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Bicameralism in Bangladesh?

Update : 29 Mar 2016, 07:57 PM

It is quite legitimate to wonder why, during its multiple previous terms in office, the BNP ignored making the constitutional changes to state governance that it unveiled in its concluded sixth National Council.

If critics wonder about the motives behind such an about-turn, they can be forgiven. But, legitimate doubts about motives aside, at least one proposal put forward by the BNP needs to be weighed on its own intrinsic merits.

The call for a bicameral legislature is neither particularly new nor an entirely sharp departure from the substance of real democracy. In fact, in SOME shape or form, the same had been proposed by both the Awami League under the late HS Suhrawardy and the JSD under ASM Abdur Rab at different points in history.

From one simple perspective it sounds wise: A legislature of 330 members was designed for a population of 75 million in 1972; with a current population approaching 200 million, a legislature with nary a difference in its numeric composition makes little sense.

Furthermore, history shows that almost no mature democracy has consolidated its democratic governance with a unicameral legislature which, generally, has been the hallmark of countries with rubber stamp parliaments prevalent in the former Soviet bloc and Arab autocracies.

Bicameral legislatures are found in democracies as varied as the US, India, Australia, and Canada and provide a much needed diffusion of concentrated power that can become a bane of pluralism in any democracy, especially a unitary one like Bangladesh.

The in-built checks and balances of two chambers of parliament are not perfect, but they are better than nothing if each of the two chambers draws its membership from slightly different universes.

In the case of federal systems like the US and Australia, the different universes are, respectively, single member constituencies and the federated states -- India draws its upper chamber mostly from the state legislatures, while Jordan empanels non-partisan retired public servants of repute like former ambassadors and judges.

At the core of the different premises for representation in the chambers of a bicameral legislature is the idea that the immediate impulses of one group of representatives can be scrutinised by another, even if the former does have a greater say, as is the case with the usually directly-elected lower chambers.

Many latter-day democratic theoreticians of representative government -- from Montesquieu to Madison to Blackstone -- have indeed emphasised this “cooling of passions” argument in favour of a bicameral legislature whereas the short-term priorities of one chamber with more frequent and direct elections is balanced against the longer-term, more holistic vision of the other chamber with less direct and less frequent methods of electoral legitimacy.

It is fair to question even the possibility of a future second chamber of a parliament when the first one’s current electoral legitimacy, institutional health, and practical power is, at best, the butt of too many jokes.

Furthermore, the costs of a second elected chamber are sure to place some burden on the treasury as well. When Bangladesh these days cannot hold free and fair competitive elections even for municipalities, what nonsense is this talk of a bicameral parliament someday?

Sometimes it is important to be both hopeful and practical at the same time. In the event that someday free and fair elections return to Bangladesh and democratic consolidation gets back on the track it was prior to the January 5, 2014 electoral exercise, it would be important not to make the overreach that too many elected governments have had since 1990.

Common sense and intuition would indeed lead us to wonder if the untrammeled and unbalanced power incumbent in a winner-take-all unicameral legislature helped governments get a sense of absolutism that led to the unraveling of the democracy so fondly restored in 1990 after the fall of the then dictator. Our personalised politics, aggrandising mentality, and human folly are all certainly to blame.

But so is an institution which resembles Westminster in little but fantasy.

Why not use the theory and practice of so many successful representative democracies which have wisely chosen to put proven checks and balances in their legislatures by institutionalising a minimal diffusion of concentrated state power through bicameralism?

The bicameralism proposal from the BNP’s national council had garnered its share of rightful criticism on the basis of motives, cost, and realism. Yet, looking into a hopeful future, it would be a folly to dismiss it out of hand, at least, for those whose partisanship and ideological rigidity take a secondary place to love for country and democracy. 

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