For nearly three decades, Bangladesh Bank held the taka at an artificially stable rate, while domestic costs climbed 172%. Exporters absorbed the gap. Migrant workers routed their earnings through illegal channels. The bill arrived in 2022, all at once, in the form of a collapsing currency, burned reserves, and the largest single-day taka fall in history.
A success story built on unstable ground
Bangladesh's garment industry is one of the most frequently cited development achievements of the past four decades. From almost nothing in the early 1980s, the country built a ready-made garments sector that now employs more than four million workers directly and supports fifteen million livelihoods across the supply chain.
Over 80% of Bangladesh's foreign exchange earnings come from garments sold to Europe and North America. That scale, built that fast, is genuinely rare.
But that record contains a problem that went unaddressed for nearly 30 years. While Bangladesh was accumulating export volumes, it was also running a currency policy that steadily undercut the competitiveness of the same factories producing those exports.
The taka was kept at an artificially stable rate even as domestic inflation steadily eroded its real purchasing power. Economists flagged the problem across multiple governments. Policy-makers passed on it every time. Costs accumulated in silence for 15 years, until a global commodity shock in 2022 forced a correction no one had prepared for.
A 140-point gap nobody fixed
The arithmetic here is not complex. Between 2006 and 2021, Bangladesh experienced a 172% cumulative inflation. Wages rose. Electricity tariffs climbed. Raw material costs increased. Compliance costs spiked after the 2013 Rana Plaza collapse.
Over the same fifteen-year period, the taka lost just 32% of its value against the dollar. That is a 140-percentage-point gap between what it cost to produce goods in Bangladesh and what exporters actually recovered per dollar earned. Harvard Kennedy School research published in December 2024 put a precise number on that gap.
Consider a specific case. A garment factory in Narayanganj exported one million dollars' worth of goods per year in 2010. Each year, production costs rise 7 to 8%. Wages, utilities, compliance, logistics. The taka barely moves.
After 15 years, economists calculated that a factory in that position lost over Tk75 crore in cumulative real income. Not because of poor management. Not because of a global recession. Because a government policy decided, year after year, that the exchange rate should not adjust.
Defenders of a fixed rate argue that devaluation also raises costs, since Bangladesh imports cotton yarn, synthetic fabric, dyes, and machinery. When the taka weakens, those inputs become more expensive.
That is true. But when you net out both effects, economists estimate the real gain from devaluation runs around 20%. For a factory running on a 4 to 6% net margin, absorbing 15 years of domestic cost inflation without any currency adjustment is not manageable.
The factories that paid first
A garment factory on a 4 to 6% net margin cannot carry seven or eight years of unchecked domestic cost inflation and survive intact. That is what Bangladesh's exchange rate policy asked exporters to do, for 15 years straight.
The factories that stayed alive typically did so by cutting quality, reducing compliance investment, or both. Orders that should have gone to Gazipur went to Ho Chi Minh City instead. Every percentage point of competitive disadvantage that accumulated over that period represented real factories, real orders, and real jobs that went somewhere else.
Migrant workers and the hundi problem
More than one crore Bangladeshis work abroad. Every month, they wire money home. When the official exchange rate was held artificially low, the taka their families received per dollar was less than what the informal market offered. Millions of workers shifted their remittances to hundi, an illegal channel that paid a better rate.
The formal banking system lost the inflows. The central bank lost reserves it could not afford to lose. By keeping the rate artificially suppressed, the state directly reduced the real earnings of over one crore workers for years and pushed them toward channels it could not monitor or tax. This is not a secondary consequence of the policy. It is a direct, measurable cost.
As stated by Professor Abdul Momen, "Overvalued currency kills exports, and failing to adjust the rate not only hurts manufacturers but ultimately destroys the agricultural sector too."
What Vietnam and China did differently
While Bangladesh was defending an artificial rate, the countries competing with it for export orders were making different choices.
