Pakistan and Afghanistan right now are locked in a cycle of escalating tension. Repeated border clashes have strained ties between the two nations.
The current round of tensions began in February 2026, when Pakistan launched strikes into Afghanistan targeting Taliban militants. At one point in March, Pakistan’s defense minister said the country was at “open war” with Afghanistan. Periodic bouts of violence have continued since then, with the latest Pakistani strikes targeting the Afghan Taliban’s “terrorist hubs” reported earlier in October.
At the heart of the dispute is Pakistan’s accusation that the Taliban authorities in Kabul allow the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group, to target Pakistan from Afghan territory. Kabul denies providing the group with sanctuary.
As the two neighbors trade strikes, the escalating conflict “presents a significant diplomatic and strategic opportunity for India,” Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, an Afghanistan expert and founder of the India-based Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies, told DW.
D’Souza argues the confrontation has weakened Pakistan’s traditional influence in Afghanistan and encouraged the Taliban to broaden its external relations.
“India can respond by expanding diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, development projects and trade, while seeking assurances that Afghan territory will not be used by anti-India militant groups,” she said.
However, D’Souza cautioned against interpreting the opening as a fundamental realignment.
“There is no ideological alignment between India and the Taliban,” she said. Afghanistan under Taliban rule is likely to pursue a diversified foreign policy rather than align exclusively with New Delhi.
India also lacks the geographical advantages, economic leverage and security presence needed to replace Pakistan’s influence, she notes. “The scenario of the Taliban becoming a strategic ally remains far-fetched.”
Former Indian ambassador to Afghanistan Amar Sinha warned against viewing the conflict simply as an opportunity for New Delhi to gain at Pakistan’s expense.
“The issues have very little to do with India,” Sinha told DW, arguing that India was not seeking strategic advantage from the fighting. He also pointed to the consequences of Pakistan’s military actions for Afghan civilians.
“Yet the rupture has made Kabul’s search for alternative partners more pressing,” he added.
For India, that creates an opening, but not necessarily a strategic alignment, Sinha notes. The Taliban can seek Indian assistance while maintaining relations with China, Russia, Iran and Gulf states, preserving its autonomy rather than exchanging dependence on Pakistan for dependence on India.
Gautam Mukhopadhyaya, another former Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, sees the deterioration in relations between Pakistan and the Taliban as an opportunity for India to recover some of the strategic ground it lost when the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
“The crisis has allowed strategic openings for India,” Mukhopadhyaya told DW. He warned, however, that New Delhi’s own treatment of Afghans could undermine its efforts to build a durable relationship.
He pointed to restrictions affecting Afghans seeking Indian visas for education, scholarships, work and medical treatment.
“For all practical purposes, India’s security establishment treats Afghans as proxy Pakistanis and ‘terrorists’ by default,” he said.
Former Afghan partners had been left “disappointed, even bitter,” Mukhopadhyaya added. “A strategic relationship built on the sands of oppression is not a sound foundation.”
India has restored air freight links between Kabul and Delhi and between Kabul and Amritsar in northwestern India in December 2025.
Bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan stood at about $908 million (€807 million) in the 2025-26 fiscal year, while trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan fell sharply amid repeated border closures.
On October 14, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi stressed the importance of relations with India during talks with Indian charge d’affaires Yatin Patel, signaling Kabul’s interest in expanding economic cooperation.
But air freight is expensive, and India cannot easily replace Pakistan as a transit route.
New Delhi has sought to use Iran’s Chabahar port to improve access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, but regional instability and complications surrounding Iran have constrained those ambitions.
D’Souza cautioned that “the ongoing conflict in Iran” limits India’s ability to use Chabahar as a crucial trade and connectivity hub.
Gulshan Sachdeva, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University specializing in Afghanistan and Eurasian connectivity, highlighted similar obstacles.
“In the last few decades, Islamabad has obstructed Kabul’s efforts to gain access to the vast Indian market. However, political instability in Afghanistan and sanctions on Iran have undermined these efforts,” Sachdeva told DW.
“Afghanistan’s potential as a connector between regional markets remains considerable, but the infrastructure and political conditions needed to realize it are far from assured,” he added.
Sachdeva also sees Russia and China as better positioned to shape Afghanistan’s wider economic integration. Alternative routes may become more attractive to India, but they are not commercially viable overnight.
Pakistan has portrayed arch-rival India’s growing engagement with the Taliban as a security threat. On October 7, Pakistani diplomat Muhammad Jawad Ajmal accused India at the United Nations of providing the Taliban with material and logistical support.
“Under the guise of humanitarian aid, they have been actively supporting the Taliban regime with material and logistical support for carrying out terrorist attacks against Pakistan,” Ajmal said.
The allegation reflects Islamabad’s position and has not been established as fact.
Pakistan has accused India of supporting the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army, a militant organization.
India rejects accusations of backing militant activity, while the Taliban denies allowing Afghan territory to be used for attacks against Pakistan.
Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani expert on military and security affairs at King’s College London, offered a more nuanced assessment of Pakistan’s position.
“India has stepped into a space and is trying to exert its influence and feed anti-Pakistan groups intelligence,” she told DW.
Siddiqa added that Pakistan’s establishment continues to view the crisis through “a singular security lens.”
“Islamabad feels physically squeezed from both sides,” she said, adding that closer Kabul-New Delhi ties could create “a dangerous two-front security trap” for Pakistan.
India may gain more room to operate in Afghanistan as ties between Kabul and Islamabad deteriorate. But the Taliban is unlikely to put all its eggs in New Delhi’s basket.
