Why has such a small, impoverished country like North Korea resorted to nuclearisation? What are its likely intentions with these weapons? How are the neighbours, especially South Korea, Japan, and the US, responding to such a development?
These are delicate questions to answer, as the issue is intricately linked to geo-politics, internal and external security of the Koreas, China, and Japan, and historical animosities.
North Korea, traditionally a satellite and outlawed state of the former Soviet Union, used its status as a Soviet-client to shield itself against any retribution. After its collapse, North Korea lost a powerful benefactor. It watched with dismay the destruction of Iraq in 1991 whose military much resembled North Korea’s. So it concluded that conventional forces could no longer protect the regime and the state.
In this context it is difficult to differentiate between regime and state. Regime survival, at the cost of human security, is the primary motivation of as grandiose a project as nuclear armament.
This impoverished country, with a GDP one-third of Ethiopia, diverted its resources into a nuclear program and, in 2006, detonated its first nuclear bombs. And it worked to create an artificial protection both for the regime and the state. It tested its nukes four times, starting in 2006, in underground tunnels located in the eastern part of the country. It is estimated it has between 10 to 16 such weapons in its arsenal and in the worst-case scenario may reach up to 1,000 bombs by 2020.
It even tested its first ever hydrogen bomb on January 6; and a long-range ballistic missile was tested on February 7. All these were conducted in violation of many UN Security Council Resolutions. More stringent sanctions by the UN Security Council have been imposed.
The US-Korea Institute at the John Hopkins University has assessed that North Korea can fire a bomb from its medium-to-intermediate range missiles. These missiles can reach targets in countries such as Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, and at the formidable military bases of the US in the Asia Pacific.
A new version of the KN-08 ballistic missile, likely to be operational by 2021, may be able to reach the West Coast of the US with smaller sized nukes.
To put it in perspective, North Korean missiles are capable of reaching targets beyond the Japanese mainland. North Korea’s behaviour overall, and especially after the Taepodong Missile Crisis, rather forced Japan to incorporate a concept of expanded national defence as part of its national security policy.
To deal with North Korea, China has turned out to be a key player. The US wants China to take a harder line towards North Korea. Interestingly enough, North Korea wants to play the US card. North Korea proposed to abandon the nuclear program in exchange for economic aid (or even a peace treaty) through direct bilateral talks with the US.
This tactic, called the “cycle of provocation and accommodation,” is being tried by North Korea even after the recent regime change. The present young leader must feel vulnerable.
Japan would have been happy with one-on-one negotiations with the US, as presumably it would have sidelined China. North Korea succeeded in concluding the Geneva Agreed Framework that puts North Korea on an equal footing with the US.
However, the US has given a cautious response to such an overture and has always communicated to Beijing that the Six-Party Talks would be the appropriate forum. Although the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since 2009, US-North Korea contacts got renewed early 2011.
The recent testing of so-called hydrogen bombs has put North Korea on the backfoot. China’s stakes are high as the security of two of its most important allies, Japan and South Korea, are inextricably linked. American deterrence may not be able to placate the involved players. Both South Korea and Japan are potential nuclear powers.
However, the US may not approve of such a venture in the foreseeable future. And the China-America Mutually-Assured Dependency Syndrome is at work. Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD) Syndrome is also at work. Both the powers may not allow the status quo be disturbed although it is a period of transition. And a period of transition is always fraught with risks and uncertainties.
That said, China’s policy is formulated by a combination of factors such as historical relations, ideological solidarity, economic motives, alongside a fear of collapse and the loss of North Korea as a strategic buffer. It is primarily driven by security considerations. Its value as a strategic buffer best explains its worth to China. But this time round China is rather unhappy, as such developments provide no tangible benefit. China would not like to see North Korea turn into a strategic burden. It is otherwise a burden as China provides assistance, in food and energy, for sustenance of its impoverished people. In the process, human value, dignity, and the rights of the people are getting marginalised.
Be that as it may, China is one of the signatories to the Armistice Agreement of 1953 that brought an end to the Korean War. China has an alliance treaty with North Korea dating back to 1961 that obligates China to defend North Korea should the eventuality dictate so. However, at this point in time, neither the US nor China would like to see a repeat of the Korean War.
As a counter-measure to nuclear attack, Japan has deployed a multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) with the support of the US for the protection of its mainland and the surrounding islands. Japan has also been assured of the US’s extended nuclear deterrence. There is a difference between direct deterrence and extended deterrence. Japan is getting extended deterrence assurance but that may not totally placate Japan.
Japan is allowed to transfer its BMD to third parties under certain conditions. This is an ominous development. Japan is also set to invest in the US-made Terminal High Altitude Defence (THAAD) system and is also pondering over developing its own cruise missile.
Geo-political strategies such as balancing, alliance-building, action-reaction cycle, populist nationalism, skirmishes, joint military drills, nuclear arms race, nuclear defence, trampling of human security and rights, consolidation of totalitarianism, etc would tend to rise with all its horrendous and destabilising impacts.
North Korea revised its constitution in 2012 to proclaim itself as a nuclear power.
That said, there is a silver lining as we see the success of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. But it has nothing to do with the resumption of Six-Party Talks as preconditions from the stakeholders are diametrically opposed to each other.
