After much hand-wringing and running through all possible options, the US decided to enter again into Iraq space more than two years after it had withdrawn all its troops from that ill-fated country. Ostensibly, this second entry, albeit a very limited one, began as humanitarian aid to rescue a minority sect of Iraq forced by the Islamic militants fighting in the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) to flee their townships to remote mountains.
But now it has turned to air attacks on ISIL forces to drive them out of Iraqi towns occupied by them with support from Kurdistan troops who are purportedly helping the anemic Iraqi government to recover territories lost to the militants. At the time of this writing, the airstrikes by US have been able to drive the ISIL militants from some strategic areas of Iraq, which they had occupied from a thoroughly demoralised and dilapidated Iraqi army.
If the current intensity of the US air attacks continues for some time, and the ragtag Iraqi army is able to remobilise and regroup with renewed strength under the new Iraqi prime minister, it is possible that the ISIL militants will retreat to their strongholds inside Syria, and Iraq may gain its lost territories back. But there are too many imponderables in this scenario, the most difficult of which is the ability of the Iraqi army to regroup and remobilise.
The follow-through battles after the US airstrikes in the ISIL-held region were mostly fought by Kurdish troops who came out to secure their autonomous region from the militants initially, and then lent support to Iraqi government forces. In fact, it is doubtful if the militant-occupied territories could have been regained with only airstrikes without the Kurdish ground support. The second biggest unknown is the ability of the new Iraqi government and its prime minister to forge a coalition of unity in Iraq that was fractured by sectarian and ethnic divisions.
The abject failure of the previous prime minister, Maliki, to show a minimal semblance of sectarian unity, and his rather open bias toward his own sect, in official acts and public policy, led to wide disgruntlement among other minorities, in particular the Sunnis. In fact, a major reason for the reportedly cordial reception to ISIL militants accorded to the Iraqi towns captured by them was because the residents had become resentful and antagonistic to the Maliki government. The militants, who all professed to be Sunnis, in a way had become their liberators.
So the challenge to the new prime minister and his government would be to allay these fears from the Sunni minorities as well as the now powerful Kurds who would like to retain their autonomous status with complete ownership of their oil wealth.
The third big puzzle is the ISIL itself. It is simplistic to cast it off as a terrorist organisation. But it is much more than that. In a time span of less than a year, the group emerged as the most powerful of all the armed groups that were fighting against the Assad regime in Syria.
But while other anti-Assad forces were simply fighting the Assad army and driving them away from cities, the ISIL militants were focused on not only driving Assad forces from the cities, but also trying to establish the Sharia law in the areas they occupied. They proved that they were not simply seeking to oust the Assad government, but to establish a government according to their interpretation of Islam, and the laws they thought appropriate.
Hence, their desire to fan out and stake their claims on bigger territories to spread their concept of government and the laws this government would implement. The ISIL may retreat from the areas they occupied in Iraq, but it will regroup and channel its forces to other areas in and around as soon as the current air attacks abate and follow up ground forces return to normal mode.
This second phase of the war in Iraq may end quickly if the mission is only to oust ISIL from the country. But it may be protracted if the mission expands to the eradication of ISIL militants from that geographic area, which conjoins several countries. Airstrikes will temporarily dislodge the logistics and locations of the militants, but to drive them out of the habitats they have selected, it will require more coordinated efforts from all the countries in the region, including Iran. It will require a strategy both long and short term that will be agreed upon by the countries and their allies in the west which aim to end religious militancy.
Militancy cannot be an end by itself. It is a means to an end, it is a tactic to achieve a goal. The mission of the current militant movement in Syria and Iraq is to establish a system of governance that was meant for a society in the distant past that had just come out of ignorance and idolatry.
Unfortunately, the group is trying to foist on people the same system in the name of religion with a harshness that contradicts the main teachings of Islam, which is tolerance and moderation. The countries within the region need to wake up to this threat and stop it before it causes irreparable harm to them.
Any movement, whether militant or peaceful, is sustained by support both direct and indirect. The direct support comes from the resources, finance, and manpower that the movement receives from its ideological sympathisers and political opportunists. The indirect support comes from countries that fail to resist such movement within themselves.
The ISIL movement will continue to remain a threat to the region as long as the region itself, particularly Syria and Iraq, remain unstable. It may go underground under air attacks and resurrect itself when opportunity strikes. It can only be stopped with the concerted actions of all countries in the region, which includes Iran. We do not know if that day will ever come.



