Publish : 13 Dec 2021, 06:26 PMUpdate : 14 Dec 2021, 06:33 PM
In my last column, I distinguished between crony-friendly, business-friendly, and market-friendly policies.
I argued that, to build a truly competitive economy Bangladesh needs to put increased emphasis on market-friendly policies that impose the discipline of competition on businesses.
Business-friendly policies, which make life easier for businesses but do not necessarily introduce greater competition, are not enough.
Thus, we need to move from business-friendly policies to market-friendly ones.
I expressed the concern that we may instead be moving in the opposite direction, i.e., increasingly towards crony-friendly policies.
Similar views have recently been expressed by prominent economists in the country.
While giving his keynote speech on the last day of the recently concluded Annual BIDS Conference on Development, Prof Wahiduddin Mahmud referred to my column and indicated: “Business-friendly policies may easily degenerate into what is called crony capitalism.”
A few days later, giving his keynote speech at the CPD-Cornell conference on 50 years of Bangladesh, Prof Rehman Sobhan expressed his concern about “the emerging political economy where an increasingly powerful business elite, patronized by the state, is empowered to influence policies and public action.”
In brief, crony capitalism is a problem in Bangladesh, and it may get worse.
How may we tackle this phenomenon that could be the single biggest threat to increased competitiveness, derailing us from our journey towards becoming a high middle-income country?
Some people believe that the solution lies in some revolutionary change that fundamentally alters the balance of power in society, moving it away from the unequal distribution of power and authoritarian or oligarchic governing regimes that breed crony capitalism.
But revolutions are hard to come and even harder to sustain.
But we need not wait for such revolutionary shake-ups to address this problem.
There may be scope for concrete and specific policy design that could limit opportunities for policy capture.
In a 2018 book that I co-authored with Meriem Ait Ali Slimane, Privilege-Resistant Policies in the Middle East and North Africa, we recognized this possibility and articulated an operationally feasible approach to address crony capitalism and privilege-seeking, one that could make a dent in this seemingly intractable problem.
This approach, which I shall briefly mention in this article and explore in greater detail in a follow-up article, rests on the belief that, even in a privilege-ridden system, potential entry points exist to introduce changes that may dent the system, and over time, further dents could be made through additional reforms.
The cumulative effect of these may be large enough to break the privilege-ridden, crony-friendly system.
Such an approach requires creativity and a more granular understanding of how the system operates.
Entry points
Sometimes, extraordinary events create such entry points.
Such critical junctures may result from factors such as domestic and international conflict, geopolitical shifts, economic booms or crises, the discovery of new natural resources, global changes in economic conditions, major episodes of technological innovation, or changes of political regimes.
Readers will be quick to point out that such critical junctures can’t be engineered and thus we can only wait and hope for such an extraordinary event to materialize in the future.
We took a more optimistic view in the book and stated: “In the absence of such catalytic events, and given existing power configurations and constraints to change, it is still possible to improve outcomes at the margin. Moreover, a critical mass of interventions that generate such marginal outcomes may make it easier to exploit the 'critical junctures' if and when they appear.”
This is not naïve optimism.
A growing body of literature talks about windows of opportunity which allow incremental changes with a substantial cumulative effect over time.
In a 2014 article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives titled When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, worldviews, and policy innovations, the well-known economist Dani Rodrik writes: “New ideas about what can be done - innovative policies - can unlock what otherwise might seem like the iron grip of vested interests. The history of economics is replete with ways ideas can shape politics.”
What Rodrik is saying is essentially this: although the actions of powerful interest groups, families, and individuals may be pernicious, these are not necessarily deterministic.
His arguments give us hope that even if the overarching structure of political power does not change, there may be scope to maneuver and make changes on specific technical issues at the margin.
Brian Levy, who worked for many years at the World Bank on governance and public sector issues, has a similar argument in a book published the same year that Rodrik’s article came out.
In “Working with the Grain: Integrating governance and growth”, Levy uses case studies of successful change in a diverse set of countries to discuss how virtuous cycles of change could be triggered even in weak overall governance settings.
The trick is to “work with the grain”, i.e., search for an initial set of interventions that are feasible in a given context and can catalyze a process of cumulative change.
The key question is of course the following. Such technical solutions need to be implemented by government officials.
If the system is very privilege-ridden, and officials are benefiting from it, why should they agree to implement actions that make the system less vulnerable to privileges and crony-capitalism? Fair question.
But such a position assumes that the system is beyond repair.
This may not always be the case.
Indeed, a more realistic scenario is one where not everyone has been irremediably co-opted into the system.
Thus, while some politicians and bureaucrats are busy giving favors to their cronies, others may resent this.
While some may expand the scope for privileged treatment through their policy-setting roles and award privileges through their administrative approval authority, others may look for an opportunity to address the weaknesses in the system that allows such egregious actions.
The latter group is driven by an urge to do some good, such as making sure government actions, whether important policy decisions or small projects, serve broad societal interests rather than the interests of a privileged few.
Such motivations may be triggered by patriotism, pride in one’s job, or empathy with ordinary people.
