The term "performance legitimacy" emerged in political discussions following remarkable economic developments in countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and the People’s Republic of China, where, according to Western analysts, democracy somewhat fell short of liberal, Western standards. The Economist Intelligence Unit, an affiliate of The Economist magazine, ranks Singapore as either a flawed democracy and China as authoritarian. South Korea has graduated to a “full democracy.”
China is not bothered by such grading; instead, they focus on their own business and tackle issues in their own way. The idea of legitimacy in China, historically, was based on the concept of the "mandate from heaven." Rulers, as they claimed and many believed, were bestowed legitimacy by none other than God. If rulers received their legitimacy from God, questioning it would be tantamount to challenging God’s authority. This system provided political stability, more or less.
Max Weber’s three types of legitimacy included traditional (where "mandate from heaven" fits), rational/legal (democratic), and charismatic. Weber did not discuss performance legitimacy. Performance legitimacy is a type of legitimacy mainly derived from the economic performance of the government. Economic success becomes the primary basis for a government’s legitimacy, with the quality of democracy being a secondary consideration.
But what is economic success? In democracy-deficient countries, it is measured in terms of GDP growth rate, infrastructural development, poverty reduction, and improvement in people's well-being. As long as these indicators are favourable, governments draw legitimacy based on their performance.
Performance as a basis of leadership, where legitimacy is not used, has always been a feature in the corporate world. You become the CEO of Google or Baidu not because of a mandate from heaven or a democratic election but because of your performance. As modern, development-oriented states become more corporation-like, performance legitimacy gains traction.
However, are states, meaning governments, like private corporations? Corporations are accountable to their shareholders; governments are accountable to their people. "The people" is sometimes a misnomer. Who are the people? All major political parties, religious leaders, and NGOs claim that the people are with them.
Nothing short of pure, unadulterated democracy (an impossibility, I must say) can settle that question. Mostly, a democratic election gives us an approximation of popular mandate. People do not vote; voters do. And not all voters. I have encountered voters in the US as well as in Bangladesh who would talk politics endlessly but on election day stay home and not move to the polling stations, not because of their political convictions but simply because of their laziness.
American political scientists call this political apathy. What is more interesting is that many well-meaning political scientists contend that political apathy is good for democracy. Too much political mobilization may not be good for the health of democracy. But that paradox should not detain us here, except to say that political mobilization has become a thorny issue in the context of social media-driven politics where populism threatens democracy.
Let’s return to performance legitimacy. Can performance legitimacy be sustainable unless backed by electoral or legal/rational legitimacy in the Weberian sense? Weber’s formulations remain ideal types, which happen to be his other famous idea. Truth be told, all political systems combine elements of performance legitimacy with legal rationality. A democratically elected government cannot just sit on its laurels claiming it has a popular mandate; it must deliver on its promises of economic development and other political commitments.
The big question is: Is economic development enough to buy legitimacy? Meaningful economic development must come from below. What do people want? Different people want different things. A commuter wants transportation. Most people want affordable prices of goods in the market. Many want affordable housing, as they also want affordable and high-quality healthcare.
Above all, most people want the rule of fair law. By fair law, I mean a system of law based on the idea of equality. The sole purpose of the law must be the protection of the fundamental rights of the people as well as delivering equal justice.
The selective use of law and the weaponization of law undermine the very principle of the rule of law. A serious look is urgently needed to deal with this issue to make performance legitimacy meaningful.
Countries that enjoy performance legitimacy boast of their administrative and financial institutions. Without unassailable institutions, performance legitimacy cannot be achieved. Repairing and building institutions must be the primary task of any government seeking performance legitimacy.
Reforming, strengthening, and rebuilding institutions are matters that bring the subject of governance to the centre stage. Good governance can be assured only when corruption is reined in. Unrestrained corruption makes a mockery of the idea of good governance. In order for a government to get the designation of good governance, utmost priority must be given to tackling corruption.
Once resilient, impartial, and task-oriented institutions are built, only then can the meaningful fight against corruption begin. This is where political will is of great significance. A determined will to achieve a goal will produce good results; political slogans and rhetoric alone will not do the job.
Once true performance legitimacy is achieved by ensuring a good governance, it can pave the way for legitimacy in a comprehensive sense that includes legal/ rational, democratic legitimacy as well.
Habibul Haque Khondker is a sociology professor at Zayed University, Abu Dhabi who previously taught at the National University of Singapore
