Two World Bank reports, published less than 11 months apart, illustrate the increasing fragility of Bangladesh's development gains.
The November 2025 Poverty and Equity Assessment documented a decline in national poverty from 37. 1% in 2010 to 18. 7% in 2022.
The Bangladesh Development Update, released on October 6, 2026, presents a troubling reversal: National poverty is estimated at 22.5% in FY 2025-26 and projected to reach 22.8% in FY 2026-27.
The latest update also estimates that approximately 2.1 million additional people fell below the international poverty line of $3 per day during FY 2025-26.
This is a distinct measure from the national poverty rate. Both indicators point to deteriorating household welfare, although neither represents a new household survey count. This distinction is important when using these figures to assess government performance.
The central question is whether Bangladesh can pursue accountability without undermining productive businesses and the livelihoods they support. When political retaliation damages factories or obstructs legitimate commerce, workers bear costs that have not been imposed by any court.
A fair assessment requires acknowledging that the crisis did not begin in August 2024. Inflation, foreign exchange shortages, and import restrictions had already weakened the economy.
Banking vulnerabilities accumulated over many years due to weak oversight, connected lending, and governance failures. The poverty assessment also found that growth had become less inclusive after 2016. Recent global energy disruptions have added further pressure.
However, inherited conditions do not absolve the government of responsibility. Governments must be assessed on whether their actions contain existing weaknesses or exacerbate them.
The World Bank identifies financial fragility, energy constraints, weak revenue mobilization, and uncertainty as obstacles to recovery. Protecting lawful business activity and maintaining public order are essential components of an effective response.
Growth slowed from 5.8% in FY 2022-23 to 4.2% in FY 2023-24, then to 3.5% in FY 2024-25, and is estimated at 3.4% in FY 2025-26. The slowdown therefore began during the Awami League regime.
Moreover, FY 2025-26 spans both the interim and the elected government, with the latter assuming office in February 2026. Attributing the entire year's performance to either administration would misrepresent the chronology.
Nevertheless, the destruction of industrial assets after August 2024 deserves direct scrutiny. The looting and arson at Gazi Tires in Rupganj on August 25, 2024 became a disturbing example of the failure to protect a business associated with a former minister.
Reports of missing people require careful investigation; they should not be presented as a confirmed death toll. The destruction itself, and its consequences for employment, are sufficient grounds for concern.
A March 5, 2025, Prothom Alo report recorded 95 permanent factory closures across major industrial areas during the preceding seven months, affecting 61,881 workers.
Its explanation extended beyond political violence: Financial distress, insufficient orders, attacks on politically-connected businesses, and owners going into hiding all contributed. The report identified 33,244 job losses across 14 factories in Beximco Industrial Park. These losses are included in the broader total and should not be counted as an additional figure.
This evidence supports criticism of inadequate protection and industrial disruption. However, it does not establish that every closure resulted from retaliation. Maintaining this distinction strengthens the argument by focusing attention on failures that authorities could reasonably have prevented or mitigated.
An owner accused of corruption should be subject to investigation, asset recovery where justified, and a fair trial. Employees, suppliers, and customers should not automatically lose their livelihoods or contracts.
Where legally permissible and commercially feasible, professional administration or restructuring can preserve a viable enterprise while the courts determine liability. These arrangements must protect creditors and prevent the concealment or diversion of assets.
Nor should the preservation of employment serve as a justification for rescuing every indebted conglomerate with public funds. Some businesses may be insolvent or reliant on privileges that cannot continue.
The objective should be orderly restructuring, transparent decision-making, and payment of workers’ lawful dues. Political identity should neither confer immunity nor substitute for evidence.
Achieving this requires decisions at the level of individual enterprises. Authorities should distinguish funds suspected of being criminal proceeds from those necessary for lawful operations. Restrictions should be justified, proportionate, and subject to review.
Workers need clear information on wages and compensation, while lenders require reliable financial statements and a viability assessment.
Without this discipline, a campaign against wrongdoing can spread losses throughout an entire supply chain and undermine confidence in legitimate enforcement.
The broader deterioration in public order reinforces this concern. In its year-end 2025 reporting, Ain o Salish Kendra recorded at least 197 deaths from mob violence during that year and reported at least 293 since the interim administration began.
The latter was a cumulative figure reported before that administration ended, not a final count for its entire tenure. These deaths demonstrate a serious failure of protection, although they cannot all be classified as political retaliation.
Human Rights Watch’s January 2025 report also documented the resurgence of abusive security practices and reprisals against individuals perceived to support the Awami League. Its warnings about arbitrary arrests and indiscriminate criminal complaints underscore the importance of due process.
Accountability loses credibility when allegations supplant investigation or when individuals are treated as guilty by association.
Economic consequences arise through identifiable channels. Damage to factories disrupts production and deliveries. Uncertain legal treatment may discourage lending and investment. Workers who lose wages reduce their spending, affecting shops, transport operators, and other local businesses.
These mechanisms provide compelling reasons to protect enterprises, although the World Bank’s aggregate figures do not quantify the distinct contribution of political retaliation.
The investment indicators are concerning. Private sector credit growth fell to its lowest level in 33 years. Net foreign direct investment declined by 15% in FY 2025-26, while new equity investment fell by 70. 3%.
Weakness in the financial sector, energy shortages, and global conditions also influence these outcomes. These figures are warning signs of a challenging investment environment, rather than evidence of a single political cause.
The earlier poverty assessment recorded nearly two million fewer employed people between 2023 and 2024 and projected a further decline of 0.8 million in 2025. That projection should not be treated as a subsequently verified outcome. Its broader message remains relevant: Weakening employment and purchasing power threaten households with limited capacity to absorb shocks.
There are also achievements to acknowledge. Remittances reached $35.6 billion in FY 2025-26, reserves improved, and average inflation eased from 10% to 8.7%.
More transparent recognition of problem loans is necessary, although the reported non-performing loan ratio of 33.2% in June 2026 demonstrates the scale of the remaining repair effort. Macroeconomic stabilization is valuable, but it must translate into productive investment and employment.
The elected government now bears responsibility for recovery. It should protect viable firms through lawful restructuring, investigate industrial arson regardless of political affiliation, and review cases through independent scrutiny of the evidence.
Bank restructuring requires credible deadlines and a fair allocation of losses. Reliable energy supply and stronger revenue collection should also form part of the recovery agenda.
Households need protection while these reforms take effect. About half of the poorest remain outside social protection programs. The World Bank estimates that consolidating food subsidies and combining the Family Card with better targeting of existing cash programs could lift millions out of poverty.
Bangladesh need not choose between justice and jobs. It must pursue justice through institutions capable of protecting both public funds and lawful livelihoods.
The promise of dignity after the uprising cannot be fulfilled if ordinary workers repeatedly bear the costs of their employers' politics.
The writer is a US-based policy analyst and freelance consultant on financial risk management.
