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The Rooppur question

Update : 01 Jan 2016, 09:52 AM

It is also not clear how the base price of $12.65 billion was fixed. This price, however, does not include $550 million, which we already spent for a feasibility study and another $1.5bn (at 4% rate of interest for six years) will be required to spend as interest during construction. The total cost will come to $14.7bn if these costs are added.

So long, the responsible quarters of the government have been quoting a price of $3bn to $4bn for a 2000MW nuclear plant at Rooppur.

If we apply the price escalation of 2.5% per year, as stipulated in the contract, for six years, the price of $4bn should increase to $4.64bn. If we adjust for increase in the size of the plant from 2,000MW to 2,400MW, it should further increase by to $5.57bn.

This is less than half of the negotiated price of $12.65bn. How can the government explain the astronomic increase in the cost of the plant and be so happy about it? Why did they consistently keep quoting the price of $3bn to $4bn since 2009? Was it their ignorance or a deliberate attempt to hide the facts? It is difficult to say which one is worse.

This is not all what we would pay to the Russians. It was further reported that, besides the general agreement, Bangladesh and Russia will sign four more agreements for nuclear fuel purchase, transporting spent fuel from Bangladesh to Russia, maintenance and service of the power plant, and manpower development. It does not mention for how long the above services will be provided but these agreements will involve a cost of a further $8bn.

When shall we pay the $8bn and who will finance this part of the cost? The period of services to be provided is very important as the amount of $8bn sounds like another astronomical figure. It may be noted that nuclear fuel is already included in the additional cost of $1bn as stated previously. Does it mean that we are paying twice for the same service?

The $8bn includes the cost of transporting the spent fuel to Russia. Will the Russians charge us additionally for reprocessing the fuel and storage of the nuclear waste? Are we getting any credit for the substantial amount of unspent enriched uranium-235 and plutonium-239 in the spent fuel which can be recycled in the reactor after reprocessing?

Have these issues been negotiated while fixing the price? Moreover, $550m we paid includes the cost of the plant design. Normally, this should be a part of the plant cost. Are we not paying twice again for the same services?

Is the payment of $8bn reflected in the calculation of the cost of generation of Tk4.5 per kWh? Will the BAEC show us how the cost of generation has been calculated? Does it include the costs of decommissioning and interim replacements?

It is not clear why we are signing so many contracts. We signed three deals for $550m for a feasibility study and one deal for $12.65bn for construction of the plant. Four more deals for $8bn are being contemplated for different services. From the newspaper reports, it is difficult to understand the scope of the services for each contract.

It is also not clear what other deals will be necessary in addition to those under $12.65bn and $8bn contracts to bring the plant to operation. If the additional cost of $1bn includes fuel for one additional year, where is the cost of the first fuel load? Is it included in the main contract of $12.65bn or shall we sign another contract for it?

Coming to regulatory issues, it is reported that substantial preparatory works were carried out at the site during the feasibility study. No such activity is permitted before issue of the site permit by the regulatory authority.

Did Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission take the site permit before start of site preparation? Since the contract has been signed, we may soon receive the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) which needs to be evaluated by the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA).

According to an IAEA Guidebook, BAERA will need a work force of 55 professionals (44 engineers with MS in nuclear engineering and 11 scientists with MS/PhDs) to evaluate the PSAR and it will take about 18 months to do this job.

Do we have this kind of manpower? If the answer is negative, it will obviously take more time for issue of the construction permit.

This means the concrete pouring at the site cannot start before July 2017. If the construction of the plant takes about 6 years (India took 11 years to build the first unit, supplied by Russia, at Kudankulam), how can the first unit be operative before July 2023?

To me, it appears that we are in a hurry to build the first nuclear plant in Bangladesh. This is not a project to make decisions in a hurry. When the Russians showed interest in the Rooppur project in 2009, I advised the BAEC to go for a large-scale recruitment and training of engineers.

They did practically nothing between 2009 and 2013. Though they accepted most of my other suggestions, like building VVER-1200 reactors, setting up a separate regulatory body, and a separate organisation for construction and operation of nuclear power plants, they failed to build a competent team of qualified and experienced engineers.

As a result, there is a serious shortage of manpower both in BAEC and BAERA. They are naturally hard pressed to take important decisions on evaluation of the feasibility report, evaluation of the project proposal, issue of site and construction permits etc.

These are serious issues with regards to the safety, reliability, and economy of the plant. If we try to take decisions in a hurry, without proper evaluation or understanding, we are likely to make serious mistakes. It must be made clear that the consequences of such mistakes often become very costly, if not catastrophic, when it involves the construction of a nuclear power plant.

Nobody should misunderstand me. I am not against the nuclear power but I am not in favour of building a nuclear power plant in a hurry without first building our own manpower, who are capable of taking wise policy decisions, or compromising on issues like safety, reliability, and economy. 

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