At the same time, honest government officials may also be motivated to lead a quiet life of acquiescence in which they passively agree with the decisions of their superiors and colleagues even if they don't personally agree with them.
Trade-off
The trade-off between these two motives is depicted in the figure.
Here I use the economist’s favorite tool in explaining choices, i.e., indifference curves.
Curves I and II represent a set of such curves showing the trade-off.
On a particular indifference curve, say curve I, officials are able to do more good (that is, move right along the horizontal axis) only if they are willing to sacrifice a quiet life (that is, move down the vertical axis), and vice versa.
The slope of the indifference curve shows how large the trade-off is.
It may be noted that there are costs to pursuing either of the two motives.
Acquiescing in wrong decisions now in order to lead a quiet life may incur costs, including a feeling of personal guilt as well as the possibility of disciplinary action later.
Doing some good may also have costs.
For example, opposing the grant of privileges to a select few may mean going against the wishes of bosses and colleagues, thus disturbing collegiality.
It may even incur the wrath of powerful people inside and outside the government, leading to career stagnation and inconvenient postings, or even job losses and other more extreme forms of harassment.
These relative costs are captured by the straight line touching the indifference curve I.
Utility is maximized at point A; hence, this is the initial equilibrium. As we can see, in the scenario depicted by the figure, the officials like to play it safe and their proclivity to do good is rather limited.
In this model, government officials could be motivated to do more good in two ways.
First, the relative costs of playing it safe compared to doing good may be changed.
This will be represented by a change in the slope of the relative cost line. For example, a flattening of the line will generate a new equilibrium (at point B) in which officials are more willing to disturb the status quo so that they can do more good.
Alternatively, if the indifference curve itself shifts to curve II, officials can do more good without sacrificing a quiet life (moving to point C).
Some may wonder about the utility of such conceptual discussions.
But when we are trying to understand a complex world, with many dimensions and crosscurrents, it is often useful to start with a simple depiction of reality which can then be built upon.
The above figure may appear theoretical but once we look at it carefully, we begin to see the entry points for action and how these relate to each other.
The above model tells us that as we search for concrete ways to address the problem of privilege or crony capitalism, it is not sufficient to only think of technical solutions.
Technical solutions are important, but we must understand the context in which these would be deployed.
An important aspect of that context is the behavioral tendencies and motivations of people in government, which the above figure seeks to capture.
How do we move from such a theory to the real world?
What are the concrete actions that change the equilibrium for government officials so that they work to make policy systems less vulnerable to crony capitalism?
And, once so motivated, what are the concrete steps officials can take to make systems privilege-resistant?
We shall come to these important questions in the next article.
The author is an economist, previously with an international development agency
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How to combat crony capitalism
In my last column, I distinguished between crony-friendly, business-friendly, and market-friendly policies.
I argued that, to build a truly competitive economy Bangladesh needs to put increased emphasis on market-friendly policies that impose the discipline of competition on businesses.
Business-friendly policies, which make life easier for businesses but do not necessarily introduce greater competition, are not enough.
Thus, we need to move from business-friendly policies to market-friendly ones.
I expressed the concern that we may instead be moving in the opposite direction, i.e., increasingly towards crony-friendly policies.
Similar views have recently been expressed by prominent economists in the country.
While giving his keynote speech on the last day of the recently concluded Annual BIDS Conference on Development, Prof Wahiduddin Mahmud referred to my column and indicated: “Business-friendly policies may easily degenerate into what is called crony capitalism.”
A few days later, giving his keynote speech at the CPD-Cornell conference on 50 years of Bangladesh, Prof Rehman Sobhan expressed his concern about “the emerging political economy where an increasingly powerful business elite, patronized by the state, is empowered to influence policies and public action.”
In brief, crony capitalism is a problem in Bangladesh, and it may get worse.
How may we tackle this phenomenon that could be the single biggest threat to increased competitiveness, derailing us from our journey towards becoming a high middle-income country?
Some people believe that the solution lies in some revolutionary change that fundamentally alters the balance of power in society, moving it away from the unequal distribution of power and authoritarian or oligarchic governing regimes that breed crony capitalism.
But revolutions are hard to come and even harder to sustain.
But we need not wait for such revolutionary shake-ups to address this problem.
There may be scope for concrete and specific policy design that could limit opportunities for policy capture.
In a 2018 book that I co-authored with Meriem Ait Ali Slimane, Privilege-Resistant Policies in the Middle East and North Africa, we recognized this possibility and articulated an operationally feasible approach to address crony capitalism and privilege-seeking, one that could make a dent in this seemingly intractable problem.
This approach, which I shall briefly mention in this article and explore in greater detail in a follow-up article, rests on the belief that, even in a privilege-ridden system, potential entry points exist to introduce changes that may dent the system, and over time, further dents could be made through additional reforms.
The cumulative effect of these may be large enough to break the privilege-ridden, crony-friendly system.
Such an approach requires creativity and a more granular understanding of how the system operates.
Entry points
Sometimes, extraordinary events create such entry points.
Such critical junctures may result from factors such as domestic and international conflict, geopolitical shifts, economic booms or crises, the discovery of new natural resources, global changes in economic conditions, major episodes of technological innovation, or changes of political regimes.
