Bangladesh is on the precipice of a third consecutive election that contradicts its founding democratic values -- values which, on paper, represent the core spirit of the constitution and should seek to establish electoral exercises as being free, fair, credible, inclusive, and participatory. Despite this, the very party that spearheaded a political struggle for independence appears unwilling to compromise on the structure of an election-time government -- insisting on upholding the status quo as dictated by the existing constitutional framework.
This is the same system that the ruling party established amid much controversy before the categorically unilateral 2014 elections. In their calculations, the most critical element of a democracy -- the will of voters -- has been conspicuously, and to a large extent, predictably sidelined. On the other side, the BNP is focused on its one-point demand: the ousting of Sheikh Hasina and her cabinet, to be replaced by a "neutral" government prior to the elections.
Public opinion, which reflects tangible concerns about the feasibility of conducting a "good" election under a partisan government, is subtly but perceptibly shifting -- even if it stops short of an outright endorsement of the opposition. Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who remains popular notwithstanding her political inactivity for the past six years, is fighting for her life in hospital. Additionally, Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and the top brass of the party, including standing committee members Mirza Abbas and Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury, among others, have been detained on charges that could best be described as politically motivated, seemingly aiming to stymie the BNP's current agitation movement.
Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect the Awami League to yield to the BNP's demands. The ruling party's systemic grip on the civil bureaucracy transcends mere administrative oversight, exposing a strategy that has transformed state institutions into partisan instruments of political dominance. As has become customary, law enforcement agencies have trespassed into the political arena, blatantly embodying a form of political agenda. The arrests of BNP leaders and the disruption of their activities have been tactically timed -- taking place just before the announcement of the election timetable.
An ongoing issue
Bangladesh's ongoing political conundrum is a familiar one. Since independence, successive governments have shown neither the willingness nor the capacity to conduct elections that could be termed as "acceptable" in a democratic sense. Only the four elections held in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2008 -- all under a temporary, "neutral" caretaker administration -- came close to reflecting the genuine will of the people in choosing their governments. Therefore, a question warrants introspection: What kind of administration should oversee Bangladesh's electoral litmus test as it chooses whether to remain a democracy?
The most probable scenario is a maintenance of the status quo. The prime minister has indicated that a conventional election-time administration, which she would lead, will oversee the elections. Her cabinet will likely stay intact, or she may decide to reduce its size -- as is her prerogative. The government will continue its routine operations and will respond to the Election Commission's specific requests -- as is customary in Westminster democracies.
An election under this framework will not be a sincere celebration of democracy, as demonstrated by the 2018 general elections. Should the BNP opt to compete, they are likely to face a landslide defeat, which would misrepresent their authentic standing as the country's principal opposition. The ruling party is poised, therefore, to secure a two-thirds majority, enough to push through constitutional amendments -- while allies like the Jatiya Party would form a nominal opposition. Once again, parliament risks being reduced to a mere rubber-stamp body, with the people's votes seemingly inconsequential.
Another option?
The second option, which the BNP may have considered, also seems improbable given the ruling leadership’s apparent disinclination to concede to any opposition demands. She could resign or take leave of absence in the coming month. While the constitution does not explicitly address the situation of a prime minister on leave, Westminster convention would prevail.
The prime minister would consult with Bangabhaban, advising the president of her leave and recommending a deputy who would serve as an "acting" prime minister. The appointment would need to occur before the prorogation of Parliament, given that the appointee must be an elected MP with the "confidence" of the majority of parliamentarians. However, this would not benefit the BNP, as an Awami League member would most likely preside over the cabinet.
The inclusion of BNP leaders in the cabinet as technocrats could be a concession. Considering the constitutional provision that permits up to 10% of the cabinet to be unelected, two BNP members could be allocated key ministries, such as Home Affairs and Public Administration, in a downsized cabinet. Reducing the cabinet to 20 members would permit the inclusion of up to two technocrats -- allowing for BNP members to join the government. Such an approach could lead to a quasi-all-party election-time administration, echoing the arrangement under Sheikh Hasina in 2014, which did not succeed in delivering a satisfactory election.
