Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), as a political party, has long been plagued by a grandiose intellectual superiority, particularly in its approach to the contentious issue of the 1971 Liberation War. Such pretense is not merely a matter of political missteps but reflects a deeper, systemic issue: A chronic superiority complex that has rendered the party incapable of articulating a coherent, principled, or ideologically robust stance on one of the most pivotal events in the nation’s history.
Despite occasional attempts to critique or subtly insinuate alternative narratives, JI has consistently failed to substantiate its positions with credible evidence, rigorous analysis, or a well-reasoned historical perspective. Instead, its discourse has been marked by superficiality, defensiveness, and a glaring lack of intellectual honesty.
Recently, Information Adviser Mahfuz Alam addressed JI’s role in 1971, acknowledging its complicity in war crimes during the Liberation War. However, he also emphasized that those within Jamaat who align with Bangladesh’s interests have the right to engage in politics. He noted that, barring a few exceptions, the new generation of Jamaat members is not pro-Pakistan, arguing that their political rights should not be undermined by labeling them as anti-liberation forces. Alam suggested that the battle against JI must be fought politically and ideologically, rather than through exclusionary tactics.
Unsurprisingly, Jamaat has rejected these claims. Its Secretary General, Professor Mia Golam Parwar, countered that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s 1972 war crimes commission found no evidence linking Jamaat to war crimes, leading to amnesty for detainees and the repatriation of Pakistani soldiers.
However, this defense is riddled with inconsistencies. The commission’s findings remain shrouded in ambiguity, with no clarity on how an initial list of nearly 2,000 Pakistani war criminals was reduced to 195. Moreover, the commission did not investigate the involvement of Jamaat or other political actors, rendering claims of exoneration baseless.
Sazzadur Rahman, Doctoral student at Strassler Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University has pointed out in a Facebook post that the concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity were new to Bangladesh’s judicial system in the early 1970s. By mid-1973, the government’s focus on prosecuting domestic offenders waned, and by 1974-75, trials under the Collaborators Act had all but disappeared. This historical context underscores the unresolved nature of the 1971 issue and the inadequacy of Jamaat’s attempts to absolve itself.
However, since coming to power in 2009, it is no secret to the people of Bangladesh or the international community how the autocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina monopolized the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) to conduct its judicial proceedings. The manner in which the judiciary has been manipulated, bypassing due process and fair trial standards, has often turned the so-called trials into a farce, marked by coercion and a lack of transparency.
Numerous instances have come to light where the principles of justice were compromised, raising serious questions about the integrity of the process. Yet, despite these controversies, can the role of Jamaat-e-Islami in 1971 truly be absolved or forgotten? Will Hasina’s vindictiveness and perceived injustices toward Jamaat erase the party’s historical accountability for its actions during the Liberation War?
What is particularly striking is Jamaat’s inability to engage constructively with critical scholarship opposed to its egoistic intellectuals. Few intellectuals and activists have undertaken a tireless saga of building a narrative with critical insights and analyses not being affiliated with Jamaat, though the party often views such individuals with disdain, further highlighting its intellectual dishonesty and defensive mindset. This inability to engage with nuanced, critical perspectives renders Jamaat fundamentally unfit for meaningful political discourse, let alone governance.
Given these limitations, it would be prudent for Jamaat to withdraw from electoral politics altogether and redirect its efforts toward social welfare initiatives. The party’s historical baggage, particularly its controversial role in 1971, makes it a perpetual target for political adversaries. The BNP, for instance, will continue to exploit the 1971 narrative to consolidate its own standing, while students and the broader public increasingly align with the dominant national narrative of patriotism and liberation. In this context, Jamaat’s position will only grow more untenable.
Moreover, this polarization benefits the Awami League, which has ironically positioned itself as the standard-bearer of patriotism and liberation. As comparisons are inevitably drawn, Jamaat will find itself further questioned, marginalized, unable to shake off its historical stigma or present a compelling alternative vision.
In light of these realities, Jamaat’s continued participation in electoral politics is not only unsustainable but also counterproductive in countering the Bangladesh Awami League. The party’s inability to reconcile with the historical realities of 1971, coupled with its lacking of rationale and strategic shortcomings, necessitates a fundamental shift in focus.
By transitioning to social welfare work, JI could potentially rehabilitate its image and contribute to society in a more constructive manner. Such a move would allow the party to step away from divisive and futile political struggles, offering a path toward relevance in a nation that has moved beyond the ideological battles of the past.
In conclusion, Jamaat-e-Islami’s future lies not in the political arena but in social reformation. It is time for the party to acknowledge its limitations, embrace a new role, and work toward healing the divisions it has long perpetuated.
Nymoom Sakib is an Associate at MNA Barristers and Advocates and a political commentator. Email: [email protected]