Vietnam's export to GDP ratio sat at roughly 25% in 1995, comparable to Bangladesh's at the time. By 2019, Vietnam's ratio had crossed 100%. Bangladesh's had fallen to around 20%. The entire period that Vietnam spent building a diversified export base, Bangladesh spent protecting a currency peg.
China's 1994 devaluation, moving the renminbi from 5.8 to 8.3 per dollar in a single step, is the most dramatic example. It was politically costly and economically disruptive in the short run. Within a decade, China had become the world's largest exporter. Bangladesh watched that decision and did nothing equivalent.
How the crisis finally landed
The sequence of decisions that produced this outcome did not arrive by chance. Each step deferred the cost to a future government, a future crisis, a future generation of workers.
That May 2024 adjustment did not happen because policy-makers decided the time was right. It happened because the International Monetary Fund made it a condition of a $4.7 billion loan tranche.
The central bank spent $7 billion in four months defending a rate the market had already rejected. Reserves fell from $27bn to $19.9bn in that window.
Where Bangladesh stands in 2026
As of April 2026, the taka trades at roughly Tk 122 to 123 per dollar. The crawling peg introduced in May 2024 has brought some stability. The gap between the official and informal market rate has mostly closed. Interbank volatility has narrowed.
That is real progress. But progress that arrives as a crisis rather than a managed transition carries a larger price tag than it should.
The structural challenges ahead are specific. Bangladesh is scheduled to graduate from least developed country status in 2026, which removes its preferential duty-free access to European and American markets.
That access made the RMG boom possible. US tariff uncertainty is already visible in the data: Merchandise exports fell 3.2% in the first eight months of FY2026. BNP won a supermajority in the February 12, 2026 elections and now inherits both the crawling peg and these structural vulnerabilities at the same time.
The crawling peg is better than fixed suppression. But it is still a managed system. Bangladesh Bank retains discretion over the pace of adjustment.
Harvard Kennedy School and IMF economists have both argued that this discretion is precisely the problem, because the central bank has not built the credibility required to exercise it responsibly, given its track record over the past two decades. The risk of another artificial stabilization, and another reserve burn, has not disappeared. It has only been reduced.
A new governor and an old institutional reflex
On February 25, 2026, Bangladesh Bank appointed Mostaqur Rahman as governor. He is the first businessman to hold the position in the institution's 52-year history.
He has not read about the exporter's cost squeeze in academic papers. He has lived it. He knows what an overvalued taka does to a shipment's landed cost. He knows what happens to your margins when electricity tariffs rise but the exchange rate stays fixed.
The test is whether he has the political backing to act on that knowledge. The institutional pressure to hold the taka has never depended on who sits in the chair. Governors who understood the problem still could not fix it.
As a Harvard Kennedy School Policy Brief, December 2024 summarizes: "The exchange rate is not the weather, something unpredictable and external, best endured. It is a thermostat. You set it deliberately, and the economy adjusts."
The bill Is still running
Bangladesh's exchange rate story is, at its core, about who bears the cost of political choices. By keeping the currency overvalued for 30 years, the government transferred the burden from importers to exporters, from protected industries to productive ones, from the policy office to the factory floor.
Garment workers, migrant remitters, and export-oriented entrepreneurs absorbed that burden for nearly three decades, mostly without knowing it. They paid through lower real wages, lost orders to competitors in Vietnam and Cambodia, remittances diverted to informal networks, and industries that never materialized.
The crawling peg has changed the mechanism. Whether it changes the underlying institutional instinct is the question you should watch over the next five years.
If Bangladesh Bank uses its discretion to stabilize again when adjustment becomes politically uncomfortable, the answer will be clear.
If it lets the rate move with market conditions, the answer will be different. The outcome is not yet settled.
Md Morshedul Hoque is a professional accountant with 27 years of experience in finance, accounts, and treasury functions. He has served as Chief Financial Officer of Bitopi Group since 2014. Views expressed are the writer’s own.



