The BNP is an important stake-holder in Bangladeshi politics. The party was formed in 1978, but its founder, the late General Ziaur Rahman, who had ruled the country from 1976 until his murder in the 1981 military coup.
Since 1990, the BNP has been in power twice (1991-1996 and 2001-2006) under the premiership of Khaleda Zia, the widowed wife of Rahman. Public support of this party has been consistently high.
In 1991, the BNP won 140 parliamentary seats out of 300, with support from 31% of 34,477,803 voters. In 2001, the party won 193 seats, and in 2008 the party won about 30 seats even though it bagged over 30% of all votes. These figures should be enough to show how significant the BNP is in Bangladeshi politics.
However, the party seems to be going through something of an existential crisis lately. Even though it has experienced problems before, especially during the time of Ershad’s regime, this time, the nature, degree, and manifestation of the crisis seem to be extraordinary for three major reasons.
First, BNP seems to be struggling to maintain its stature as an organisation. The party is structured so that its member base reaches villages, sub-districts, and districts, even outside Bangladesh.
Currently, BNP’s level of activity seems to be confined within the short boundaries of TV talk-shows, press statements, and seminar symposiums.
While political movements and parties are mostly about strengthening their activities in all strata of a given society, BNP seems content being within the confines of the media.
The party has failed to show evidence that it is able to maintain a large number of activists. Therefore, when party leader Khaleda Zia was blocked from exiting her Gulshan office, we saw little to no street protest from BNP activists.
There was no civil disobedience staged by any other political and professional fronts associated with BNP.
BNP’s spokesperson always blamed government oppression for a lack of empathy shown by BNP activists for the alleged house arrest of Khaleda Zia.
While they may have some point in that argument, it is also necessary to recognise that “shifting blame” is not a useful mechanism in evaluating one’s own status.
It is a fact that BNP’s student and other fronts have failed to perform as useful entities to uphold organisational structure, and that is why when Khaleda Zia was confined in her office, virtually no one was there to protest. This was nothing but BNP’s own failure as an organisation.
Second, against the backdrop of the ongoing multi-faceted pressures on BNP, the party has, strangely, failed to generate any semblance of a public relation campaign that would foster a favourable image among key stake-holders such as the media, the civil society, and the international community.
Another well-known fact is that BNP, after Ziaur Rahman’s demise, never bothered to articulate strategic relationships with civil society members, unlike AL. Rather than extending a hand of friendship with BNP’s staunch critics in the civil society, the party always preferred to intimidate them, sending many to jail even.
When party leader Khaleda Zia was blocked from exiting her Gulshan office, we saw little to no street protest from BNP activists
As a result, those civil society members who are now active leaders in academia, media, and other professional arenas used AL’s platform to challenge BNP’s image with little to no resistance.
Due to a lack of aggressive media campaigns from BNP against Tarique Rahman’s alleged corrupt ways, and the party’s suicidal alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami, a time when Islamists are seen as a threat to global stability, the international community seems to have little faith in BNP.
Anyone who is a regular within the diplomatic circles in Dhaka would know that there still remains a sense of reservation about BNP.
If it could come to power through a fair and free election, not many would be against it, but the international community will not stretch out to do something extraordinary, like in 2006-2008, to stage an election.
Third, a party survives on its vision, and the BNP seems to have none.
Its chief rival, AL, has invigorated a new politics on shadhinotar chetona. It was successful in mobilising a vast number of youths of the country around that idea.
Even an apolitical youth of the country now relates to or discusses about Shadhinotar Chetona. The intake of AL’s student front also seems to be a continuous process, whereas no bright young student nowadays enrolls for membership in BNP’s student front.
Foreign policy-wise, the AL revised its stance to play a balanced game between India, China, the US, and the Middle-East. By contrast, BNP still persists its politics on ideas laid out by Ziaur Rahman. Ideas that include promotion of a religious nationalism based on anti-India, pro-China, and pro-US policies. There are arguments that there are elements within BNP who have decidedly pro-Pakistan agendas.
However, BNP’s leadership needs to understand that the context of Ziaur Rahman’s brand of politics and the current context are different, and the party thus needs to revise its vision to contextualise its politics in the current national and international fronts.
There is little doubt that BNP still is a popular party, but being popular isn’t enough for a political organisation, and as an organisation, BNP seems to be struggling on many fronts.
Mubashar Hasan is an expert on Bangladesh politics. He teaches political science at a Bangladeshi university. He is the founder of www.alochonaa.com, an online platform to promote dialogue and pluralism.
