Pundits of international relations and strategy are coy about speaking explicitly about “World War Three,” perhaps out of concern that doing so invites accusations of alarmism or even war-mongering.
Yet the possibility of a catastrophic global conflict has long occupied serious thinkers. Nearly seven decades ago, C Wright Mills -- a sociologist best known for his analysis of power structures -- published The Causes of World War Three in 1958, just 13 years after the end of World War II.
His book was not a technical military analysis but a work of engaged public sociology. Drawing on his concept of the “power elite,” Mills argued that decisions of war and peace were concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group: Political leaders, senior military officials, and corporate executives.
These actors, he believed, operated with interests and perspectives often detached from the broader public. Mills feared concentration of power as he wrote, “at the top an elite whose power probably exceeds that of any small group of men in world history.”
Mills wrote during the height of the Cold War, when tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were intensifying. The nuclear arms race was accelerating, and both sides were building unprecedented destructive capacity.
For Mills, this was not merely a rivalry between states but a systemic condition -- a “permanent war economy” -- in which institutions and incentives increasingly normalized preparation for large-scale conflict.
Dwight D Eisenhower, who served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, later became president of Columbia University before assuming the US presidency. Mills was teaching sociology at Columbia during that period.
Years later, in his farewell address as president, Eisenhower famously warned against the growing influence of the “military-industrial complex,” a concept that closely parallels Mills’ critique of the power elite.
Mills’ central argument was stark: Modern societies had developed political and economic structures that made large-scale war more likely, not less.
As power became increasingly centralized, fewer decision-makers controlled vastly greater destructive capabilities, particularly nuclear weapons.
The danger, he argued, was not only deliberate war but also miscalculation, escalation, and what he called “crackpot realism” -- a form of strategic thinking that treats the unthinkable, such as nuclear war, as a rational policy option.
His concerns remain eerily relevant.
Contemporary accounts of high-level decision-making -- whether fully verified or not -- sometimes suggest how close leaders may come to considering extreme measures.
Even the possibility that nuclear weapons might enter strategic deliberation echoes Mills’ deepest fears: That the logic of power, rather than moral restraint, could dominate decision-making at critical moments.
Mills also recognized the importance of propaganda in shaping public opinion. In his time, this meant traditional media and state messaging. Today, the information environment is far more complex.
Digital platforms and algorithm-driven systems amplify narratives at unprecedented speed and scale. The emergence of artificial intelligence adds another layer, enabling highly targeted and persuasive forms of communication that can influence both conscious beliefs and subconscious perceptions.
This evolution intensifies Mills’ concern about how populations can be mobilized -- or manipulated -- into supporting conflict. He even used the term, “management of consent.”
Other thinkers have grappled with similar dangers.
George F Kennan, writing under the pseudonym “Mr X,” warned of the dynamics of containment and escalation in great-power rivalry.
Bertrand Russell, one of the most prominent anti-war intellectuals of the 20th century, argued that nuclear weapons posed an existential threat to humanity.
Meanwhile, Herman Kahn explored nuclear war scenarios in an attempt to understand -- and thereby prevent -- catastrophic outcomes.
Yet the question remains: Does awareness alone prevent disaster, or merely make us more articulate about its risks?
In more recent years, Graham Allison has popularized the concept of the “Thucydides Trap,” derived from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. The idea suggests that when a rising power threatens to displace an established one, the resulting tension often leads to war.
Allison applies this framework to the relationship between the United States and China, identifying structural stress points that could escalate into conflict.
Interpretations of this dynamic vary widely. Some analysts view China as a rising power challenging US dominance, while others argue that the global system is evolving toward a more complex, multipolar order in which China remains a reluctant super power.
China may be more interested in rule-based global order than a super power-centric world. Whether the United States is in decline or simply adjusting to new realities is itself a matter of debate.
What is clear, however, is that shifts in power distribution tend to increase uncertainty -- and with it, the risk of miscalculation.
Recent geopolitical developments have further intensified these concerns. The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a major rupture in the post-Cold War order. Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned early in the conflict that it could escalate into a broader war, even suggesting at one point that a global conflict might already be underway in some form.
Others, including investors and commentators such as George Soros, have also warned that the war could become the opening stage of a larger confrontation.
At the same time, economic conflicts -- such as tariff wars and technological decoupling -- have added new dimensions to global rivalry. While not equivalent to military conflict, these struggles can destabilize international systems and deepen divisions between major powers.
The idea of a multipolar or “polycentric” world is gaining traction as an alternative to both unipolar dominance and bipolar confrontation.
In theory, such a system could distribute power more broadly and reduce the likelihood of direct great-power war. In practice, however, multipolarity can also introduce complexity and unpredictability, as multiple actors pursue overlapping and sometimes conflicting interests.
Mills’ warning ultimately remains unresolved. The structures he identified -- concentrated power, militarized economies, ideological rivalry, and technological escalation -- have not disappeared.
If anything, they have become more intricate. Whether the world drifts toward another global conflict or manages to build a more stable order depends not only on leaders but also on the institutions and norms that constrain them.
The question Mills posed in 1958 still lingers: Is catastrophic war an avoidable choice, or the logical outcome of the systems we have built?
Habibul Haque Khondker is a sociologist and columnist.
