Bangladesh is not simply running out of fuel. It is running out of confidence in how fuel reaches its people. In recent weeks, the streets of Bangladesh have become a theatre of the absurd.
While the Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC) repeatedly assures the nation that reserves are stable and imports are overflowing, the kilometre-long queues at filling stations tell a story of desperation.
As of mid-April 2026, the BPC reportedly holds approximately 55,500 tons of octane in stock. This volume actually exceeds our national storage capacity of 53,000 tons, yet the public cannot find a drop without a fight.
This is not a supply crisis; it is a governance failure rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of human behaviour and simple mathematics.
While global instability and the volatile shipping routes of the Middle East have placed undeniable pressure on our energy security, these external shocks do not fully explain the chaos currently unfolding at our filling stations.
We are facing a crisis of trust, and in moments of peak uncertainty, trust moves much faster than supply.
When a crisis arrives, it is often argued that we cannot change the past or prevent the global triggers that caused it. However, the current disruption in Bangladesh is less about a collapse in supply and more about a failure in operational management.
To resolve it, we must shift our focus from controlling the resource to managing the behaviour, the incentives, and the mathematics of the national vehicle fleet.
The first shift we must address is behavioral. In normal times, a vehicle tank is a flexible tool; we refill when it hits a quarter.
But in a panic, the logic changes. When a driver sees a kilometre-long queue, fuel is no longer something you buy when needed; it is something you secure whenever available.
This simple shift in the "refill threshold" across our fleet of nearly six million registered vehicles has a devastating effect.
If about 4.8 million motorcyclists suddenly decide to top up their tanks daily rather than weekly, the pressure on the system multiplies fivefold without a single extra mile being driven.
The second shift is structural, as fuel does not disappear on its own. The recent recovery of over five hundred thousand litres of hoarded fuel proves that supply is being diverted into the black market through the collusion of dispensing points.
Filling station owners must be held strictly accountable for every drop they receive. By tracing the oil and the money, authorities can instantly spot the mathematical impossibility of a station receiving a tanker only to claim a stock-out hours later.
Ensuring the supply chain remains a closed loop, protected from those who exploit national anxiety for profit, is the true mark of effective crisis management.
The third shift is a policy signal. Our current rationing, limiting motorcycles to five hundred taka and cars to a thousand, is meant to control demand, but it does the opposite.
By treating a massive population with a "dropper" approach, we have inadvertently institutionalized the panic. We are telling the public they cannot be secure, so they return to the pumps with even greater frequency.
Scarcity is not just being experienced; it is being reinforced by the very rules meant to manage it.
Breaking this cycle requires a decisive, management-led "shock inundation." Instead of prolonged restrictions, the government should temporarily flood the market with double the daily national demand of approximately 1,200 tons.
This must be done without prior warning to prevent a pre-rush, allowing the public to buy their way back to a sense of security.
This requires coordination across distribution networks that can keep the timeline confidential -- not impossible, but operationally demanding.
Once a tank is full, the urgency fades. A rider with a full tank stays home for a week, and the queues begin to thin not because fuel has increased dramatically, but because the frequency of visits has returned to a baseline.
Critically, when visible supply normalizes, the margins that make black-market hoarding profitable collapse. There is no incentive to divert fuel illegally when purchasing at the pump is no longer a struggle.
Simultaneously, we must address the systemic hoarding occurring behind the nozzles. Hoarding is a child of scarcity and it cannot survive abundance. If the market is flooded and tanks are full, the black-market traders currently siphoning fuel will find themselves with expensive stock and no buyers.
The math is clear: We cannot ration our way out of a psychological panic. The oil is in the ships and the depots; it simply needs to be in the tanks.
If the authorities stop managing the oil as a scarce commodity and start managing the tank as a psychological buffer, the crisis will vanish in seven days.
It is time to stop the drops and start the flood. Only by letting the people feel full can we finally empty the streets.
AKM Tariful Islam Khan is Head of Communications at an international organization based in Bangladesh. Email: [email protected]. The views expressed are his own.



