unlike their many other smaller Slavic brothers. Many Russians consider they are rather a competitor of the EU in that continent. Watching the ever-expanding Nato in its own Western frontiers, the Russian Bear thus wants to retain some essential bit of strategic space.
Nato on the other hand aims to secure as many East European countries as possible by bringing them in the fold of Western Bloc/Free World. All these together explain the genesis of the new cold war. Conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ukraine, etc, seem to the proxies of that.
But this is a much-regionalised cold war – sometimes spilling out of the region in a limited way like in Syria’s case. The new cold war isn’t a globally harmonised one like its precursor in the communist era. But there is one more regionalised cold war too. That’s in Asia Pacific Indian Ocean trans-region and it’s between the US and its core and strategic allies in one hand and China on the other.
India holds a key balance in this context though, and has its own aspirations outside the US designs, adding new dynamics to the twist. There are some similarities between China and Russia in the question of democratisation and getting attached with the world system. But militarily, China’s case is in reverse. It’s the second largest economy of the world, but with a disproportionately weaker military.
China’s crucial trade and energy routes are still at the mercy of the US navy. But as China strives to enhance militarily, that evokes another kind of worry among the US and its democratic allies of Asia. Both the camps exercise a degree of caution in their steps, yet the undercurrent of another brewing cold war can be felt.
The good thing is, this new cold war lacks the intensity and pervasiveness of the old one – largely due to the end of the ideological battle between capitalism and communism. The concept of a capitalist welfare state has negated the misplaced romanticism around socialism for the foreseeable future at the least.
Whatever else China might be, it’s certainly not a communist country anymore. The domains of this cold war are regional or trans-regional at the best; certainly not global. Whatever may be the course of this new cold war, it is projected and expected that humanity won’t revert to those insane days of the erstwhile cold war that nearly brought the world on the verge of a third world war.
