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The curse of cronyism

Update : 19 Feb 2014, 09:06 PM

A gentleman came down all the way from the World Bank, Washington DC, to discuss and determine the possible intervention points in state-owned banks following the Hall-Mark debacle. He had all the sincere interest to streamline Bangladeshi banking, especially the state-owned banks.

I thought, even if the government had placed the best economists, civil bureaucrats, businessmen, or politicians as directors or chairmen, the state-owned banks couldn’t be fixed. It is a structural issue. We need to hit hard at the way state-owned banks run their risk management, process and produce information or data, manage profitability or distribution channels, and more importantly, recruit and promote people. The good part was that we both agreed that the best intervention point would be IT capacity-building in state-owned banks.

Bangladesh has too many state-owned banks. However, their market share, as well as efficacy, is shrinking. More private sector commercial banks are eating into the country’s banking space. Even after 42 years of independence, much intervention by development partners, state-owned commercial and development banks are synonymous with inefficiency, corruption, large classified loans, low profitability, poor risk management, inefficient human resources, inept delivery platforms, and failure to ensure banking services to the common people.

The Ministry of Finance is being forced to divert hard-earned tax money to pay for the inefficiency and corruption in these state-owned banks. These days, none of the good borrowers with good business intentions go to state-owned commercial banks. State-owned development banks have hitherto been used to attend to the delinquent but populist approach of subsequent governments. Their interest rates were lowered to ensure money flowing to the hungry streams of the economy and priority sectors.

These banks never went for optimum capacity modeling, hence remained burdened with excessive, inefficient, and corrupt manpower. None of them could play the desired role for financial inclusion, or for bringing banking services to the poor. They kept on bleeding with large non-performing loans and thereby negative net worth.

Bangladesh Bank kept on refinancing them due to their low internal cash generation or asset and liability mismatches. The Ministry of Finance was forced to recapitalise them at frequent intervals through budgetary allocations or one-time block allocations.

Ever since independence, subsequent political rulers wanted to earn popularity by waiving agricultural loans, or granting favours to their political loyalists through disbursement of industrial loans. This did not help our agriculture or industrialisation.

On the contrary, it did help the unpopular government or corrupt members of parliament to stay in power at the cost of the national exchequer. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) or NGOs were never granted enough leeway by the governments to play their due roles. They were forced into political cracks.

It was a tough situation here. Suggestions of corporatisation or privatisation of the select few state-owned banks would have been treated as almost anti-state by many within the policy-planning architecture. We kept mum and the national balance sheet kept on bleeding for the misdeeds of these state-owned banks. Development aid was forced into this space, depriving other priorities.

Financial sector reform almost failed to streamline the state-owned banks. The World Bank wanted to help in bringing in minimum possible efficiency in the major state-owned banks, recapitalise them, corporatise them, maybe help them take the capital market listing route for long-term sustainability.

 The subsequent finance secretaries and ministers subscribed to the idea but lacked adequate energy to drive this process. They had to face unprecedented resistance from the political leadership, their cronies, and most shockingly, a part of the intelligentsia, even economists.

The interim caretaker government progressed quite a bit in that direction. Large state-owned banks were made public limited companies. The corporatisation process was put in motion. Finding out strategic investors to recapitalise these banks was being talked about like the China banking sector restructure model.

But everything was put on hold with the taking-over of the new government. The new board forced these banks to realign their strategies to be more pro-people, without looking at what was happening in other similar countries. In the name of being pro-people, these banks seriously compromised with their risk management, internal control, compliance, or even minimum possible governance standards.

One can rest assured that this exercise of recapitalisation of major state-owned commercial banks is likely to continue with the new government, or even future governments, unless we stand up and say – enough is enough.

The finance ministers would be forced into appointing political cronies in the state-owned bank boards, the management would be told to disburse loans to the political loyalists’ otherwise bankrupt entities, and the banks would remain low-capitalised with poor risk management and weak information technology infra-structure.

We have Sonali Bank, Janata Bank, Agrani Bank, and Rupali Bank. We have Bangladesh Krishi Bank, Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank, and Bangladesh Development Bank. We Have Prabashi Kalyan Bank, ANSAR-VDP Bank, and Karmashangsthan Bank. We also have BASIC Bank.

All are owned and run by the state. More are coming. There has been talk of a women’s development bank, and a freedom fighters’ bank too. Do we need so many SOBs? No. Did it help us in financial inclusion? Not really. Will it help us in the future? It won’t. We need to change our track. We need to look back and move forward.

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