It is not always easy to differentiate between success and failure in history. What may look like success in the short term may turn out to be a failure and a major disappointment in the long run -- and vice versa.
Tomorrow marks November 3, the anniversary of a pivotal but often overlooked event in Bangladesh's history. On this day, 49 years ago in 1975, a coup d'état unfolded that, while historically significant, is scarcely commemorated. There will be no official observances, no special newspaper editions, and no statements from leaders in power -- perhaps a solitary television talk show if that. Yet, despite its obscurity, November 3, 1975, remains a defining moment in Bangladesh's history.
Reflecting on history, sometimes it is worthwhile to consider the counterfactuals -- the “what ifs.”
What if there had been no November 3 coup? The coup itself was short-lived, lasting from the early hours of November 3 until November 7. Yet, in another three days, the United States will hold a presidential election that will influence not only its own future but also the world’s.
Should Trump win -- a plausible outcome -- the impact could alter not only the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine war but potentially the future of Bangladesh as well.
Although these two events appear unrelated, examining how the United States responded to the November 3, 1975, coup in real-time offers some instructive insight.
In a telegram (Number 5470) from the American Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State on November 10, 1975, the American perspective on the coup was candidly expressed:
“We do not know positively whether [Brigadier] Mosharraf was the architect of the confrontation, as many contend, or whether, as one reliable source has suggested, he simply went along with subordinates determined to end the special role of the [m]ajors in the Moshtaque government -- a role that had, among other consequences, led to the harassment of some military officers. This source further suggested that one of Mosharraf’s objectives -- though he was likely mindful of personal gain -- was to guide his subordinates’ plans in a way that avoided major bloodshed.”
The November 3 coup was indeed bloodless, removing the officers responsible for the August 15 assassination of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family (leaving only his two daughters). It reinstated the chain of command in the army, seemingly Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf’s primary objective at the time, as Chief of the Army General Staff.
The US source appeared to be correct: The coup had been organized by young officers from both the Bangladesh Air Force and Army. This explains why, at the onset, MIG fighters and a helicopter threatened to strike the Lancer’s detachment guarding Bangabhaban, armed with tanks and armoured vehicles.
The coup, which began without violence, ultimately culminated in tragedy. As the officers responsible for August 15 were allowed to depart for Bangkok on November 3, they enacted one final, heinous act before leaving: The assassination of four national leaders within Dhaka Central Jail. Among the victims were former Home Minister Mansoor Ali, former Vice President Syed Nazrul Islam, former Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, and former Industries Minister Kamaruzzaman -- all executed in cold blood.
The subsequent tragic deaths of Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, Colonel Huda, and Lieutenant Colonel Haider, three highly esteemed war heroes, was a devastating loss. These patriotic officers could not tolerate the cabal responsible for August 15, and their primary aim was to restore law and order to the country.
Nevertheless, the coup was swiftly labeled a “pro-Indian” movement -- without any substantive evidence. On November 4, a pre-planned procession commemorated Bangabandhu's legacy, which was immediately branded as “pro-Indian.”
The American cable to the State Department clarified unequivocally: “We have no reason to believe that any of the regimes of the past week were anti-American, pro-Indian, or pro-Soviet in character.”
The November 3 coup installed Justice Abu Sadat Mohamed Sayem as president of Bangladesh, ensuring constitutional continuity in the wake of Moshtaque’s resignation. This set a precedent of appointing retired chief justices to head caretaker governments. Following President Sayem’s inauguration, Parliament was dissolved.
Without the November 3 coup, the Majors’ regime would have likely continued under President Moshtaque -- a former cabinet member who had betrayed his friend and leader Bangabandhu. Major General Zia would have remained Chief of Army Staff.
During the coup, Major General Zia was placed under house arrest, as officers visited his official residence, requesting that he “stay put.”
Would there have been a November 7 without November 3? On November 7, the Ganabahini, under retired Colonel Taher, a war hero and a Comrade in arms of Gen Zia rose against the November 3 regime, and Taher's brothers, alongside soldiers, freed Major General (later, Lt General) Zia from house arrest.
Colonel Taher himself showed no interest in assuming power. Apparently, Moshtaque was poised at the radio station, prepared to address the nation and reinstate himself as president, but Colonel Taher prevented this.
President Justice Abu Sadat Mohamed Sayem continued in office, and the rest, as they say, is history.
Habibul Haque Khondker is a sociologist and columnist.
