Two years ago the Arab Spring took the world by surprise by ushering in a wave of democracy in one of the regions of the world that scholars and observers deemed to be the most resistant to these ideas. New research from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) shows that the Arab Spring was in fact in line with the wave of democratisation that has swept the developing world in the past few decades.
While in 1974 there were 41 democracies among the existing 150 states, by the end of 2011 most of the countries in the world were formal democracies and elections were held in all but five countries between 2000 and 2012.
However, a large gulf exists between “formal” democracies and “functioning” ones. As the ODI research points out, across most of the developing world the quality of democracies remain deeply flawed. This is unfortunate news for the health of democracy in these newly emerging systems and has important implications for countries like Bangladesh.
In scholarly literature, such regimes have been dubbed “hybrid democracies” – regimes that are stuck in the process of democratic transition. While these regimes display rhetorical acceptance of a liberal democracy and some democratic institutions, in reality they are characterised by informal systems, personalisation of power and sometimes even authoritarian traits.
Dhaka Tribune recently had a discussion with Alina Rocha Menocal, Research Fellow in the Politics and Governance Programme at the ODI in London and one of the leading experts on these issues, about the relationship and gaps between elections and democracy.
Bangladesh is a fairly new democracy that is still experiencing considerable growing pains. In that context your research is very relevant to us and we are glad to have the opportunity to delve further into some of your findings. Overall, how would you describe the relationship between elections and democracy?
It is my pleasure to speak with the Dhaka Tribune.
Elections are the most visible and identifiable element of democracy. However, what we have learned over the years is that, while elections are important, they are far from sufficient to ensure democracy.
In order for democracies to work, you need free and fair elections, but also wide acceptance of democratic processes and solid accountability mechanisms, both vertical and horizontal.
A very useful procedural definition of democracy was given by Polish scholar Adam Przeworski – who defined it as a system of “institutionalised uncertainty.” This means that in a democracy all outcomes are in principle unknown and are open to contestation among key players – except the rules of the democratic contest itself.
So, for example, there is no way to know beforehand who will win an election or what policies will be enacted. The only certainty is that such outcomes will be determined within the framework of pre-established democratic rules.
Therefore, for the democratic process to work, all parties have to agree to negotiate and bargain within the democratic framework. There is no substitute for this. Democracy has to be the only game in town.
This is a crucial problem that we face in Bangladesh. There is little commitment to the democratic process among political parties and it is abandoned very quickly when the outcome is not in your favour.
Yes, this is a very big challenge for hybrid democracies.
Politics is essentially an ongoing process of competition and contestation for power and resources, and this is true everywhere, in both developed and developing countries. However, the crucial difference is that in functioning democracies this competition is channelled through a pre-established, agreed upon and publicly accountable framework.
It is my impression that in Bangladesh political parties are not willing to engage in genuine dialogue with each other or negotiate over outcomes within the democratic framework, which is very damaging.
However, in addition to commitment to the democratic process you also need good accountability mechanisms to exist, both vertically and horizontally.
Can you please elaborate on the accountability mechanisms? What do you mean by vertical and horizontal accountability?
Elections are an example of vertical accountability, through which voters can hold the government to account periodically by voting them out of office. This is one of the most established accountability mechanisms across democracies everywhere in the world – even if often they have important limitations.
However, horizontal mechanisms of accountability (between different parts of government) are also essential to the quality of democratic governance, because in principle they provide checks and balances and prevent the undue concentration of power in the figure of the executive, for instance.
Parliament and parliamentary committees, for example, are critical mechanisms of horizontal accountability, intended to hold the Executive to account over its different actions and decisions. The same holds for oversight commissions, like anti-corruption or electoral commissions.
Vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms work best in conjunction with one another. Let’s take the example that residents of a certain municipality have complaints about sanitation systems not working in their locality. If they bring this complaint to their local government body and if this body is not able to deal with the issue then they need to have functioning mechanisms to bring their demand to the higher level of (let’s say national) government. There then needs to be proper accountability between these different parts of the government so that the national government can be held to account for addressing the issue in a satisfactory manner or provide clear reasons why the concern cannot be resolved. And vice versa.
Unfortunately, in emerging democracies both vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms are often not powerful or effective enough to keep the government in check.
Another thing to keep in mind is that accountability is not a quality of democracies alone. Accountability is an essential component for any state to be effective, irrespective of regime type. A functioning state requires robust rule of law, for instance, and the Asian Tigers are good examples of this. Democratisation in East Asia is a relatively new phenomenon, with the largest state, China, still an autocracy. However, these countries have had fairly well functioning states in place for a long time, with effective internal accountability mechanisms. In large part, this also helps to explain why they have been so successful at promoting economic development.
The research indicates that economic development is key to the stabilisation of democratic systems. Can you comment on that?
Actually, the nature of the relationship between democracy and development remains one of the most contested debates in both academia and policy-making processes.
Democracy is a system to arrive at decisions and elect rulers, and there is nothing inherent in its definition that it should lead to better development outcomes. Despite this, emerging democracies usually confront extremely high expectations about what they should be able to deliver, and this puts them under considerable strain. The inability of these new democracies to meet basic citizen needs and demands can lead to disillusionment with democratic forms and longing for “strong leaders,” which, in extreme cases can lead to the reversion of authoritarianism.
From our experience we find that it can also create embedded problems of distrust of the state and the political process among the population.
Absolutely. I don’t know if there is comparable data available on this in the Asian context, but from surveys of public perceptions in Africa and Latin America we find that political parties and parliaments are consistently the least trusted institutions in these regions. Other institutions that are meant to check the power of the executive, such as the judiciary also tend to fare poorly.
This is a source of concern because democracies cannot really exist without these institutions, and rehabilitating their credibility is therefore essential. Consistently low trust in these institutions over time can itself create barriers to reform and lead to disengagement from the democratic process by the citizens.
There is comparable public perception data on Bangladesh, which also consistently finds that political parties and parliament are perceived to be some of the most corrupt institutions. Can you please elaborate on the capacity issue and the role that civil society and the media can play in increasing accountability?
The media can play a very important role in holding the government and other political players to account. Not only that, they can also exert pressure to increase horizontal accountability between different parts of government by uncovering incompetence or corruption.
In many emerging democracies the space for media and civil society to act is limited. It seems to me that this may be less of an issue in Bangladesh, given that it has a very strong history of social mobilisation and civil society activism. This means that there is a lot of potential for civil society and media to play a role in increasing accountability.
However, one needs to ensure that voices from civil society and the media are effectively channelled and that the government has the ability to respond. If the state is just the recipient of demands but they don’t have the capacity or mechanisms in place to respond or adjudicate fairly between competing demands, then that feeds perceptions of ineffectiveness and public disillusionment with the system. Again, this is ultimately very harmful for the health of democracy – and so the challenge lies both in increasing the ability of civil society to exercise a diversity of voices, but also in enhancing the capacity of the state to respond.
Thank you very much for an informative chat. What would you say is the take-away message from your research?
The wave of democratisation around the world is a positive sign. However, hybrid/stunted democracies pose a significant risk. Expectations raised through the enthusiasm that accompanies democratisation can be difficult to satisfy, and setting up adequate democratic institutions and accountability mechanisms that go beyond the ballot box might take a long time. This can lead not only to public disillusionment but also to the persistence of informal systems that coexist uneasily with formal democratic institutions, which creates a vicious cycle that prevents the democratic framework from taking root.
Developing robust accountability mechanisms and, more importantly, commitment by all stakeholders to the democratic process and rules of the game above and beyond their own personal interests, is absolutely essential for democracy to flourish.
