Following an almost year-long interval since US president Joe Biden first announced the emergence of a new economic bloc in the Indo-pacific region in October last year, the United States, along with 12 other Asia-Pacific countries, officially unveiled the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on May 23, 2022.
Initial participants in the framework include Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, New Zealand, and Singapore.
After the Trump administration's woeful withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, a signature trade agreement of the Obama administration, the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) -- the geostrategic bedrock of US containment policy against China -- was struggling with the absence of any economic correlative to the broader geostrategic maneuver.
Moreover, from the very beginning of his presidency, Biden's global diplomatic endeavour has been marked by the characteristic of “diplomacy without due commitment” to economic resources. With an aim to address the economic missing link to its broader strategic set-up and seemingly to refurnish his diplomatic profile, the US president has kicked off the economic framework, christened as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
However, while stating Bangladesh’s strategic orientation to and probable future posture in its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) Foreign Minister Dr AK Abdul Momen said, “We’re sure that we’ll be effectively engaged in any future ‘Indo-Pacific Alliance’ if it is found to be purely economic in nature.”
Now, while IPEF is on the scene as an economic frontier of the US grand geopolitical strategy in Asia, should Bangladesh join IPEF?
For Bangladesh, before stepping straight down to this question, it is worth contemplating some underlying questions concerning the very aspects of IPEF:
Is the IPEF economic in nature, and if so, how much? Or is it just another US geopolitical avenue in its strategic rivalry with China? And if so, is it strategically viable for Bangladesh to be embroiled in such a power struggle, by becoming a member of the IPEF?
To start, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework consists of four modules covering fair and resilient trade rules, supply chain resilience, infrastructure and green technology, taxes, and anti-corruption. It is a non-traditional economic arrangement, dealing with high-standard trade and manufacturing rules and regulations -- like ambitious labour standards, sweeping supply chain decarburization, data localization guidelines, etc -- with no binding commitments to market access or tariff concession.
As per the White House fact sheet, while it says -- “IPEF will enable the United States and our allies to decide on rules of the road that ensure American workers, small businesses, and ranchers can compete in the Indo-Pacific” -- the IPEF is neither an economic “pact” nor a “deal.” Rather it is a loose framework aiming at serving US interests at the high compliance costs for the regional countries.
So, in a nutshell, the IPEF is all about sticks with no carrot in exchange.
Given the country’s quasi-autarkic nature of the economy, fledgling economic infrastructure, post-pandemic urgency to economic recovery, and absence of prior membership experience in any grand economic alliance, it is highly unlikely that Bangladesh could afford to absorb the tedious “too American” economic regulatory standards.
Even neighbouring India, the key cornerstone country in the US-led containment policy against China with relatively better economic infrastructure, was reportedly reluctant to join the IPEF.
So far, it appears that the US offers nothing in terms of tangible economic benefit to put meat on the bones of the IPEF. It, rather, seems the US has put forward a long laundry list of standard-setting demands in line with its economic policy, with a clear objective to contain China's increasing dominance in the Asian supply chain and reestablish its economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific.
So, given that the IPEF seems to be another frontier of the enduring geopolitical turf war between China and the US, should Bangladesh aspire to join the alliance?
The answer may lie in its diplomatic trend line it has been following over the decade. Over the last decade, Bangladesh has been carrying out a strikingly unique “three-way balancing” act between the US, India and China. And, in return, it has reaped astonishing economic and geopolitical dividends on its march toward being an emerging middle power. Embroiling itself in any geopolitical power struggle, with sudden divergence from its decade-long diplomatic maneuver, could risk its economic and geopolitical status-quo.
Besides, Bangladesh has yet distanced itself from membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) -- a China-led grand economic alliance in the Indo-Pacific region -- with a clear aim to maintain its balancing endeavour and not to be labelled as a China-tilted country. Now, it would certainly raise questions about its very diplomatic deftness, should it join the US-led IPEF -- a containment tool to the RCEP.
With Bangladesh’s economic and geopolitical stakes being evenly distributed among the global powers, it would be a risky venture for the country to lean absolutely into the geopolitical realm of any power or to embark on any contradictorily competitive political or economic bloc. It will be instrumental, in the long run, for Bangladesh to deal with global powers “on its own merit” and for powerful ones to recognize Bangladesh’s diplomatic posture “in its own right.”
Anup Sinha is a researcher and academic specializing in South Asian affairs.
