In the recent history of elections in many democracies, it has largely been the everyday concerns of ordinary people that have mattered most, paramount among them being the economic crises.
Politicians in developed Western countries, including former US President Bill Clinton, had to heed what his campaign team famously termed “the economy, stupid,” recognizing its popular appeal despite the many other political challenges any government must confront.
In Bangladesh, by contrast, even ordinary people tend to think, dream, and talk about politics. This is not to mention the political leaders’ fondness for high-sounding words and phrases, often accompanied by unrealistic or vague promises designed to captivate their audience.
Most politicians generally shy away from dealing directly with economic issues, despite their relevance and practical implications, as such matters are often considered issues of “high thought,” supposedly beyond the grasp of common people.
Instead, politicians tend to believe they are well-versed in their craft as full-time, unpaid professionals, though this is not always the case.
It must be acknowledged that political parties and leaders are compelled, particularly during elections, to make pledges aligned with popular demands for development. When choosing parties and candidates in parliamentary elections, voters sometimes prioritize economics over politics.
For them, “economics” means inflation, employment opportunities, local roads and physical infrastructure, education and healthcare services, social protection, and similar concerns.
Will this be the case in Bangladesh’s upcoming parliamentary polls?
It is my conviction that politics and economics have, paradoxically, displaced each other, despite the critical importance of both for the next government to be elected shortly.
The Bangladesh economy has been devastated by corruption, mismanagement, and the oligarchic policies of Sheikh Hasina’s fascist regime. Democratic institutions were also undermined, depriving people of the opportunity to elect their leaders independently.
Now that the country is once again preparing for elections, political parties and candidates are competing to make attractive promises related to economic policies and measures to be undertaken by the next government.
In doing so, however, the main contenders for power are inviting greater challenges for themselves. At the same time, the critical economic issues created under the Hasina regime, issues that may soon turn into full-blown crises, appear either to have escaped conventional political attention or to be deemed insufficiently attractive to sway voters.
Otherwise, we might have seen concrete bailout programs, or at least serious discussions about them by now.
There is no clear estimate of how much money will be required to provide equitable opportunities for those deprived in recent years.
Which sectors will absorb more than two million new jobseekers annually? How will a universal healthcare system be ensured, quality education delivered to all, and liveable cities, towns, and villages created for a vast population?
We have little idea about the sources of revenue needed to channel Tk 500,000 crore to rescue banks and financial institutions plagued by defaulted loans and loan forgery. Is there any viable formula for servicing foreign debt that now exceeds $100 billion? Nobody knows whether the country will ever recover the billions of dollars siphoned abroad. Corruption has become a new normal in our lives, and an effective remedy is yet to be in our sight.
It is also clear that the government to be formed after the forthcoming elections will not enjoy the luxury of a “honeymoon period,” during which newly elected leaders are spared of harsh criticism.
Instead, it will have to assess in advance the economic impact of its decisions and their political consequences, or demonstrate the courage to take politically difficult decisions in pursuit of economic goals.
The key crises facing Bangladesh’s economy today have arisen from immoral and illegitimate political decisions, actions, and maneuvers of the Hasina regime. This reality stands in stark contrast to Vladimir Lenin’s observation that “politics is the most concentrated form of economics.”
In Bangladesh’s case, the economic crisis has been a byproduct of repressive politics manifested in mass killings, enforced disappearances, attacks on the opposition, and the silencing of dissent. These policies were pursued to satisfy personal self-aggrandisement, to patronize goons and oligarchs, to install sycophants in key positions, and to serve India’s hegemonic interests in exchange for political support.
Thus we saw the consequences -- embezzlement of bank funds through loan forgery, plundering of public resources via large infrastructure projects, a heavy burden of foreign debt, looting of small investors’ money through stock market manipulation, extortion of ordinary citizens through fiscal and market interventions, and the implementation of discriminatory policies. All these have produced long-term negative political fallout that must be addressed by the next elected government, if democratic governance is to be restored.
In the 1970s, some global development planners described Bangladesh as a “test case of development,” implying that if this country could succeed, any nation could. The infamous characterization of Bangladesh as a “basket case” as attributed to Henry Kissinger nevertheless overshadowed an entire generation of policymakers.
Bangladesh has since proved such assessments both wrong-headed and heartless, demonstrating remarkable resilience in the face of challenges to life and livelihoods. Progress has largely been driven by the people themselves through individual effort and collective contribution often in spite of governance failures and political disruptions.
When the country began reducing poverty at an accelerated pace, some commentators labelled this success a “development puzzle,” failing to anticipate obvious social and economic gains. This progress was most pronounced during periods of democratic governance, not under the autocratic regimes often mischaracterized as eras of growth. Political parties seeking electoral victory were therefore compelled to make economic pledges to woo the voters.
However, after three consecutive rigged elections and the eventual fall of the Hasina regime, the conduct of a free and fair election has become the foremost national priority.
Voting patterns may now change as political polarization has shifted following the collapse of one party, the now-banned Awami League, within what had long been a bipartisan system involving the BNP, despite decades of political rivalry. Also, the crisis the economy may face anytime soon, is actually the outcome of ill politics.
Thus, the next puzzle confronting Bangladesh is less about economics than about politics, given the ongoing transition. Why is this a political puzzle? Because, there are quite a few unknowns and invisible realities on the political front at present.
Even ahead of the 12 February 2026 election, candidates may not fully grasp the preferences of female voters, the expectations of politically and economically marginalized groups, such as religious communities, the evolving outlook of the generation born in the 1980s and 1990s, or the demands of the new and first-time voters.
This is a historic turning point at which the identity of the election winner may matter less than the broader trajectory of Bangladesh’s politics.
As the aftershocks of the July 2024 revolution are yet to be fully felt, the country may see the beginning of the new politics some people talk about and dream of, after the elections.
Khawaza Main Uddin is a journalist and writer. He can be contacted at [email protected].
