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Uncomfortable bedfellows

Update : 07 Jul 2013, 03:41 AM

In as little as two years Egypt has experienced its second successful people’s revolution. While the scenes on Tahrir Square are reminiscent of the jubilant crowds that brought down the corrupt dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak in January 2011, there are important differences between then and now.

Many are hailing this as a victory of the people’s will, but one cannot help but feel uneasy at seeing a democratically elected government being overthrown by the military. In contrast to 2011, it is far more difficult to be optimistic that this latest uprising will lead to an improvement of democratic governance in Egypt.

Commentators have already pointed out that the failure to deliver on economic reforms was a big reason for the demise of the Muslim Brotherhood government led by Mohamed Morsi. There is little doubt that the Morsi government was unresponsive of the people’s demands and instead focused more on consolidating the powers of the Brotherhood.

However, many of the economic challenges faced by Egypt are structural, arising from decades of poor governance and lack of economic planning. As Nafeez Ahmed wrote in the Guardian, rising food dependency, sky-high national debt and growing inequality resulting from “structural adjustments,” driven by the IMF have done serious damage to the socioeconomic fabric of Egypt. While the policies, or lack thereof, of the Morsi government didn’t help the state of affairs, it can be argued that even under the best of reform regimes, it will take time for conditions to improve.

Deteriorating economic conditions alone, however, would not have sufficed to mobilise such a large number of Egyptians to take to the streets to oust the Morsi government. While the Brotherhood never had fans among the urban secularists, they enjoyed a high level of support among the more conservative Islamist population across the country.

These conservative Islamist forces have now found a voice in the Salafist movement, which until very recently showed little interest in politics, other than their support for the Brotherhood. However, the Brotherhood’s quest to increase their own influence at the expense of others has alienated their former allies, and they have been made to feel the consequences.

Thus far, one of the less talked about dimensions of the revolution has been the role that the Salafists played in it. The Salafists are substantially more socially conservative than the Brotherhood and they enjoy a broad base of popular support. While reluctant political players, they have recently organised themselves under two parties – the Nour party and Watan.

Their current alliance with the secularist forces is an uneasy one. The determination to oust Morsi and to do this with as little bloodshed as possible is the principle that brought together the opposing forces. However, the differences between the groups are likely to come to a head soon – especially with regards to the rights and role of women and the role of Sharia law in the constitution. 

Reportedly, the secularists have agreed that any constitutional change will leave intact the provision that Sharia law is the source of all law in the land. However, the interpretation of such a provision under a Salafist government is likely to be a lot less agreeable for the secularists than a Brotherhood government.

The fractured state of political forces in the country only strengthens the position of the army, which already enjoys massive popular support.

Political commentators in and outside Egypt have drawn attention to the fact that the Egyptian army is the biggest obstacle to a true democratic transition in the country – they control most of the levers of power, both political and economic, behind the scenes. They are also heavily backed by the US, which bodes poorly for the independence of Egyptian policy in the region.

So, what happens next? A transitional government is being formed which will lead the country through the next election.

The fact that this transitional body is being backed by a broadly representative group of leaders, including the head of the Coptic Church and the Imam of Al-Ahzar, the centre of Islamic thought in Egypt, is a good sign.

However, much depends on whether they will be able to deliver on the promise of fair and free elections that will satisfy all parties.

Meanwhile, the threat of more unrest on the streets is very real as the ousted Brotherhood is currently calling on their supporters to mobilise. While their support has dwindled, any failure of the transitional government, real or perceived, will serve to boost their voice again.

Even if the next election is held smoothly, the incoming government will face a daunting task. As mentioned above, the complex and interlocking set of economic and political challenges will make delivery of quick success difficult, if not impossible.

Given the high, and perhaps unrealistic, expectations among the people, it wouldn’t be too surprising to see yet another revolution in a year or so.

In 2011, Egypt was a beacon of hope for the world, and Tahrir became the symbol of victory of democratic forces over oppression. However, the next two years have shown that revolutions and democratic governance can be unhappy bedfellows.

Governance, especially in the context of post-autocratic states like Egypt, is fraught with complexities and uncomfortable compromises.

It requires the goodwill of opposing political forces, and perhaps most crucially, patience to see reform processes through. Without it, Tahrir might be perpetually occupied and that would be a real failed revolution. 

Farzana Nawaz is an editorial fellow with the Dhaka Tribune. This article was written with the generous support of Mr Hussein Hassan, a governance expert based in Cairo, Egypt. However, the views expressed in this article are the author’s alone.

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