On October 15, 2022, a bipartisan resolution was introduced in the US Congress to recognize Pakistani atrocities during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 as “genocide,” and for the condemnation of Pakistan for its role in the genocide and a call for the prosecution of its perpetrators. While the resolution is yet to be passed, the step itself has been a watershed moment in the history of US-Bangladesh relations considering the role of the US in the 1971 war.
Questions have invariably been raised regarding the goals and motivations of this step, which has been undertaken so long after the actual events. The possible motivations can be understood under the lens of the changing geopolitical and geo-economic situation, using the dynamics of US-Bangladesh bilateral relations.
First of all, the US initiative to recognize the 1971 genocide has to be viewed through through the viewpoint of US priorities in the changing global and regional contexts and the ongoing transformations in US relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan.
During the Cold War and the height of the War on Terror, the US greatly valued Pakistan's position, first as a “strategic buffer” against possible Soviet expansion in South Asia and the Arabian Sea, and then as a “springboard” for the US-led fight against transnational terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Accordingly, Washington sought to maintain good relationships with Islamabad in those times and consequently, the US did not feel the necessity to recognize the 1971 genocide.
While the US did undertake steps to detach Bangladesh from the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War and then sought Bangladeshi cooperation with regards to fighting transnational terrorism, it continued to view the 3rd largest state in South Asia with somewhat lesser importance and through the “lens of India”.
In the late 2010s and early 2020s, incremental shifts started to appear in the US approach vis-à-vis Pakistan and Bangladesh. The elimination of the threat of Russian expansion, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the diminishing importance of the War on Terror, the meteoric rise of China and consequent intensification of the Sino-US rivalry -- all contributed to the reduction of Pakistan's importance in the eyes of US policy-makers.
Furthermore, the US-Pakistani relations have been strained by a number of factors in the recent years: The growing Sino-Pakistani strategic ties (including Pakistan's enthusiastic participation in the Chinese-financed BRI project); Pakistani neutrality in the Syrian Civil War; Pakistan's refusal to provide the US with air bases; the gradual Russia-Pakistan rapprochement; finally, Pakistan's refusal to condemn Russia for the war in Ukraine.
It is entirely plausible that parts of the US political elite would like to pressurize Pakistan by taking the initiative to recognize the 1971 genocide and thus threatening them with a situation in which the Pakistani state and the Pakistan Armed Forces would be internationally discredited.
On the other hand, Bangladesh's significance continued to increase in the eyes of the US policy-makers. The importance of Bangladesh -- with its burgeoning population, its increasingly robust economic development, its large internal market, and its strategic location on the Bay of Bengal as well asat the confluence of South and Southeast Asia -- increased from the US viewpoint.
While Dhaka's strategic partnership with Beijing and historic ties with Moscow, as well as the internal political dynamics of Bangladesh, are viewed somewhat negatively in Washington, they have looked to secure Bangladeshi cooperation in the implementation of their Indo-Pacific Strategy and to reduce Chinese influence in the country.
Since the 1971 genocide continues to be a national trauma for Bangladeshis and as the discourse about the genocide continues to form parts of Bangladeshi state and national identities, it is possible that the US is seeking to gain the goodwill of Bangladesh by undertaking the initiative to recognize the 1971 genocide.
By undertaking the initiative to recognize the 1971 genocide, the US might be seeking to coerce Pakistan, whose geopolitical importance has somewhat diminished in US eyes, into changing its policy preferences. Meanwhile, through this same initiative, the US might be seeking to mollify Bangladesh, whose geopolitical importance has increased in proportion to Pakistan, through this symbolic gesture.
While the trajectory of US-Bangladesh relations has generally moved towards a positive direction, some thorny issues continue to pester the relationship. This is exemplified by the developments during and after the 8th United States-Bangladesh Partnership Dialogue held on March 20 in Dhaka. While the dialogue was held in a friendly atmosphere without mutual recriminations, a number of key issues, including the US sanctions on the Bangladeshi elite security agency Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and its officials, the reinstatement of GSP facilities for Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi stance towards the Russia-Ukrain War, have remained unresolved.
Washington has neither agreed to lift the sanctions on RAB and its officials nor have they provided Dhaka with any assurances regarding the GSP facilities. While the US has urged Bangladesh to take a pro-active role regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine (for instance, condemnation of Russia), Bangladesh -- owing to its non-aligned foreign policy tradition, the absence of any significant stake in Eastern Europe, and its military-economic ties with Russia -- has generally abstained from undertaking such steps (for instance, by abstaining from voting on anti-Russian resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly). It is possible that by undertaking the initiative to recognize the 1971 genocide, Washington is trying to “make good” for its non-lifting of sanctions on RAB and non-reinstatement of GSP facilities, and to provide Dhaka with an incentive to change its view regarding the war in Ukraine.
It should be remembered that the US was partially responsible for enabling the 1971 genocide. By strongly supporting the Pakistani attempts to crush the Bangladesh's independence movement, by dismissing the Pakistani atrocities against Bengalis as the “internal affairs” of Pakistan, by supplying Pakistan with military hardware, by providing Pakistan with moral, political and diplomatic support at the international level, and by threatening military intervention on Pakistan's behalf at the last moment, the US empowered the Pakistanis to continue their genocidal campaign against the Bengali civilians in 1971. Therefore, if the US recognizes the 1971 atrocities as “genocide” and condemns Pakistan, it would be an implicit admission that the policies of the US towards Bangladesh in 1971 were wrong.
Irrespective of its geopolitical and bilateral diplomatic motivations, such a step on the part of the US would not only be morally commendable but also serve as an excellent example for the world community with regards to similar humanitarian disasters. It should be noted that China's role in the 1971 war was similar to that of the US, however, China has never undertaken a similar step. Despite that, Bangladesh maintains a robust strategic partnership with China. So, such a step on the part of the US could be ground-breaking.
While the proposed resolution has not yet been adopted in the US Congress, the step itself can be considered to be in the right direction. If the US ultimately recognizes the 1971 genocide, it will definitely serve as a positive element in the US-Bangladesh relations by removing a longstanding issue of historical acrimony, and will create goodwill on both sides and facilitate further cooperation in various sectors.
Md Himel Rahman is a Master's student at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.
