Doubts drive various minds as to whether the Jatiya Sangsad elections will be held in February 2026 as per the just-announced roadmap -- or at all shortly thereafter. The reasons for doubting the government and the Election Commission’s pledge to hold the parliamentary polls vary.
First, rumour-mongers have recently attempted to discredit the August 5, 2024 political changeover, sowing suspicion about the current political process and the intention of the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government to ensure a smooth power transition. Second, perceived slow progress in reforms and a lack of clarity in the actions of the assigned authorities and concerned parties have created confusion in the public mind -- somewhat substantiating the saboteurs’ claims.
Unfortunately, the political stakeholders who contributed to the July Revolution appear to be on the receiving end of this confusion and criticism, rather than setting the national agenda for change and steering the country’s democratic forward march through a free, fair, and credible ballot.
Thus, the nation is yet to find a palpable solution to the systemic political crisis that emanated from over one-and-a-half decades of fascist rule. The vacuum created by the fall of the Awami League as the ruling party has not been filled by democratic political elements willing to flourish and serve the people.
Apparently, the post-revolutionary dominant political forces do not disagree on the relevance of reforms and the trial of the fascist ruler Sheikh Hasina and her collaborators, nor on the holding of elections -- the key terms of reference for the Yunus administration. However, visible differences of opinion among legitimate political parties regarding reform agendas and their implementation have created further confusion in the public domain.
This reality is admired by the defeated forces of the revolution -- Hasina’s Awami League and its allies such as the Jatiya Party of late dictator General Ershad -- as a way to justify their past misdeeds.
A series of activities on the sidelines of politico-administrative affairs -- such as meetings between influential figures, political and criminal incidents, and hushed conversations among opinion leaders -- have added fuel to the fire, eroding confidence among citizens and investors alike.
Given the situation following the rather unique revolution, Awami League’s auxiliary forces are attempting a comeback, as seen in their sudden processions and social media campaigns aimed at negating the facts of massacres, enforced disappearances, political repression, massive corruption, abuse of power, and election rigging during Hasina’s rule.
This indicates that Hasina’s men, ousted by a popular uprising, are trying to exploit sharp differences of opinion on critical electoral and reform issues to revive their banned party. AL leaders, activists, subsidiary forces, and grassroots supporters show no remorse for the atrocities committed by their regime, instead maintaining a vindictive attitude toward the change-makers.
If, hypothetically, they regain political power, few believe they would spare any of the currently active political forces -- be it the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, or the National Citizens’ Party. The leaders and workers of the first two have already experienced the regime’s repression, while the founders of the latter fear annihilation if their fate falls into the hands of the fallen rulers, as suggested by leaked conversations.
At the very least, AL supporters wish “all the worst” not just for their rivals but also for the country, as part of their strategy to demean Professor Yunus and his potential legacy. Hasina’s unwillingness to allow free and fair elections proves that her party had already become a depleted political force with a diminished support base among Bangladeshi voters. It has metamorphosed into a frustrated group, isolated from conscientious people and broader society.
In such circumstances, there are reasons to suspect that anarchy may be unleashed. Revolutions in other countries have often led to anarchic consequences when post-revolutionary actions failed to overcome challenges posed by counter-revolutionary forces -- especially when supported by opportunistic groups within the pro-revolution camp.
In Bangladesh, the revolution occurred without a paramount leader or a single party. No revolutionary council of ministers was formed. Though joined by students, youths, and the masses, the revolution was handed over to non-revolutionary and even non-political forces. These actors failed -- or refrained from -- forming a national government to carry out necessary reforms and prosecute the murderers and corrupt elements of the fallen regime.
Now, political forces are entangled in unnecessary altercations over who deserves credit for ousting Hasina, although most opposition parties -- excluding Hasina’s domesticated ones -- played their part in the prolonged movement from 2013 to 2024 for the restoration of democracy. Ideological differences among them are natural, but their communication gaps and rhetorical hostilities offer the AL a glimmer of hope for regaining its position in power politics.
Furthermore, if political tensions heighten and the gap between election-bound parties widens disproportionately, ongoing reform programs may stumble, and the governance crisis that haunted the nation may persist even after the elections.
Therefore, it is time for pro-revolution forces to forge a new political alliance to pursue a common national agenda and counter the visible and invisible fascist forces that held the people hostage for over a decade and a half. Doing so does not require sacrificing party interests or ideologies -- only a commitment to national reconciliation and a more vibrant democratic statecraft.
Even in competitive elections, they can form a loose coalition to defeat disguised candidates of the banned Awami League and its collaborator Jatiya Party, securing an electoral mandate aligned with the revolutionary mandate of 2024.
Such a national coalition can take responsibility for advancing the people’s aspirations reflected in the revolution and the reform initiatives of the interim government. Urgency in reaching a complete agreement on the July Charter is a case in point.
To pass the baton of the agenda to political authorities and leadership aspirants -- especially to a new generation deprived of voting opportunities -- the interim government may expand the Consensus Commission by incorporating political leaders. A transition team comprising members of the Advisory Council and new faces with clear political vision may be assigned to work with the next elected government during its first three to six months to help implement reform programs and re-institutionalize democracy.
Khawaza Main Uddin is a journalist. He can be contacted at [email protected].
