Bangladesh stands at a rare democratic turning point. After years of growing frustration, a government widely perceived as unaccountable was finally pushed out through an unprecedented wave of youth-led civic mobilization. What many are calling a democratic reawakening has brought to power a transitional administration shaped not by elite bargains but by popular insistence.
For the first time in a generation, Bangladeshis feel the possibility of a political order grounded in genuine public consent. As the country debates what institutional path it should now adopt -- whether a strengthened caretaker framework, a more empowered election commission, or deeper constitutional reform -- one deeply corrosive feature of Bangladesh’s political life continues to evade serious scrutiny: The practice of pre-election seat-sharing.
Though not strictly illegal, it is still a structural distortion of constitutional principles, a violation of international democratic norms, and an ethical breach that hollows out the very idea of popular sovereignty.
Supporters of seat-sharing claim that alliance coordination is merely a prudent strategy to consolidate electoral strength and avoid fragmentation. But this narrative disguises a profound democratic injury.
When parties negotiate candidacies behind closed doors and withdraw nominees to guarantee victory for an allied party, the election is effectively predetermined before a single ballot is cast. The public theatre of voting becomes a ritualistic endorsement of decisions made by political elites.
Bangladesh’s Constitution does not envision elections as symbolic exercises. It promises direct elections -- an idea grounded in meaningful choice, not managed outcomes or choreographed consensus. Direct election requires direct choice. Anything less renders the franchise an empty procedural gesture rather than a transfer of democratic authority.
A persistent misunderstanding in Bangladesh is that the constitutional requirement of direct election applies only to the simple act of casting a ballot. As long as ballots exist and voters drop them into boxes, many assume the constitutional obligation is fulfilled. But this narrow interpretation collapses upon closer scrutiny.
In all credible democracies, elections are understood as a two-stage process: First, nomination; then, voting. Nomination determines who appears on the ballot; voting determines which candidate wins. If elites manipulate the nomination stage -- eliminating viable candidates not through public judgment but through alliance deals -- the subsequent voting stage becomes meaningless.
A ballot offering only one alliance-approved candidate may technically permit voting, but it does not permit choosing. Courts across the world have affirmed this logic. The Indian Supreme Court has warned that voting rights are rendered meaningless when voters are denied the choice of candidates. The European Court of Human Rights requires genuine competition as a condition of electoral legitimacy. South Africa’s Constitutional Court stresses that restrictions on candidacy undermine the very essence of electoral rights. Under these standards, Bangladesh cannot claim to meet its constitutional responsibility while engineering away real competition.
What the law says
The practice of seat-sharing strains multiple constitutional provisions. Article 7, the foundational clause of the Constitution of Bangladesh, declares that all powers belong to the people. Yet seat-sharing shifts the power of selection from citizens to party leaders negotiating in private.
Article 11 requires that the political system ensure the effective participation of the people. But participation cannot be effective when voters are given no real alternatives.
The most direct contradiction lies in Article 65, which mandates that members of Parliament must be chosen by direct election. Directness does not mean the mere mechanics of voting; it means genuine electoral agency. When alliances withdraw candidates and create uncontested or effectively predetermined constituencies, the directness of the election is replaced by indirect selection through party negotiation.
Even Article 38, which protects freedom of association, is implicated. Party supporters in a constituency may wish to put forward their own candidate, yet seat-sharing agreements -- almost always opaque and top-down -- override the will of local members. The freedoms of party members are subordinated to the calculus of central leadership.
One may argue that the local party establishment's Freedom of Association is not directly affected, since an allegedly deprived candidate (due to seat-sharing) can contest independently. Those local party members may choose to leave the party and create their own association to support her. So strictly in the legal sense, neither the participant nor the voters are barred from participating or voting.
Still, local voters of that party are being deprived of their choice of candidate and forced to vote for the alliance candidate from another party. Also, ethically, it is unfair to the party loyalist who cares about the symbol above all else.
Speaking of ethical damage, seat-sharing violates the moral obligation of political transparency. Decisions that shape representation in a democratic system should be made openly, subject to public debate, and justifiable to those affected. Instead, Bangladesh’s seat-sharing negotiations occur in secrecy, with no disclosure of who decided what, when, or why.
The practice undermines political equality by ensuring that some constituencies receive meaningful competition while others are deprived of it simply because national leaders strike a deal. It also breaches the principle of voter autonomy, a cornerstone of democratic ethics.
Democracy assumes that citizens are independent moral agents capable of making their own choices. When parties manipulate the candidate field, they treat voters as instruments rather than decision-makers. Representatives who enter Parliament through uncontested or artificially limited races carry a compromised mandate. Their loyalty runs upward to party leadership, not downward to constituents. This erodes public trust, weakens accountability, and diminishes the quality of governance.
Bangladesh is bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires genuine periodic elections that reflect the free expression of the electorate. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated explicitly that voters must be presented with real choices and that nomination processes must not be manipulated to limit competition.
Elections in which the candidate field is artificially suppressed fail to meet this standard. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that governmental authority derives from the will of the people, a principle violated when representatives are chosen through inter-party negotiation rather than voter preference.
International guidelines -- from the Venice Commission to global electoral best practices -- emphasize political pluralism, competition, and meaningful choice. Bangladesh’s systematic removal of candidates through seat-sharing does not align with these principles.
While defenders of seat-sharing often cite coalition behaviour in established Western parliamentary democracies, these comparisons collapse under scrutiny. In the United Kingdom, occasional pre-election understandings do occur, but they are limited, publicly debated, and never imposed on local party organizations.
Crucially, they do not eliminate voter choice: Independent or dissident candidates routinely contest those constituencies, and pacts that appear to restrict competition are often punished by voters.
Germany’s electoral structure, with its mixed-member proportional system, makes large-scale non-competition arrangements nearly impossible. In Canada, where minor non-compete gestures have surfaced, they provoke immediate criticism for diluting democratic integrity.
Bangladesh’s laissez-faire approach to seat-sharing differs notably from practices in many other democracies. Observers note that the process is sometimes affected by what has been referred to as a “nomination business,” in which transparency may be constrained and decision-making tends to be concentrated at the top.
In this moment of democratic rediscovery, Bangladesh has a unique opportunity to rebuild its political system on firmer ethical and constitutional foundations. A youth-backed government has signaled that the country is ready to reclaim democratic agency. A transitional, caretaker-guided process is attempting to restore public trust.
But these reforms will fall short if pre-election seat-sharing -- one of the quietest yet most destructive practices in the political system -- remains intact. Parliament must reflect the true will of voters, not verdicts written behind closed doors.
Dr Ishtiaque Ahmed is a Professor and Chairman of the Department of Law, North South University. Saquib Rahman is a Senior Lecturer of law at North South University, and former International Affairs Secretary of the Jatiyo Party.
