Worried over the evident dismemberment of Pakistan by India and possible repercussions against American citizens stranded in East Pakistan, the US President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger first felt the need to send a naval task force to the Bay of Bengal.
To get this thing done, as a warning to India and its key ally the Soviets, Kissinger tried to convince President Richard Nixon to authorize the movement of helicopters operating off an aircraft carrier for the evacuation of US civilians from the war zone.
At a meeting in the Oval Office of the White House on December 9, Kissinger repeated his warning of the dangers of allowing India to dismember Pakistan.
Kissinger felt that the impact of the dismemberment of a United States ally would "be severe in Iran, in Indonesia, and in the Middle East”. He concluded "there is no good deal possible anymore at this stage. And if the Russians want to press it to a brutal conclusion, we're going to lose."
The Soviets wanted a Middle East settlement, a European security conference, trade with the United States, and a summit meeting, he added.
Kissinger felt that the United States was in a position to "warn the Russians and the Indians that if this continues, we could leak out or in some way make clear that Kennedy made a commitment to Pakistan against aggression from India."
"Secondly," he added, "we should move that helicopter ship…and some escort into the Bay of Bengal" ostensibly to evacuate US citizens.
He was not, at this point, recommending the introduction of the carrier.
"From the Chinese angle, I would like to move the carrier. From the public opinion angle, what the press and television would do to us if an American carrier showed up there," Kissinger explained.
Nixon asked: "Can't the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation?"
Kissinger responded: "But against whom are we going to use the planes? Are we going to shoot our way in?"
Nixon asked what good it would do to move a helicopter ship into the area.
Kissinger said it would be "a token that something else will come afterward". He also recommended letting "the Jordanians move some of their planes. And I'd get the Indian Ambassador in and demand assurances that India doesn't want to annex territory[from West Pakistan]”.
To the question of introducing US naval forces into the Bay of Bengal, Kissinger said he had discussed the matter with Secretary of Navy John Bowden Connally Jr, and Connally had favored using a helicopter ship rather than a carrier. Connally felt that using a carrier would be interpreted by the American public as a threat to intervene militarily.
It was a tough decision, Kissinger said: "I go back and forth on it myself." He noted that there were some 200 US citizens in East Pakistan.
"Goddamn it, I've got a responsibility to protect American lives. I'm going to do it,” Nixon said, according to a transcript of the conversation.
The tape is difficult to understand at this point, but Nixon apparently said he was prepared to use the carrier force to protect UScitizens in East Pakistan.
"Nobody will believe it," Kissinger warned. "The Indians will scream we're threatening them."
Nixon asked: "Why are we doing it anyway? Aren't we going in for the purpose of strength?"
Kissinger shifted ground in the face of Nixon's apparent determination to use the carrier: "I'd move the carrier so that we can tell the Chinese tomorrow to move their forces to the frontier."
He advised that a decision to move the carrier group into the Bay of Bengal meant that "we'd have to do a lot of things, and we'd have to do them toughly”.
"I understand," Nixon agreed.
Kissinger continued: "We'd have to get the Indian Ambassador called in and demand assurances against annexation. We'd have to leak at that moment that secret understanding to protect the Indians [Pakistanis] against aggression."
Nixon responded: "I understand," and he authorized Kissinger "to get the whole thing together."
Turning to the political impact of using the carrier, Kissinger noted that it would take six days to move the carrier from Southeast Asia to the Bay of Bengal by which time Congress would be out of session.
He said he would assess whether the US could keep the carrier back of the Bay of Bengal."
Nixon asked: "Then can we move the other helicopter thing in?" Kissinger was affirmative.
Nixon reviewed the other decisions reached during the discussion: to encourage the transfer of Jordanian planes to Pakistan, to notify the Chinese about what they had decided to do, to leak the Kennedy commitment to protect Pakistan, and to ask India for assurances that there would be no annexations as a result of the crisis.
Paks in dire straits
Kissinger said that Pakistan's army would run out of ammunition and oil within two weeks. In response to Nixon's question about what the United States could do to influence the outcome, Kissinger replied: "I would keep open the possibility that we'll pour arms into Pakistan."
If the Soviet Union could ship arms to India, Kissinger did not see why the United States could not supply arms to Pakistan. "I don't understand the theory of non-involvement," he said. "I don't see where we will be as a country. I have to tell you honestly I consider this our Rhineland."
He warned: "If the Russians come out of it totally cocky, we may have a Middle East war in the spring."
Nixon was concerned about the implications of taking a hard line. "We have to know what we are jeopardizing," he said.
Kissinger responded: "You are jeopardizing your relationship with the Soviets, but that is also your card, your willingness to jeopardize it." Not to play that card, Kissinger suggested, would be to concede the Soviet Union a dangerous victory.
Nixon observed that opponents of his policy toward South Asia were also concerned about jeopardizing United States relations with India. Kissinger said: "You could argue that it will help us in the long-term with the Indians." Nixon replied: "I don't give a damn about the Indians."
