Through the eyes of our neighbours

Bangladesh-US relations start with a bumpy ride. In Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971, the US not only sided with Pakistan but also didn’t acknowledge the genocide committed by the Pakistani Army against Bangladeshis. Henry Kissinger, a prominent statesman in US foreign policy-making, later concurred with ambassador U Alexis Johnson’s assessment that Bangladesh was “an international basket case.”

Kissinger is an outstanding scholar-practitioner who did not confine only to believing a realist view of the world but mastered it by implementing it in his statecraft later as a secretary of state and national security council advisor. No other diplomat of his stature was able to make such a fateful contribution to US foreign policy as the way he accomplished. Contrary to the majority of Bangladeshis’ view -- he is a living legend among scholars-strategists-diplomats worldwide.

Those who understand how world politics work, as tragic as it may sound, would easily fathom that the role Kissinger played in 1971 was in the best interest of the US. During the Cold War, to avoid an unrealistic two-front war against the USSR and China, a consensus-based US’s top strategic priority was to wage a divide between the USSR and China and establish better relationships with the both of them than they have between each other.

In that case, Kissinger masterfully sided with China to isolate the USSR, and Pakistan’s help was instrumental in mediating this process. It is fair to say that considering the global geopolitical environment of the 70s -- timing of Bangladesh’s liberation struggle was unfortunate. One can wonder, and argue, that if the US was not facing existential Cold War threats, it could play a constructive role in Bangladesh’s Liberation War.

Although the US recognized Bangladesh in 1972, China voted against its membership in the UN. Bilateral relations have improved significantly, but in the US’s South Asia policy, it was Pakistan, and later on, Afghanistan-Pakistan, through which Washington made its sub-regional policy.

Times, however, have changed

The United States now sees China as a strategic competitor and India as an offshore balancer against mighty China. Consequently, the US quickly shifted from its Pakistan-centric policy to an Indo-centric South Asia policy, which is well manifested in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, QUAD, and other strategic frameworks. Therefore, perception and evidence in Dhaka suggest that the US continues to see Bangladesh through the lens of its neighbours, with shifts only in the direction from west to eastward.

The newly appointed US ambassador to Bangladesh was asked recently why that was the case. He unorthodoxically stated: “Anyone who tries to look at Bangladesh through the lens of India does so at their own peril. Bangladesh in and of itself is a hugely important country to the United States.” Although this statement is (cautiously) optimistic, on-the-ground realities, however, do not suggest any major changes (not to say change is impossible in the future) in broader South Asia policy that substantially favour Bangladesh over India.

Here is why

Although US remains the largest market for Bangladeshi exports, US FDI in Bangladesh is primarily a natural resource-seeking investment. Two of the vital sectors for Bangladesh’s development -- mega-infrastructure and heavy industry -- see US investment that varies from minimal to none. In other sectors that are of national priority, US investment is equally negligible.

The US doesn’t sell any strategic weapons to Bangladesh, with the prevailing perception being New Delhi’s reservation. Whenever US officials visit Dhaka, first they stopover at New Delhi, making Bangladesh appear to be on the sidelines.

The US undertook an indictment measure against RAB, which raised mixed reactions among Bangladeshis. However, the US’s reservation in extending an invitation to Bangladesh at the Democracy Summit is unequivocally unfavourable to Bangladeshis, as it reinforces prevailing views that the US is reluctant in facilitating space for Bangladesh in the international forum, that it deserves as the world’s eighth-largest country (by population).

Most important of all, unlike Bangladesh -- a hundreds-year-old democratic and highly-educated society -- public opinion and scholarship play one of the most critical roles in US foreign policy-making.

Although Kissinger’s role can be justified from the US point of view, that does not help Bangladesh as his role has caused significant damage to US-Bangladesh relations in the years following Bangladesh’s independence. Even today, many Americans, especially those of Kissinger’s generation, live with memories of the 70s and think of Bangladesh as a “basket case” -- a poverty-stricken, natural disaster-prone, overpopulated country which produces only garments.

They rarely make sense of the unprecedented development undertaken in Bangladesh, which has a bigger economy than Pakistan, and higher per capita income than its current partner India. Not to mention the strategic value Bangladesh brings to the Indo-Pacific geostrategic chessboard, which Americans seem unable to grasp. Even the recent, relatively growing attention Bangladesh is getting in Washington is primarily based on the assumption that Bangladesh is falling into China’s orbit. In short: The US is exhibiting reactionary tactics rather than pro-active strategies to win Bangladesh.

Much of this is to blame on two factors: First, the faulty foundation that was created in 1971; the impacts of which are still quite visible even five decades later. Second, the ignorance when it comes to Bangladesh among Americans.

Let us unfold this

Political science departments in American universities are the gatekeepers of knowledge when it comes to state affairs, in which the subfield of international relations and South Asian studies are two of the most pertinent fields for US-Bangladesh relations. These two are the veritable knowledge producers, educators, and disseminators of the importance of Bangladesh among ordinary Americans, scholars, and policy-makers alike.

American universities also play a unique role in global affairs as they hold the world’s top rankings. These universities educate some of the world’s most brilliant minds. When international students return to their home countries, they become leaders, entrepreneurs, and scholars who make national and foreign policies for their respective countries.

I have done a semi-formal survey among the top 100 political science departments in American universities. My rough finding indicates that not a single Bangladeshi or Bangladeshi-origin scholar who offers expertise in the international relations and international security subfields exists among their faculties.

In the area of South Asian studies, the proportion of South Asian is 70-80% Indians, 10-15% Pakistanis, while the rest is white American men. Only 1 or 2 Bangladeshi political scientists work in third-tier non-major research universities. The same goes for graduate students, especially PhDs, which is predominantly race and gender-biased in the field of international relations. And established faculty members are reluctant to change the status quo and diversity.

As simplistic as it may seem from the perspective of Bangladeshi academia, in America’s reality, the long-term impact of this knowledge gap is the primary reason why Americans cannot make sense of Bangladesh, resulting in impediments in US-Bangladesh relations. It also does nothing to cultivate bright Bangladeshis who could impact US policy towards Bangladesh.

This has been one of the leading causes of the US’s favourable policy shifts toward India, as the Indian-American community is quite influential in the US. For example, 20 people of Indian-American origins are currently working in top-tier positions in the Biden Administration, 17 of which are in the White House alone, whereas only one in this administration who has little ancestral connection to Bangladesh through the origin of his parent.

Here is what could be done if the US is cordial in practicing what the ambassador preaches:

Providing a reasonable and proportionate space to bright Bangladeshi minds, or those of Bangladeshi origin, in the field of international relations/South Asia. Cultivating future political scientists who could play an instrumental role in shaping, theorizing, and indoctrinating the future US-Bangladesh relations going forward. This is not to limit the field; rather a wider engagement with Bangladeshis will multiply in various dimensions.
Showing pro-active strategies in underpinning a genuine interest to engage with Bangladesh, not just deploying reactionary tactics to tackle China-challenge in South Asia.
Diversifying FDI to sectors that are in vital interest for Bangladesh’s long-term prospects.
Displaying a tangible set of action plans for Bangladesh that is separate from India or any other country.
Providing Bangladesh with strategic military hardware that is key to achieving its “Forces Goal-2030.”