Except for the time of the mercantile militarists of various European countries that swamped the region in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Bay of Bengal has perhaps never been in as sweet a geopolitical and geo-economic spot as it is now.
The activity is as frenetic as the stakes are high, meshing everything from India’s maritime outreach to China’s energy and trading security, increasing superpower and G7 interest, and the intertwined interests of every littoral country from the Southeast Asian rim to South Asia and the Arabian Sea. Add the Indian Ocean into the mix, and you can up the strategic ante as high as you wish.
Some recent developments have added to the sense of hyper-activity.
There is, of course, all manner of talk about the United States pressuring Bangladesh for a dedicated port. And in that context who can forget ousted premier Sheikh Hasina’s allegation from August last year -- an allegation she persisted with well into this year from exile in India -- that the United States effectively triggered her exit as she wouldn’t give in to demands for a base and listening post on the tourist and fisheries haven of St Martin’s Island.
It is just a 3sq-km speck. But what a speck St Martin’s is, extending Bangladesh’s territory well south of its land boundary with Myanmar’s embattled Rakhine province. It can also be a terrific security lighthouse, as it were, positioned near the strategic port of Sittwe; Myanmar’s vast offshore hydrocarbon reserves; and not too far north of the strategic Chinese energy hub in Myanmar’s Ramree and Made Islands in Rakhine. These two hubs are the terminal end of two gas and oil pipelines which pump product right across Myanmar and all the way to China’s southwestern Yunnan province.
Bring in a couple of other points of triangulation in the Bay. There is the ever-expanding Indian naval presence -- ship building and maintenance, basing warships and submarines, and surveillance -- along the country’s eastern seaboard, and specifically located in Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh State. The coastal city is also the headquarters of India’s Eastern Naval Command.
Then there is the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India’s strategic bet that can arc-light the entire Bay of Bengal. They also sit astride the busy sea lanes between the southernmost islands in the chain and the nearby tip of Indonesia’s Aceh province. This is also appreciably close to the strategic and trading super-highway, if you will permit a mixed connectivity metaphor, of the Straits of Malacca. Or a chokepoint.
India’s work-in-progress plans call for a massive strategic upgrade of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, from locating frontline fighter and surveillance aircraft to a staging area of all manner of naval equipment. An integration of a multi-force command began in 2001, and since, the country’s navy, air force, army -- and, as a corollary, the coast guard -- have increasingly amped up the Andaman and Nicobar Command. (It even has a twitter handle, should you wish to visit.) It is also now an integrated “theatre command.” Based in Port Blair, renamed Sri Vijaya Puram in 2024, the command is overseen by CINCAN, or Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar Command, drawn from any of the three main services.
Draw a line southwest, and we arrive at Sri Lanka, and a little further on, the Maldives -- two hot-spots and increasingly active playgrounds for every superpower including China, and, of course, the regional biggie, India.
All this push-and-shove is leading to a transformation that has made South Asia’s maritime aspect every bit as scrappy as its myriad flashpoints on land. Perhaps it is not manifest as outright conflict, but there is certainly every manner of jostling and manoeuvring for every key regional port, every key regional trading hub, every safe harbour, every sea-inch of strategic leverage, maritime security, and blue-economy capture.
The biggest regional maritime coming-out is by India. And India is no longer being coy. It is partly reflected in the renaming of Port Blair, a harking back to India’s 11th century maritime glories -- the southern Chola kingdom’s imperial push, to be specific. But a lot more is evident in India’s positioning in the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.
There is also a continuing policy push. In a speech on September 21, Prime Minister Narendra Modi placed India’s maritime intent front and centre, from shipbuilding and port upgrades to the blue economy and security. That day, news arrived of an Rs42.5 billion (about $500 million) agreement between the private sector-run Swan Defence and Heavy Industries Ltd and Gujarat state’s Maritime Board to refurbish a vast facility at Pipavav port in the western Indian state. It is a part of an overall countrywide plan to boost supply chains and modernize shipyards.
In end-October, Mumbai will host India Maritime Week 2025. It has evolved from several such initiatives that began a decade or so ago. There will be presentations from nine Indian coastal states -- in a string from Gujarat and Maharashtra in the west coast to Odisha and West Bengal in the east. Scandinavian shipping interests will be showcased. There will be sessions on global supply chains, blue economy finance, shipbuilding, marine-tech, maritime corridors, and strategic connectivity. A platform billed as “Sagarmanthan: The Great Oceans Dialogue,” India’s public-private maritime policy and outreach jamboree that kicked off last year, will be a part of India Maritime Week in 2025.
Of great interest too is the engagement of the Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a partnership of the United States, Australia, Japan, and India at the Maritime Week in Mumbai. Quad will showcase its so-called Ports of the Future Partnership, a clear strategic throwdown to China and any competing alliances.
Bangladesh and every other littoral country along the Bay and in South Asia and the near-Indian Ocean will need to factor in these pushes and pulls. Indeed, these strategic tugs are going to intensify -- irrespective of whether one chooses to believe ousted or discredited despots, or not.
Sudeep Chakravarti works in the policy-and-practice space in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
