Political narratives are often marred by “conspiracy theories,” which often hide facts, but may sometimes obscure real conspiracies. The problem with conspiracy theories is that they are “theories.”
Here, the term “theory” or “theories” has an ominous ring to it. The parenthesis is a marker of doubt, and often such “theories” are lies, conjectures, or half-truths. One may be forgiven for having a skeptical position by default when it comes to handling such “conspiracies.”
However, it may be suggested, as a rule, that while skepticism may be a reasonable default position, one should also have an open mind and look for evidence to accept or reject the hypotheses that are presented as “theories.” What is important in the evaluation of theories is evidence, and more particularly, the quality of evidence.
I remember the day when Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to visit Bangladesh in June 1974. On that day, I was having a conversation with friends who were lamenting that people showed up to receive Bhutto and lined the Dhaka streets. A friend, who had a glimpse of the onlookers, later told me that some of them from the crowd were even shouting slogans in Urdu -- “Pakistan zindabad” -- from the sidelines.
Although such slogans were rare and somewhat muted, the very fact that some people had the gall to utter such a slogan was a travesty, and a case of collective amnesia. How could this small group of Bhutto enthusiasts forget the genocide in Bangladesh just three years ago? However, what we were not aware of at that time was the extent of the conspiracy being hatched against the newly independent Bangladesh.
In the last quarter of 1974, Bangladesh suffered a famine, mainly in the northern part. News of the famine was reported in newspapers and discussions took place at the Parliament, leading to whatever actions the government could take to deal with the crisis.
What we were not aware of at that point was the impact of the American policy of diverting ships carrying food headed for Bangladesh due to the flimsy ground of Bangladesh’s export of jute products to Cuba. US Congress ostensibly prohibited food aid to countries engaged in trading activity with a communist country.
It was a 1977 article in the Foreign Affairs (27:78) by Donald McHenry and Kai Bird -- “Food Bungle in Bangladesh” -- and Rehman Sobhan’s 1979 article “Politics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh” in Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) that revealed the impact of international, and especially Cold-War politics on the causation of the food crisis and famine in Bangladesh.
In the second volume of Rehman Sobhan’s memoirs (Untranquil Days: Nation Building in Post-Liberation Bangladesh), published for the international audience by Sage, India (2021), Sobhan provides an example of Bhutto’s role in destabilizing the Awami League government before the 1975 regime change through a brutal coup.
In his book, Sobhan cites Wolpert’s well-researched biography of Pakistan’s erstwhile Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Stanley Wolpert (1927-2019), a well-known historian of South Asia at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), found in his research on Bhutto’s biography -- Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Oxford University Press, 1993) -- a letter from Abdul Huq, the secretary general of East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) to “My dear Prime Minister,” dated Dacca, December 16, 1974.
The letter reached Bhutto on January 6, 1975; Abdul Huq had written, with “much pain and anguish,” to appeal for “funds, arms and wireless instruments” to use against the “puppet Mujib clique…today totally divorced from the people.”
Bhutto minuted on its margin “Important,” authorizing “help” for this “honest man,” who Bhutto rated as “fairly effective.” However, in addition to Bhutto’s use of the ultra-left, he also engaged a second track of destabilizing Bangladesh by deploying agents with Islamist connections.
Bhutto sent Abdul Malek, another one of his agents in destabilizing Bangladesh, who traveled to Saudi Arabia for support in the promised “liberation of 65 million Muslims [of Bangladesh], who are anxiously waiting for your guidance and leadership.”
Bhutto sent Maulana Niazi to Saudi Arabia, hoping to marshal enough diplomatic and financial support, as well as weapons, to pressure Mujib or his successors to amend the Bangladesh Constitution to call that state the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh, and to establish an “Advisory Council” of “Muslim-minded political leaders,” similar to that which Maulana Niazi ran for Bhutto’s government in Islamabad.
The above pieces of evidence highlight the role of the conspiracies of extreme left (Maoists) and the right-wing Islamists -- both defeated forces -- in destabilizing post-independence Bangladesh.
Habibul Haque Khondker is a sociologist.