The third option, more likely than the second, would see the ruling party continuing the status quo and conducting an election without the BNP's participation. This will lead to a one-sided election, possibly prompting international pressure, particularly in light of Bangladesh's economic struggles, for a subsequent election. There is precedent: Prior to the 1996 general elections, the Awami League, with former allies like Jamaat-e-Islami, boycotted Parliament. As a result, the BNP was left without the necessary two-thirds majority required to enact a constitutional amendment to accommodate the opposition's call for a caretaker government.
However, following a one-sided election where the BNP won more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, Begum Zia's government, facing both domestic and international pressure, introduced the caretaker government system through a constitutional amendment, held new elections, and was subsequently ousted from power. The viability of such an option now hinges on how the Awami League responds to latent pressures after the 2024 elections and whether the leadership is eager to engage in compromises. The prospect of meeting the BNP's demands seems improbable unless the Awami League consents to a constitutional amendment reinstating the caretaker government system. With the electoral timetable due to be announced shortly and the looming prorogation of parliament, the likelihood of this seems to be fading.
Beyond these options, the constitution presents a rarely considered scenario necessitating examination: If a prime minister becomes incapacitated -- suppose due to illness -- or decides to take a leave of absence in the short three-month window after Parliament has been dissolved but prior to an election, the president is thrust into a unique predicament. In the absence of an active Parliament to derive a clear mandate, the president retains the supreme authority to appoint an acting prime minister until elections are held. The acting prime minister would likely be selected from the members of the ruling party's recently serving parliamentarians.
Moreover, a relevant question arises in such circumstances: Does the president have the authority to appoint a technocrat to lead an interim government with the endorsement of the current cabinet, in the absence of a functioning Parliament? In the traditions of Westminster systems, many procedures are governed by unwritten norms or convention rather than unambiguously stated laws.
Common ground
Analyzing the above scenarios within the constraints of the constitution, which acknowledges the ruling party’s reluctance to compromise beyond what is constitutionally prescribed and the BNP's determination to unseat the prime minister by any means, is imperative. Finding common ground within the existing constitutional framework is perhaps the most feasible route to moving towards a consensus that could be acceptable to both leading political parties.
An examination of the 2014 and 2018 elections suggests that the Awami League's pursuit of economic growth has not been matched by an equivalent effort to consolidate democratic institutions. A citizen who is 33 years old has not voted in a fair election in their adult life. Despite economic advancements during the Awami League's three successive terms in office, the rise in political disinterest -- often termed apathy -- and the decline in fundamental voting rights, present alarming issues that are corrupting Bangladesh's political consciousness.
Over the past decade, political harassment has complicated the efforts of the opposition. However, they have yet to present a comprehensive, formalized, and realistic policy platform. The BNP's narrative does not provide a distinct alternative to the ruling party's governance model, and there is a clear lack of detailed strategic policies and implementation plans. It appears that support for them stems more from a general discontent with the current government -- termed anti-incumbency -- rather than from a convincing policy vision.
The bottom line being: The leadership of both political parties share the blame for their inability to establish a robust electoral system that can stand the test of time. Their positions are prone to change, with each often echoing the other's past policies when roles are reversed between governing and opposition. This cyclical political charade, which unfolds about every five years, is perceived as a mockery to the citizens of Bangladesh.
The Awami League, firmly holding the reins of power, must show readiness to reach a consensus with its adversaries. It would be immoral not to do so. On the flip side, the BNP must publicly put forth a detailed plan for a provisional government to oversee elections, one that can be credibly executed in the limited time before the polls. Yet, nothing substantive can occur if opposition leaders remain behind bars and the Prime Minister is not open to dialogue.
A leader's legacy is defined not just by economic achievements, but by their obligation to shape democratic values. The success of politicians is often measured by benchmarks such as the ability of citizens to elect their governments, the power given to these governments through policy mandates, and the protection of fundamental freedoms. The responsibility now rests with Bangladesh's most influential prime minister, the sole heir of Bangabandhu and his daughter, who is also an undisputed master of political strategy. The 2024 election will be the defining moment of Sheikh Hasina's legacy. Bangladesh and the world are watching.
Mir Aftabuddin Ahmed is a Toronto-based columnist for Dhaka Tribune. He serves as an Urban Fellow Researcher with the City of Toronto and is the co-founder of BacharLorai, a Canada-based not-for-profit social impact agency. He can be reached at: [email protected]. The views expressed by the author are entirely his own.
