One hundred days in government is often seen as a pulse check for any administration. The Yunus-led advisory council will soon reach that milestone. But defining the context in which the government was formed is a prerequisite for any credible analysis of its performance.
On one hand, it inherited a state architecture and policymaking apparatus in utter ruins. Public institutions rotten to their cores. Bangladesh expects a coalition of hastily appointed advisors with little to no governance experience to uphold the fundamental integrity of a dysfunctional republic. Steering the country efficiently and effectively with a nearly unwinnable deck of cards is an uphill battle. On the other hand, success is the only logical path forward.
Failure risks pushing the country into a political script dictated by opposing mobs, devoid of the rule of law and split by competing visions: Islamist-leaning versus revolutionary ideas of social welfare progressivism. Such a future would lead Bangladesh toward fragmentation. Conspirators of the deposed regime would take such an opportunity to destabilize the country, with hopes of making a political comeback assisted by the powers that be in New Delhi.
The post-Hasina era requires an inclusive democratic tilt to reset the country’s trajectory. Kickstarting a campaign of undoing decades of damage inflicted in the name of statecraft is the demand of time. Citizens must continue to criticize this government assertively and with clarity: A government installed not via an electoral mandate but through symbolic public acclamation.
Criticism should be constructive and grounded in feasible but radical recommendations rather than merely offering creative ideas that lack implementation bandwidth. Discourse should reflect a sense of ownership over Bangladesh’s future, urging this administration to listen, learn, and act. The situation is certainly complex, but this is the reality that the country must navigate its way out of.
Enough indicators point to the advisory council contending with a concoction of its own missteps and unwarranted external interference. Certain expectations remain unmet following the ousting of a draconian, mafia-style criminal enterprise.
Unmet expectations include, first, the failure of the government to inspire broad confidence in its ability to soundly lead a nation on the brink of chaos. Second, it has struggled to provide sufficient assurances of human security and to maintain a manageable cost of living. Citizens want to be able to sleep peacefully at night.
Again, the government’s struggles are not unexpected per se. More concerning is that the Yunus-led team seems to lack backbone. The opportunity cost of failing to meet these expectations is the risk of laying the foundations for a failed state.
There are four noticeable problems -- quick wins if one wishes to frame them positively -- that, if addressed, could bolster this administration.
A government’s primary responsibility is to exhibit that it understands the issues people face on a day-to-day basis and respond via public policies
- Making the interim
The first problem lies in the very composition of the interim administration. Personnel and portfolio changes are immediately required. The government has rightly been criticized for being a mostly NGO-controlled administration filled with individuals with close personal ties to the chief advisor. Each advisor handles multiple portfolios. This setup might have worked for a standard three-month caretaker government, like those between 1990 and 2008. But this is not such a situation.
As a post-uprising administration, they have the dual priorities of organizing elections and beginning to enact, or at the very least setting the agenda for, critical public policy reforms. Both cannot be achieved satisfactorily with each advisor handling multiple portfolios. A small cabinet is a weak cabinet, given the diverse motivations that fuelled the recent uprising. A multiplicity of political thought and management experience needs to be reflected more in this administration.
On principle, the interim government should be expanded to include individuals from all walks of life: Politicians, student leaders from academic institutions across the country and not just from Dhaka University, entrepreneurs, activists, lawyers, representatives of marginalized communities, and other professionals who had a vested interest and a frontline role in challenging the Hasina administration’s misrule.
This government is inherently a by-product of a mass uprising. Strictly adhering to constitutional or traditional cabinet models is unnecessary. There is no reason why more advisors cannot be appointed. Individuals who can demonstrate decisive leadership, oversee their ministries boldly, and shrewdly manage the remnants of Hasina’s bureaucracy -- still largely responsible for the administering of the state -- should be inducted as an immediate measure.
Advisors, who are de facto ministers, are expected to serve as the political arm of policymaking in each assigned ministry. However, this advisory council lacks political skills writ large. This is understandable given that they have never been active politicians. The state is inherently a political entity, and the absence of politics is, as such, contrary to the smooth functioning of a state. Two viable models could be considered to introduce a political face to this administration.
First, establishing a national political council to unify political stakeholders under a unitary governance framework. This structure would allow for consistent, rather than ad hoc, guidance to be directed to the government. Smaller committees within the council can support each advisor. This model could also facilitate Yunus’ stated intention of ensuring that this government is a vehicle for implementing reform proposals from all segments of society, rather than simply a conduit for top-down policymaking exercises, as was the case during the much-criticized Fakhruddin Ahmed-led caretaker administration.
Second, creating a national unity government, leveraging the idea of a political council but going a step further by directly appointing additional advisors from all sections of society, particularly from political parties to the current cabinet. This is likely the best option. Both of these options would grant political cover to this government, creating the representational spine and political barricade needed to counter the notion that this is a weak administration.
- Adding reform to the daily cycle
The second problem this government faces concerns the tension between reform and daily administration. A government’s primary responsibility is to exhibit that it understands the issues people face on a day-to-day basis and respond via public policies. This is especially true for pocketbook concerns. Prices of essentials, though difficult to control under free-market conditions, are at paralyzing levels. If the administration cannot tackle challenges like food insecurity and Dhaka’s traffic congestion, public confidence in them will continue to erode.
