Publish : 19 Dec 2021, 01:19 AMUpdate : 19 Dec 2021, 01:20 AM
There were serious contenders of power in Dhaka for whom the US was also a potential partner, in spite of being the critiqued hegemon. If Americans made it clear to Yahya that they would work with the Awami League, would the general have bowed to pressure? And if he didn’t, might there have been some other general whom the Americans could have worked with?
Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, for example, presents a curious case. Reputed to be a hawk, he was the architect of the infamous Operation Searchlight -- the military crackdown of 25-26 March. But arriving in Dhaka in the first week of March as the province’s military governor, he concluded that a military solution would not work. He returned to Rawalpindi, and would go on to serve Zia-ul-Huq and Benazir Bhutto as foreign minister during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Might a Yaqub regime have accommodated Sheikh Mujib under American pressure?
This is, of course, mere speculation. But this is the kind of speculation that needs to be explored and analyzed if we are to conclude that the US could have exerted influence and delivered Bangladesh from hell in 1971.
Both Bass and Raghavan implicitly assert that the US could have influenced events for the better in 1971. But neither back up the assertion with any analysis of the pro-West factions in Pakistan.
Similarly intriguing, and ripe for detailed analysis, are the actions of the communist superpowers. Both Bass and Raghavan show how Nixon and Kissinger unsuccessfully pressured the Chinese in December to intervene on Pakistan’s side. In fact, Raghavan makes a compelling case that the Indians were reasonably confident that the Chinese would not intervene militarily. Of course, China was preoccupied with internal matters in 1971 -- the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, and Lin Biao’s aborted coup. But were there also factors at play in Dhaka?
When asked by the Indians about the official name of the new country, Tajuddin Ahmed replied the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Meanwhile, there is an echo of the People’s Liberation Army in Mukti Bahini. These are suggestive of Red China’s intellectual presence in Dhaka’s political milieu.
That is not to say that the Soviet Union was absent. And this leads to one of the most intriguing episodes of the War -- the curious case of the Polish Resolution.
“My country beckons me. Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are. I am going.”
That was ZA Bhutto, representing Pakistan at the United Nations Security Council, on December 15, 1971. Between the last two sentences, he tore up a piece of paper, before making a dramatic exit from the chamber as a tired George Bush Sr looked on -- the entire clip is available on YouTube, and is great theatre. The piece of paper he tore up was a draft resolution tabled by Poland which called for an immediate ceasefire and complete demilitarization of East Pakistan followed by a UN administered election.
That is, with the Indian forces in the outskirts of Dhaka, the Soviet Union orchestrated a UN resolution that would have spared Pakistan an unconditional surrender and stopped India from installing the Tajuddin-led government in Dhaka. That Bhutto tore this up with theatrics for his own personal gain is implied by many, for good reasons.
But why did the Soviets get Poland to move this resolution in the first place? Did they think their proxies would have a reasonable chance at the UN sponsored election? They would have had good reasons to -- pro-Soviet panels swept the first student council elections in the post-liberation Bangladesh.
That is, could both China and the Soviet Union have been playing a long game in 1971? If so, how were their heavily factionalised local proxies placed for the revolution?
Ekattor-er boiguli
There were serious contenders of power in Dhaka for whom the US was also a potential partner, in spite of being the critiqued hegemon. If Americans made it clear to Yahya that they would work with the Awami League, would the general have bowed to pressure? And if he didn’t, might there have been some other general whom the Americans could have worked with?
Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, for example, presents a curious case. Reputed to be a hawk, he was the architect of the infamous Operation Searchlight -- the military crackdown of 25-26 March. But arriving in Dhaka in the first week of March as the province’s military governor, he concluded that a military solution would not work. He returned to Rawalpindi, and would go on to serve Zia-ul-Huq and Benazir Bhutto as foreign minister during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Might a Yaqub regime have accommodated Sheikh Mujib under American pressure?
This is, of course, mere speculation. But this is the kind of speculation that needs to be explored and analyzed if we are to conclude that the US could have exerted influence and delivered Bangladesh from hell in 1971.
Both Bass and Raghavan implicitly assert that the US could have influenced events for the better in 1971. But neither back up the assertion with any analysis of the pro-West factions in Pakistan.
Similarly intriguing, and ripe for detailed analysis, are the actions of the communist superpowers. Both Bass and Raghavan show how Nixon and Kissinger unsuccessfully pressured the Chinese in December to intervene on Pakistan’s side. In fact, Raghavan makes a compelling case that the Indians were reasonably confident that the Chinese would not intervene militarily. Of course, China was preoccupied with internal matters in 1971 -- the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, and Lin Biao’s aborted coup. But were there also factors at play in Dhaka?
When asked by the Indians about the official name of the new country, Tajuddin Ahmed replied the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Meanwhile, there is an echo of the People’s Liberation Army in Mukti Bahini. These are suggestive of Red China’s intellectual presence in Dhaka’s political milieu.
That is not to say that the Soviet Union was absent. And this leads to one of the most intriguing episodes of the War -- the curious case of the Polish Resolution.
“My country beckons me. Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are. I am going.”
That was ZA Bhutto, representing Pakistan at the United Nations Security Council, on December 15, 1971. Between the last two sentences, he tore up a piece of paper, before making a dramatic exit from the chamber as a tired George Bush Sr looked on -- the entire clip is available on YouTube, and is great theatre. The piece of paper he tore up was a draft resolution tabled by Poland which called for an immediate ceasefire and complete demilitarization of East Pakistan followed by a UN administered election.
That is, with the Indian forces in the outskirts of Dhaka, the Soviet Union orchestrated a UN resolution that would have spared Pakistan an unconditional surrender and stopped India from installing the Tajuddin-led government in Dhaka. That Bhutto tore this up with theatrics for his own personal gain is implied by many, for good reasons.
But why did the Soviets get Poland to move this resolution in the first place? Did they think their proxies would have a reasonable chance at the UN sponsored election? They would have had good reasons to -- pro-Soviet panels swept the first student council elections in the post-liberation Bangladesh.
That is, could both China and the Soviet Union have been playing a long game in 1971? If so, how were their heavily factionalised local proxies placed for the revolution?
Jyoti Rahman is a reader. He writes about what he reads at www.jrahman.substack.com.