Readers will be quick to point out that such critical junctures can’t be engineered and thus we can only wait and hope for such an extraordinary event to materialize in the future.
We took a more optimistic view in the book and stated: “In the absence of such catalytic events, and given existing power configurations and constraints to change, it is still possible to improve outcomes at the margin. Moreover, a critical mass of interventions that generate such marginal outcomes may make it easier to exploit the 'critical junctures' if and when they appear.”
This is not naïve optimism.
A growing body of literature talks about windows of opportunity which allow incremental changes with a substantial cumulative effect over time.
In a 2014 article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives titled When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, worldviews, and policy innovations, the well-known economist Dani Rodrik writes: “New ideas about what can be done - innovative policies - can unlock what otherwise might seem like the iron grip of vested interests. The history of economics is replete with ways ideas can shape politics.”
What Rodrik is saying is essentially this: although the actions of powerful interest groups, families, and individuals may be pernicious, these are not necessarily deterministic.
His arguments give us hope that even if the overarching structure of political power does not change, there may be scope to maneuver and make changes on specific technical issues at the margin.
Brian Levy, who worked for many years at the World Bank on governance and public sector issues, has a similar argument in a book published the same year that Rodrik’s article came out.
In “Working with the Grain: Integrating governance and growth”, Levy uses case studies of successful change in a diverse set of countries to discuss how virtuous cycles of change could be triggered even in weak overall governance settings.
The trick is to “work with the grain”, i.e., search for an initial set of interventions that are feasible in a given context and can catalyze a process of cumulative change.
The key question is of course the following. Such technical solutions need to be implemented by government officials.
If the system is very privilege-ridden, and officials are benefiting from it, why should they agree to implement actions that make the system less vulnerable to privileges and crony-capitalism? Fair question.
But such a position assumes that the system is beyond repair.
This may not always be the case.
Indeed, a more realistic scenario is one where not everyone has been irremediably co-opted into the system.
Thus, while some politicians and bureaucrats are busy giving favors to their cronies, others may resent this.
While some may expand the scope for privileged treatment through their policy-setting roles and award privileges through their administrative approval authority, others may look for an opportunity to address the weaknesses in the system that allows such egregious actions.
The latter group is driven by an urge to do some good, such as making sure government actions, whether important policy decisions or small projects, serve broad societal interests rather than the interests of a privileged few.
Such motivations may be triggered by patriotism, pride in one’s job, or empathy with ordinary people.
At the same time, honest government officials may also be motivated to lead a quiet life of acquiescence in which they passively agree with the decisions of their superiors and colleagues even if they don't personally agree with them.
Trade-off
The trade-off between these two motives is depicted in the figure.
Here I use the economist’s favorite tool in explaining choices, i.e., indifference curves.
Curves I and II represent a set of such curves showing the trade-off.
On a particular indifference curve, say curve I, officials are able to do more good (that is, move right along the horizontal axis) only if they are willing to sacrifice a quiet life (that is, move down the vertical axis), and vice versa.
The slope of the indifference curve shows how large the trade-off is.
It may be noted that there are costs to pursuing either of the two motives.
Acquiescing in wrong decisions now in order to lead a quiet life may incur costs, including a feeling of personal guilt as well as the possibility of disciplinary action later.
Doing some good may also have costs.
For example, opposing the grant of privileges to a select few may mean going against the wishes of bosses and colleagues, thus disturbing collegiality.
It may even incur the wrath of powerful people inside and outside the government, leading to career stagnation and inconvenient postings, or even job losses and other more extreme forms of harassment.
These relative costs are captured by the straight line touching the indifference curve I.
Utility is maximized at point A; hence, this is the initial equilibrium. As we can see, in the scenario depicted by the figure, the officials like to play it safe and their proclivity to do good is rather limited.
In this model, government officials could be motivated to do more good in two ways.
First, the relative costs of playing it safe compared to doing good may be changed.
This will be represented by a change in the slope of the relative cost line. For example, a flattening of the line will generate a new equilibrium (at point B) in which officials are more willing to disturb the status quo so that they can do more good.
Alternatively, if the indifference curve itself shifts to curve II, officials can do more good without sacrificing a quiet life (moving to point C).
Some may wonder about the utility of such conceptual discussions.
But when we are trying to understand a complex world, with many dimensions and crosscurrents, it is often useful to start with a simple depiction of reality which can then be built upon.
The above figure may appear theoretical but once we look at it carefully, we begin to see the entry points for action and how these relate to each other.
The above model tells us that as we search for concrete ways to address the problem of privilege or crony capitalism, it is not sufficient to only think of technical solutions.
Technical solutions are important, but we must understand the context in which these would be deployed.
An important aspect of that context is the behavioral tendencies and motivations of people in government, which the above figure seeks to capture.
How do we move from such a theory to the real world?
What are the concrete actions that change the equilibrium for government officials so that they work to make policy systems less vulnerable to crony capitalism?
And, once so motivated, what are the concrete steps officials can take to make systems privilege-resistant?
We shall come to these important questions in the next article.
The author is an economist, previously with an international development agency