The first step to solving a problem is to understand it. Generally, we spend a lot of time and resources solving a problem rather than understanding it. Here in the intellectual circle, everyone talks about building consensus on the Rohingya policy. I would urge building a consensus to understand the Rohingya crisis from a military dimension.
The Rohingya issue was a social issue in Myanmar society, but instead of politicizing it, they militarized the issue and wanted to resolve it militarily. Now, let us understand Myanmar’s society and its strategic culture relating to the Rohingya.
The government does not represent the whole population. Sub-actors are more cohesive than nationalism. Myanmar society as a whole respects hard power and military power. Almost all of their ethnic groups have an armed organization. Often, differences are resolved by hard power play.
The kinetic power determines your seat at the table. Respect for religious gurus (monks) is profound, and superstitions influence.
Myanmar’s “strategic culture” relating to the Rohingya issue is important to recognize and appreciate why it has developed this way. They believe that the Rohingya are non-ethnic to Myanmar, and their assumptions say that the Rohingya have migrated to Myanmar in recent times. These have resulted in non-acceptance, causing hostile behaviour towards the Rohingya.
Moreover, their common experience exhibits that the Rohingya have high growth rates, and inter-community marriages are growing. More so, there is an accepted narrative propagated by the monks that there will be Islamization from the West, meaning Bangladesh.
So, all this has shaped their collective identity. This collective identity is “security anxiety,” which has been considered an existential threat. This is why Myanmar society in general, and the junta in particular, decided to address the issue militarily, with the political aim that “Myanmar is free of Rohingya.” The military applied its ends, ways, and means in 2017, and so here we are today with the Rohingya crisis.
The current problem was created by a General’s daughter and a General. Now, resolving the Rohingya issue depends on two generals. Arakan Army (AA) chief, Major General Twan Myat Naing, and TATMADAW chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
The AA is the mirror image of TATMADAW. The Myanmar Army was established before the state of Myanmar, and it has dominated the country since then. The AA was established before its political wing, the ULA, and the AA has dominated its politics.
It may be remembered that military under military over time turns into brutal force; TATMADAW is no exception. Will the AA be an exception? And a brutal force respects a brutal force. (case example: Iran-Israel).
As stated earlier, this Rohingya crisis has been a military operation orchestrated in five phases by TATMADAW, and phase 6 will be executed by geopolitical players:
Phase I -- shaping up operation: When General Min Aung Hlaing took over as Chief of Defense in 2011, he said, “We have an unfinished job to be done.” Since then, the media campaign, propaganda, disinformation, demonization of the Rohingya, and the anti-Muslim movement led by militant monks had intensified. These were all shaping up and conditioning the environment for military operations.
Phase II -- preliminary operation: Many times, before carrying out a major operation, a preliminary operation (prelim operation) is undertaken to facilitate the major operation. In 2016, in the name of an “insurgency-clearing operation” in the Mayu Range, about 90,000 Rohingya were sent to Bangladesh. The purpose was to study the reaction of the world community in general, and Bangladesh in particular. They fathomed the weakness of Dhaka in its political, diplomatic, and military capability -- especially the will to resist.
Phase III -- major operation: In 2017, genocide and ethnic cleansing caused 1.1 million Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.
Phase IV -- mopping up operation: Now, the AA is expelling remnants of Rohingya in bits and pieces until “Arakan is free of Rohingya” (political aim).
Phase V -- conflict termination: In this phase, civil order will be restored, administration will be set up, reconstruction will be carried out, and the lands of the Rohingya will be surveyed and distributed among the Rakhine community. Even if someday the Rohingya go back to Myanmar and to their villages, getting back their lands would have legal complications.
Phase VI -- geopolitical phase: This phase is not part of the “Myanmar Military Operation” but would be mobilized geopolitically by global, regional, and local geopolitical actors shaped by INGOs and NGOs. There will be a synchronized move to assimilate the Rohingya into Bangladeshi society in exchange for lucrative offers.
What are the options, and what consensus is needed in the Bangladesh strategic community?
Diplomatic, political, and military options are on the table, but neither Bangladesh nor the international community has the appetite for military options. More so, there is a capability gap in our military, and there is a lack of ‘strategic culture’ in our society.
As such, I do not see palatability for a military option, nor the military capability gap being narrowed soon.
Let this be amply clear, when I say military option, it does not necessarily mean going to war with Myanmar. It primarily means developing credible deterrence to circumvent wars and to avoid being humiliated (Myanmar has violated our airspace more than 19 times and crossed our international border a couple of times with impunity; however, we only complained).
Developing credible deterrence would meaningfully constrain their Phase IV (when I say developing credible deterrence, it does not mean building up military capability only; it encompasses a wide range of capacity across the spectrum).
Let's come to a consensus that it is a military crisis from the Myanmar side, and a military solution is one of the options. Let’s also come to a consensus to send a message to the Myanmar Military outfits that even strategic patience has a shelf life.
Whatever consensus we make, three things are important to AA/TATMADAW/Myanmar: Consequence, incentive, and motivation. We need to build our options around these.
My final thoughts are built around these three factors. A clear political message needs to be given; if Myanmar and AA pursue continuing with phase IV of their operation, there is a consequence that could be greater than the gain by pursuing their “mopping up operation.” People of Rakhine (irrespective of community), in general, and AA in particular, are suffering from a logistics deficiency.
Suspending or moving away from “mopping up operation” may be incentivized with administration, logistics, and humanitarian support, officially or unofficially, from the Bangladesh side.
As proposed by Professor Imtiaz Ahmed, a mini-Marshall Plan could be worked out with global and regional partners so that there is a dream for economic emancipation, development, and a better life for the people of the tri-border region (India, Bangladesh, Myanmar). That could motivate people from this conflict zone to collaborate.
Lieutenant General (Retd) Mohammad Mahfuzur Rahman, PhD, is Chairman, Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies.
