On July 20, Bangladeshis in many cities worldwide held protest rallies against the Awami League government’s armed repression of student-led protests over government jobs. I went to the one on Danforth Avenue in Toronto. Dhaka's streets have been ablaze with protests, ignited by an unlikely spark: A debate over job quotas. What began as student demonstrations -- against a system that, until recently, used to reserve 30% of government jobs for descendants of independence war veterans -- has in a week grown into a challenge to the country's increasingly authoritarian governance.
Students saw the quotas as strangling any hope that merit mattered more than political bosses. The graying Awami League leaders saw the students as either ungrateful or traitors from the War for Liberation fought in 1971.
The ruling Awami League, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, finds itself in a precarious position. Having presided over impressive economic growth -- Bangladesh's GDP has outpaced India's in recent years -- the party now faces a crisis of legitimacy. Its gradual erosion of democratic norms, including weakening opposition parties and curtailing press freedoms, has alienated itself from the country's youth, other than its often cocky, corrupt, and violent student wing.
The government's response has followed a familiar authoritarian playbook: Initial dismissal, followed by half-hearted concessions, and finally, a harsh crackdown. The deployment of security forces against unarmed students only fueled the protests.
On July 20, the Supreme Court ruled to reduce the quota for freedom fighters' descendants to 5%, representing a belated attempt to defuse the crisis. However, protesters also want justice for the dead and injured and will not be appeased by gestures alone.
Opposition parties, beleaguered with restrictions, have proceeded with relative caution. They did not ignite the protests though they supported the momentum. The student protest leaders are thought to be around thirty men and significantly women, many from private universities. The Opposition’s "Black Flag Day" aimed to broaden the movement yet avoid being seen as opportunists or targets for a government more willing to blame them than middle-class young men and women.
Bangladesh’s history is one of tough choices. Now is another moment of decision. The optimistic scenario sees this crisis as a catalyst for democratic renewal. The pessimistic view fears a descent into authoritarianism. The reality is likely to fall somewhere in between, with the government making tactical concessions while striving to maintain its grip on power.
The challenge now is to transform street-level energy into meaningful political change. For this, Bangladesh must confront its democratic deficit.
Lost in anger is the existential need for free and fair elections. The 2024 general election, as with the one before in 2018, was -- for the most part -- a charade, which damaged the country's democracy. Sadly, international delegations again proved supine and issued a few censorious remarks of no consequence. Only the US’s visa ban on blatant electoral offenders had any impact. The international follow-up has been quiet pledges of absolute support for various ideals.
Here is the list of what is needed most.
- Electoral reform: The Election Commission must be overhauled to ensure its independence. This could involve changes to the appointment process and stricter rules against partisan behaviour. The temptation of power may just be too great. It is a question of whether civil society could do a better job with international support
- Legal framework: Laws that suppress opposition voices, such as the Digital Security Act (rechristened as the Cyber Security Act), need to be repealed or amended. Media freedoms must be protected to ensure voters have access to diverse viewpoints. The government's reaction to cut off the internet will fail and potentially leave the country in regulatory limbo
- Opposition renewal: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and other opposition groups must present themselves as credible alternatives. This means developing coherent policy platforms that address the concerns of a young, increasingly aware, and educated populace
- International pressure: The diplomatic community in Dhaka is limited in what it can do. However, the Department of State and foreign offices in democratic capital cities should use their influence to push for democratic reforms. Visa and economic incentives work if applied consistently
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina faces a critical choice. Continuing down the authoritarian path risks further unrest and international isolation. Embracing political competition, while challenging, could improve her legacy and Bangladesh's democratic future.
The quota protests, while important, are a symptom of an older political identity crisis. Recently, the idea has been revived of the Awami League as a revolutionary one-party government guided by a mid-20th century post-colonial vision. Addressing its darker implications requires more than policy tweaks; it demands a fundamental re-commitment to democratic accountability and political pluralism.
Bangladesh's economic success story is at stake. To build on its achievements, the country needs a political system more responsive to its citizens' aspirations. This means holding free and fair elections and strengthening institutions that can check executive power. The public wants an end to the corruption that ranges from political tithes skimmed from teacher salaries to public sector banks as cash machines for the well-connected.
The path from protest to politics is never smooth. As Bangladesh treads the journey, it may become a model for other developing nations facing similar challenges. The world has seen the Bangladesh protests.
We should cheer as Bangladesh reaches out for its democratic future, the core legacy of the War for Liberation.
Owen Lippert is a researcher and activist with expertise in Asian countries. A version of this article previously appeared in the author’s Substack.
