The UK government made him an honourary knight commander of the Order of the British Empire. The French government made him knight of the Legion of Honour. The Spanish government awarded him the historic Grand Cross … and the Japanese government finally arrested him.
Carlos Ghosn, the legendary chairman of the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance, was taken into custody on November 19 for allegedly understating his earnings and misappropriating Nissan’s corporate assets over the course of many years.
While this gargantuan leadership ethics issue led to the Japanese behemoths Nissan and Mitsubishi immediately removing Ghosn, the French auto giant Renault revealed after a December 13 board meeting that the incarcerated maverick would continue to head the organization as chairman and CEO.
Is this refusal by Renault to remove Ghosn a sign of Western corporate culture being at odds with the more traditional Asian corporate culture in recognizing and culling unethical and irresponsible behaviour by the top management leadership?
While it may seem so, this is not the case. In fact, the Japanese corporate keiretsu model -- where supplier and buyer firms may belong to the same shareholding groups, where boards rarely include independent directors, where unanimity, consensus, and compromise with your superiors is more the mandatory norm -- is worst-suited for appropriate corporate governance oversight than, say, the French model, where you may often see a two-tiered board, with one group constituting management, and the other group representing, for example, labour and independent members.
But then again, in corporations which have a wide public shareholding base, board members, especially those holding the chairman’s position, are rarely answerable to anyone, except perhaps once a year when they need to be present during the annual general meetings in front of all shareholders.
And even in these, those are the CEOs who are castigated for non-performance and face the danger of being subsequently removed by the board.
Take a quick look at the constitution of Renault shareholding, and you’ll understand why Ghosn could quite be an emperor for life in his position. 62.09% of Renault is owned by the public, which almost never can come together demanding that Ghosn be removed. 15% of Renault is owned by Nissan -- a result of the initial alliance, where Renault took over 43.4% of Nissan’s shares and in return gave Nissan 15% of its own shares, but with a critical clause.
These are non-voting shares; so, Nissan can’t have a say in whether Ghosn stays at Renault or not. Out of the remaining shares, 7.3% shares are broadly equally owned by employees (who’ll want to save their jobs), Daimler AG (another alliance partner brought in by Ghosn), and Renault itself. That leaves an unaccounted 15.1% of Renault shares, which are owned by, well, the French government.
That means that the single largest shareholder in Renault, apart from the public, is the French state, which probably would not want to demean the knight of Legion of Honour. No wonder, the French government released a statement that their position was as such, because as per them, there was “no evidence” that Ghosn had committed any crime in France.
For a developed nation’s government, to give such a statement seems quite odd, given the extent to which the French state is attempting to corner the crown prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman on the Jamal Khashoggi affair -- a killing of a foreign individual that happened in a foreign country, in a foreign consulate, probably by foreign agents.
This brings us to the final question. How do developed economies, which mostly have large scale publicly held distributed shareholding, rein in board members? For example, how does United States, where around 51% of shares of publicly listed companies are owned by individuals, put firewalls on board behaviour?
The answer is actually quite simple -- through non-negotiable legal provisions that make it mandatory for boards of publicly listed companies to be constituted predominantly with independent external directors. These are apart from the legally required filings by various independent committees -- like the audit committee or the remuneration committee -- mandated by bodies like the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The momentous 2002 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act enforced much of this and brought the directors under legal penalty for non-adherence to various such clauses that limited the power of entrenched board members.
At the macro-level, taking the Renault case as an example, the French government could also consider implementing such large-scale regulations to control board behaviour in publicly listed companies; at a micro level, the French government should take a stand and remove Ghosn till he is, if at all, acquitted. And it’s not as if the French government cannot enforce such a change of stand by the Renault Board.
Two years ago, the Renault board had rejected an outcry by public shareholders against the large pay hike given to Ghosn. Listening to the public, the then French economy minister had stepped in and warned Renault to reverse the pay hike, which they finally did.
This had never happened before in the French business space; and especially when a supremely powerful corporate leader was involved.
The young economy minister had rewritten the Ghosn protocol, something that was considered mission impossible till then. That economy minister was a young politico called Emmanuel Macron, who probably now needs to connect with the public much more than he ever did. And there’s no better chance than right now to do it.
Ananthanarayanan Sandeep is the Group CEO of STS Group, co-author of the strategy best-seller Cult, and guest faculty of strategy at IIM Calcutta.



