When 171 factories in Habiganj Industrial Park shut down on a single day and one and a half lakh workers go home without wages, it is no longer an energy issue. It has become a national livelihood issue.
The report published on August 28 claiming that Bangladesh had to buy LNG at $22.35 per unit on the spot market while the contract price was around $9 to $10.40, and that an extra Tk500 crore was spent for just three days of gas, has shocked many.
Whether the exact figure of Tk500 crore is precise or not, the underlying pain is real. Anyone who visited Gazipur, Narayanganj, and Savar-Ashulia in the last two weeks will confirm -- looms are silent, dyeing machines are cold, and export orders are being cancelled.
As concerned citizens, we should not get trapped in the debate of who said what. The right question is: Is this true, and what should we do about it?
Three facts are undeniable.
First, our dependency
Almost 37% of our daily gas now comes from two floating terminals in Maheshkhali. This is not a diversified energy mix; this is a single point of failure.
When one ship of Excelerate Energy caught fire on July 21, the whole industrial belt from Habiganj to Narayanganj felt the tremor. A country of 170 million people cannot afford to keep its industrial future hanging on two rented ships.
Second, the contract model
The build-operate-transfer model with a daily capacity charge of $454,000, payable even when no gas is supplied, is unusual in any competitive market. The logic of capacity charge exists worldwide, but it must be paired with heavy penalties for non-supply and strict performance guarantees.
We, the public, still do not know what those guarantees are. The 2016 contract was signed for 15 years. The ship hired was built in 2005. By the time we own it in 2032, it will be 27 years old -- effectively scrap in marine engineering terms. Who approved this asset valuation? On what basis?
Third, the planning failure
If it is true that Qatar informed as early as March that it would supply 20 cargoes instead of 40, what did Petrobangla and the energy division do for five months?
Why was there no contingency? Why was a spot purchase needed at double the price in August?
Even if there was no corruption, this is a textbook case of poor planning that costs the exchequer hundreds of crores.
This is where the citizen's stand must be clear and non-partisan.
We are not interested in scoring political points against any individual. Personalization of the crisis actually helps the system hide. If we make it about one person, the system that allowed such a contract to be signed remains untouched. The next government can do the same with a different person.
What we should demand is institutional reform.
One, full disclosure. The government must explore and publish the full contracts of both FSRU terminals -- Excelerate and Summit -- on the Petrobangla website. Not a summary, but the full contract including capacity charge, O&M charge, termination clause, and insurance liability in case of fire or accident. Let energy experts, journalists, and citizens read it.
Two, an independent energy audit. Not an internal committee of Petrobangla. A panel comprising an international LNG procurement expert, a chartered accountant, and a retired Supreme Court judge should audit all LNG spot purchases from January to August 2026. How much was bought, at what price, from whom, and who authorized it? The report must be public within 60 days.
Three, cost pass-through protection for small industries. Large groups like BSRM can absorb a few days of closure, but a small dyeing factory in Madhabdi or a weaving factory in Sirajganj cannot. Every day of closure pushes them towards becoming a loan defaulter. Bangladesh Bank must issue a special forbearance for gas-crisis-affected industries. We must also ensure that the extra cost of emergency LNG is not directly passed on to small industrial consumers.
Four, long-term correction. We must not repeat the same mistake. The permanent solution to the gas crisis is not more expensive LNG terminals.
It is:
- aggressive exploration of our own onshore and offshore blocks -- which was neglected for years;
- revisiting the power sector's gas consumption -- inefficient captive power plants waste more gas than modern combined cycle plants; and
- a transparent bidding policy for future terminals where the lowest tariff, not political influence, wins.
The most painful part of this crisis is the human cost that is not visible in the $22.35 figure. In the fisheries sector alone, reports say fish worth Tk15 crore died because aerators could not run without gas-based electricity.
In a household, a mother cannot cook. In a factory, a worker earning Tk12,000 a month does not get paid if there is no production. This is the real looting -- the looting of hope.
As citizens, our stand should not be "pro-Awami League" or "pro-Pinaki." Our stand should be pro-transparency.
If the allegation of Tk500 crore looting is false, the government can prove it by publishing invoices. If it is true, the money must be recovered and those responsible must face trial, regardless of how powerful they are.
The gas crisis has given us a rare window. For the first time, people are asking questions about capacity charges, FSRU contracts, and spot market purchases -- topics that were once confined to closed-door meetings. We must not waste this window by turning it into a Facebook fight.
Let us demand documents, not slogans. Let us demand audit, not abuse. Let us demand energy security, not political revenge.
That is the only way to ensure that in August 2027, we are not writing another op-ed about another gas crisis.
Brig Gen Qazi Abidus Samad, ndc, psc (retd) is a freelance contributor.
