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The moral justification of murder

Update : 19 Sep 2014, 07:51 PM

It is a shocking title and is meant to be. When is a human being entitled to take the life of another human being? It happens all the time, though we seldom ponder on it. The most obvious moral justification is in self-defence or in war. If the state takes a human life, it is more often legally endorsed, thus serving the cover for moral justification.

In extreme cases, it is ideologically defended when morals are suspended to commit genocide. But, by far the most common moral justification of taking another life is when the person to be killed has committed the most heinous crimes. Now, this could be carried out through a normal legal process if capital punishment is allowed, or ignoring or influencing the process on popular demand despite the law being there.

This may seem to be a piece on capital punishment, but it is not. The debate on capital punishment could be endless, but central to all arguments for and against is the fundamental question of whether any murder (I use this term broadly to cover every instance of a human being taking the life of another human, including executions) can be morally justified.

For the opponents of capital punishment, the answer is a simple no, except perhaps in the case of self-defence or war. When this simple but resolute premise is challenged, moral justifications are the primary underpinnings of those arguments. And as with all moral justifications, it could run on and on.

This piece is about closure and how we are dealing with it. The most heinous crimes were committed in 1971 by a group of people driven by ideology, greed, or pure malice. For those who do not oppose capital punishment, perpetrators of those crimes deserve to die, and justice followed by closure can only come from their death. The problem of seeking justice was complicated by the fact that for decades after the country won its independence in 1971, the perpetrators never had a day of reckoning, some were even rewarded and a few were endorsed with electoral mandate. The first task therefore was to bring them to justice, and in a country where capital punishment is allowed, justice could mean death but need not necessarily guarantee it.

The government of Sheikh Hasina came to power in 2009 with an election manifesto that promised trial of the war criminals of 1971, thus promising justice, but could not and did not guarantee their death. This promise was kept, when in 2013 the first sentences were handed down to the war criminals. Shahbagh erupted because justice was equated with death, with the false pretext that only a movement for death sentence could bring justice to the people. Thus, the movement took on a larger than life proportion stretching beyond its scope. The fact that it imploded from within is no surprise.

But where does it leave us with closure? Opponents of capital punishment would argue there is no “fairness” in taking a life, thus no justice, and without justice there cannot be closure. Who deserves to die and who doesn’t, when both are guilty of similar crimes is a tricky area and not simply academic, because a death sentence, if implemented, is a judgment that is irreversible. Human mistakes will happen, and when it involves a human life, that is one grim prospect.

On Thursday September 18, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence of Sayedee to life imprisonment. Was justice served? Photographs of Shahbagh today in social media sites show a deserted venue. Shall we then assume most people are happy with this judgement? It doesn’t take much to realise that people who had equated justice with death will not be, and they made up for the bulk of the people in the first Shahbagh movement.

But what about the small minority of those who seek justice and closure, but oppose capital punishment? Could they be happy because justice has been served, when hardly a year ago the same court overturned the life imprisonment sentence to death penalty for a lesser person guilty of similar crimes? And finally, would we have at all asked these questions today if justice was not equated with death, and Shahbagh did not happen, and we had left such matters to the judiciary to carry on with its task to deliver justice as the government has promised?

Ironic though it may sound, with its singular and persistent demand of “fashi chai,” Shahbagh perhaps prevented bringing closure to the ones who needed it most, despite the AL government’s best efforts to deliver justice as promised. If this was not so, we would have seen another Shahbagh today. 

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