On the fateful day of March 25, 1971, the Awami League negotiators, comprising Dr Kamal Hossain, Tajuddin Ahmad, and Syed Nazrul Islam, were waiting to hear from the emissaries of General Yahya Khan. Pakistan's negotiators were led by Lt Gen SGMM Peerzada and included the ex-chief justice Alvin Robert Cornelius and a member of the army's Judge Advocate General Corps.
Whereas the Bengali negotiation team consisted of two elected civilian representatives and an eminent lawyer, the junta's team had a two-to-one majority of army officers. The governor of East Pakistan was also a member of the military. The junta could not appreciate a reasonable political settlement. And there simply could not be a military solution, as events proved later on.
In his interview with Philippe Sands, Dr Sharif Bhuiyan, and Nico Schrijver, Dr Hossain recounts that the Awami League team was waiting for the whole day on March 25 for that fateful phone call.
The day before on March 24, Dr Hossain bluntly told Cornelius, “look, let's not waste any more time, let's meet at breakfast and prepare the final draft. Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujib can then finalize the text and announce the settlement.” General Peerzada interjected by saying “no, no, wait, we will telephone you, we have to discuss the draft among ourselves.” Peerzada was acutely aware that a military operation was in the offing and stalled the talks between Dr Hossain and Cornelius.
The Awami League had proposed a perfectly amicable way out of the crisis. A provisional constitution would be in place during a transitional period to allow elected lawmakers to convene a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing a new constitution. The Bengali team had been negotiating constitutional arrangements clause by clause.
Pakistan's first constitution of 1956 was repealed by the military. The second constitution of 1962 was tainted by its lack of popular legitimacy. It was clear to all that a new constitution had to be enacted.
The military's aversion to civilian leadership of the constitution-making process resulted in a genocidal war, which could have been avoided. A rare opportunity to bring about a settlement in concert with the political, legal, and militaristic powers at play was lost.
The people of Bangladesh had no other option but to assert their right to self-determination. They were on the right side of history.
A sovereign state in Bengal had been an aspiration for decades. Even if the constitutional process had taken its own course, the people of Bangladesh would have inevitably asserted their right to self-determination. The people of Bangladesh did so in an epic manner and their valor will always be an inspiration. It was their date with history.
Earlier in 1969, the Awami League proposed constitutional reforms, including amendments to the 1962 constitution. Ayub Khan rebuffed those proposals before his resignation on March 24, 1969.
Eventually, both Bangladesh and Pakistan ended up with new constitutions.
Bangladesh enacted its constitution within a year of liberation on November 4, 1972. The Bangladeshi constitution was a revolutionary document, with a broader and expansive bill of rights than the 1956 and 1962 constitutions.
The bill of rights in Bangladesh's constitution has been in alignment with universally accepted formulations of human rights. Pakistan's present constitution was introduced in 1973, a year after independent Bangladesh enacted its own constitution.
Today, Bangladesh should consider how to build on its past achievements and its epic date with history in 1971. Has the time come for a new set of reforms? Will today's Awami League provide the impetus for a new era in Bangladesh's journey?
Umran Chowdhury works in the legal field.
