Modi’s visit to China received front-page attention from the Chinese media, and the Indian media resonated this with high-pitched sopranos. Nevertheless, beyond this official humdrum quite a few hard questions are raised about the real gains of this trip.
A major highlight of this trip was a 41-point joint declaration by the two governments that dealt with many elements under the sun. This grandiloquent statement spoke of high ambitions and was keen to convey to the world that the bond of common aspirations was stronger than that between Esmeralda and Quasimodo. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, was glad to receive Modi in Xian, his hometown. A rare distinction indeed!
They spent five hours intensely discussing, visiting temples, pagodas, spectacles, and banquets. It was the Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s turn the other day. They spent the whole day together, apparently trying to efface the tag of distant neighbours.
The new associates
It can’t be claimed that China and India don’t want stable relations as far as trade and commerce are concerned, but the mistrust between these two is so deep that it can take ages for the ice to break. At the level of BRICS or the creation of the New Development Bank (popularly known as the BRICS bank), the relationship between these two often seems harmonious.
It is also true that, as aspirant global powers, they have some tactical alliances for demanding a larger share of the global pie or in challenging the traditional hegemonies like the IMF or the World Bank. And both Indian and Chinese capital are looking forward to the New Development Bank as a new institution for accumulation.
It cannot be denied that India and China are the two most stable components of this block. Especially since, another superpower of this group, Russia, has been in a tight situation, particularly over the combined European attack regarding Ukraine on one hand and, on the other hand, low oil prices, for a considerable period. Therefore, the mantle of challenging the developed order rests on these two rising heroes, at least temporarily.
Sans frontiers
The major stumbling block in any meaningful relationship between the two countries is the dispute around the borders. The decades-old contention not only failed to find a place in the agenda of the official meetings, but in a great embarrassment during this much-hyped visit, CCTV, the Chinese state-owned television channel, beamed a map of India claiming Arunachal Pradesh as “south Tibet” and included large parts of Jammu and Kashmir in the Chinese territory.
The opposition and other nationalist sections in India cried foul over it and called this a cartographic aggression, equating it with actual Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Ladakh in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in September 2014.
There are a number of contradictory developments, especially in the last two decades, which put the brakes on any meaningful advancement.
The Indo-US proximity, more so in the last 15 years, has always raised Chinese eyebrows. These strategic alliances set limits to such exercise. The Chinese bonhomie with Pakistan is not welcome by India and the growing Indian proximity with the United States creates Chinese suspicion.
However, their internal relationships are not without competition, which then lead to certain contradictions. China, a much bigger economic power, needs India much less than India needs her. Again, on territorial issues, China has often taken a maximalist strategic position and is not quite interested in compromise. This is not exclusively limited to Indo-China border disputes but strongly extends to the East and the South China Sea where it is locked in disputes with Vietnam and others.
India’s foreign policy also hinges vis-à-vis its position towards Pakistan. Therefore, any Chinese proximity with her western neighbours would not go well with the ruling establishment. Moreover, Pakistan and all associated questions like Kashmir, “terrorism,” etc are highly charged with emotive issues that often lack any rationality.
Reinforcing the mistrust
On the other hand, a growing feeling in India is about Chinese investments in India’s neighbourhood, especially, in Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan. Many in the establishment think India should counter-act this by increasing both economic and military association with Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea, and of course, the United States.
There is also a sense of slipping behind due to a huge external trade-deficit of $48bn and unavailability of Chinese endorsement for India’s quest for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Moreover, the Chinese indifference about stapled visa for the residents of Arunachal Pradesh and the refusal to share comprehensive data, including the construction of dams on Brahmaputra and other common rivers, rub salt to the wounds.
It can’t be forgotten that India has actually lost to China in the past. The defeat of 1962 has created a permanent Line of Control along the frontiers of Chinese military aggression. The Chinese are not only absolutely intransigent about any border concessions but would rather like to get more inside the Indian territory, especially in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. For India, the only way to recover its lost territory is through military invasions which are ruled out a priori.
It is for sure that India would not like to fall behind, and therefore try to make every possible alliance with the Chinese in spite of political disquiet. Nevertheless, data suggests that India’s major economic partners are the Western powers, or more precisely, the OECD countries, and economic partnership with the Chinese is still very nominal compared to that.
Indian capital would try to take all routes for the time being. However, beyond a point, all roads may not be open in similar ways. The sharpening of such contradictions may force events to take new and unexpected turns.
It is genuinely difficult to compose a symphony with such discordant notes, and in all probability, there would hardly be any long-term Chinese interest in India -- in spite of signing umpteen MOUs -- until and unless such contentious issues are solved. It is yet to be seen how much priority does China -- a rising capitalist power -- accord to capital vis-à-vis border issues and territorial questions.
In the end, it seems that Modi’s recent visit to China was all about high decibels and low deliveries and without much essence.