Reform agendas can and must proceed behind the scenes and in consultation with subject-matter experts. But the government must address, or at least be seen trying to address, daily economic and societal concerns to gain wide-ranging buy-in for reforms. Advisors assigned to the commerce and home ministries, for example, should be seen in the public sphere. They should be visibly working on these issues and instilling confidence that change is underway.
This is not happening, and people are growing weary of words without action. Lofty ideas of reform are commendable, but without cabinet-level interventions to solve day-to-day societal issues, they risk appearing elitist and disconnected from the common man. Most advisors remain out of the public eye, creating the impression that they are out of touch with realities. Visibility is a must: Seeing is believing, and without public engagement, pressure will only escalate.
- Keeping everyone updated
The third problem is communication. The interim government appointed a press secretary to the chief advisor, who is a highly qualified and respected journalist. Why he is being utilized sparingly, and not daily, as the government’s spokesperson is baffling. He, or someone equally competent, should be delivering daily media briefings, similar to the White House spokesperson.
Contradictions, differing perspectives, and internal conflicts among those involved in the uprising are becoming far too common. Unity is taking a back seat. An official spokesperson who provides point-by-point daily updates on government decisions, rather than reacting to the headline of the day, would be a proactive step and help calm public nerves. Meticulously designed political communication is critical at this stage as law and order remain fragile.
- Prioritizing reality
The fourth problem centres around an inability to prioritize what is doable and what is not, what is sensible to prioritize and what is not. Ambition is a must for Bangladesh, but so is practicality. Take the back-and-forth around banning the Awami League, removing the President, or setting an election date. Why the government has not clearly outlined an electoral roadmap is puzzling. In policymaking, drafting forward-looking instruments like work plans or strategic plans is standard practice. The interim government should develop one without delay instead of vaguely promising that a few commissions will publish reports by December, followed by a roadmap.
Time is not on their side, and they need to realize this. The army chief and the law advisor share similar views on election timelines, suggesting that the country will likely be ready for polls by the end of 2025. Putting pen to paper is the best way to clear any confusion on this front. With respect to difficult questions regarding the Presidency and the Awami League, the focus should be on process, not just policy. Executive decisions on banning entities without due legal process are reckless and short-sighted. It mirrors the very toolkit for which Hasina was criticized.
If the Awami League is to be held accountable as an organization for the plethora of crimes committed by its members, a defined process -- ideally judicial and with zero interference from this administration or those backing it -- needs to be clearly communicated to the public. The government is failing to prioritize what issues demand immediate attention and what do not, and thereby struggling to clarify the processes it relies on to make its decisions. Governments cannot function like a roulette wheel, where priorities are spun and reshuffled with each turn. Governments need a transparent political vision. The sooner this is realized, the better.
A multiplicity of political thought and management experience needs to be reflected more in this administration
Addressing these four factors cannot wait, and even with the best of intentions, this government will not succeed if it cannot begin rebuilding public trust in the state apparatus while strengthening its social contract with the masses. The public may currently support -- or, more accurately, refrain from opposing -- this administration, but that acceptance largely stems from the absence of other viable options to Yunus to lead a nation where it is nearly impossible to find a single person behind whom people of all stripes can coalesce.
The growing rift between students and other participants in the movement -- political parties, day labourers, and the average citizen -- is becoming increasingly clear.
Each group brings unique strengths. Students, though lacking governance experience, are idea generators whose sacrifices during the recent protests cannot be understated. They envision a future for Bangladesh that may seem utopian today, yet their advertised hope for a different, and better tomorrow was necessary to break the country from the shackles of authoritarianism. Political parties understand governance better than most, grasp the complexities of policymaking, and can assess the executional feasibility of ideas coming from students. The interim government can serve as the bridge, harnessing both sets of skills to drive reforms.
Bangladesh has a very short window to get its house in order. The slim yet tangible possibility of a counter-uprising could return Hasina and her sycophants to power, sans an inch of regret for their misrule, leaving Bangladesh back at square one.
This scenario has unfolded before in many parts of the world. The lessons history offers from mass uprisings in underdeveloped democracies are clear: Dream big but remain practical, seek reconciliation not revenge, establish strong policymaking processes, and pursue changes that are radical yet feasible to implement -- while avoiding emotional, knee-jerk responses to political or policy challenges.
Criticism of this government, given it has been only 100 days, is remarkably severe -- far harsher than would be directed at any other administration. Yet, it stems from a place of respect for those willing to take on the monumental task of state repair. Let us be clear: This administration has also had its wins. Yunus’ trip to the United Nations General Assembly and Ahsan Mansur’s exceptional stewardship of the central bank are two that come to mind.
As the people’s government, it naturally faces enormous expectations and must go above and beyond what is typically considered a good performance. Notwithstanding everything else, the real story today is that this moment -- here and now -- is Bangladesh’s tryst with destiny and, ultimately, a litmus test of the country’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty. Failure is simply not an option.
Mir Aftabuddin Ahmed is a Toronto-based Public Policy Columnist for Bangladeshi and Canadian media outlets. He serves as a Policy Development Officer with the City of Toronto and is the co-founder of BacharLorai, an international social impact agency. He can be reached at [email protected].
