Salil Tripathi is a London-based Indian journalist and writer, currently serving as contributing editor for The Caravan and Mint. His most recent work, The colonel who would not repent, a ground-breaking history of Bangladesh’s history, focusing especially on the seminal years of 1971 and 1975, and what led up to them and their aftermath, has received rave reviews and been featured on the cover of Newsweek Pakistan and has been excerpted in many other publications. In this exclusive interview, Tripathi shares with Shahidul Islam Chowdhury why he wrote a book on the Liberation War and his thoughts on the Bangladesh-India relationship
What prompted you to write a book on the 1971 War of Independence for Bangladesh?
I decided to write about the war for several reasons. First, it is a war I remember as a child. I grew up in India, in a city that was then known as Bombay. I remember the air raid sirens at all times, the calls for “lights out” by home guards; I remember helping my parents paste black paper on our windows; I remember staging a play with my friends to raise funds for the refugees who had come to India. I also remember how we saw the struggle for independence in Bangladesh as one between good and evil. The election results in 1970 were clear; by right Sheikh Mujibur Rahman should have been elected prime minister, but that did not happen. Bangladeshis suffered hugely; millions were driven out as refugees, hundreds of thousands died, many women were raped, and I felt proud of the role India played in helping Bangladesh achieve its freedom – a war in which the sacrifices of Bangladeshis were enormous.
I also have a deep, personal interest in Bangla language and culture. My father studied Rabindrasangeet and would sometimes take me to the classes. My parents chose Bangla names for me and my two younger brothers. And when I turned 16, I studied Bangla language for two years voluntarily, partly so that I could see Satyajit Ray’s cinema without subtitles.
Can you recall specific incidents that remind you of the days of the 1971 War in Bangladesh?
I have vivid memories of seeing photographs and reading about the refugees from Bangladesh in India. I heard about the Concert for Bangladesh at Madison Square Gardens. As I said earlier, I staged a play in Bombay, in Gujarati, which raised funds for an organisation called the Bangladesh Aid Committee. This committee collected funds for the refugees in India. I also remember taking food cooked by mother, and the mothers of my school friends, to the railway station in Bombay, for soldiers who were travelling to the battlefront, once India joined the battle. As school children, we often shouted the slogan, “Joi Bangla,” to each other.
Were your classmates in school aware of the war in Bangladesh? Would they talk about it?
Yes, as I said, we were familiar with the basic facts of the war; we knew the main leaders – Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmed; we had also heard of Osmani, and later, of Kader Siddiqui and of course, of the Mukti Bahini.
According to a rough estimate, about three million people were killed during the 1971 War of Independence. I think you have done extensive research for your book. Do you have any information to support the number as a fact?
It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of deaths in any conflict. The correct estimate of the number of deaths in the 1971 war is made harder due to the passage of time. I have examined the Chuknagar massacre, and what I have discovered is that many of those who were killed had come from other villages to Chuknagar, to go from there to Satkhira and cross the border to India. Many of those people were not known to anyone in Chuknagar; their relatives in their villages would not know where they were; their remains would have remained unidentified. In many cases the bodies of the people who were killed were thrown in rivers and the bodies disappeared. There were also deaths due to illnesses in refugee camps. The conflict was felt in all parts of the country, and unless there had been a serious effort to count the number of deaths soon after the war, it would be extremely difficult to arrive at an accurate number of deaths. In my personal view, more important than the number of deaths is the tragic fact that so many people died for no reason, and regardless of the actual number, these crimes against humanity must be acknowledged and never forgotten.
Have you come across any indication that the number of deaths was grossly exaggerated?
I do not have any information that suggests that the numbers were grossly exaggerated. Estimating a large number of people in any context is difficult. You have to recognise that if three million people died during those nine months, you are talking of between ten and twelve thousand deaths per day. The most lethal conflict we know of in the past few decades is in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the average number of deaths was about 700-800 per day. Was the Bangladesh conflict 10 or 15 times more lethal? I don’t know, but think of the probability - how likely is it? Think also of the fact that detailed records of deaths in 1971 do not exist. And if we take a step back from the issue of numbers, the question to ask is: suppose the figure was a tenth of that - 300,000 deaths - does that make the conflict more humane or less lethal? Does that not mean that what Pakistani army did, aided by domestic collaborators, was a crime against humanity, regardless of numbers?
Let us come to the points of bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India. India had supported Bangladesh immensely during the Liberation War of 1971. It is widely believed that the two countries have failed to explore potentials for relations with the spirit of cooperation in 1971. Why do think that is?
This is an important and complicated question. I’m no expert on India’s bilateral relations with any country. But if I were to see the situation from the Indian perspective, I’d think it is because India was stunned by the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, and the trajectory of politics in Bangladesh since then. India also had domestic compulsions over what Indians call “infiltration” of Bangladeshis in India, initially in the northeast. There were unsubstantiated allegations over Bangladeshi immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities, although the large majority of them were law abiding. There was also resentment in India over border trade that was unregulated. And India, being larger, probably expected Bangladesh to accept that India was the big brother. I’m not saying any of this is necessarily true, nor that it is justified. But it is how India saw it. With growing Hindu fundamentalism in India, many in India do not differentiate between Pakistan and Bangladesh – which is not only unfair to Bangladesh, but shows fundamental illiteracy about Bangladesh and its history.
On the other hand, Bangladesh too had expectations of India which India did not fulfill – the sharing of waters is one such; the concern over dominance of Bangladesh’s economy by Indian business is another. In the post-Mujib years, Bangladeshi governments too attempted to distance the country from India, a trend that continued for at least two decades. There was also a sense of denial in Bangladesh about Bangladeshis migrating into India and the consequences in host regions in India. Bangladesh is a proud country, and did not like seeing itself referred to as India’s little brother. And Bangladeshi governments sometimes blamed India for its problems – such as the recent power outage in parts of Bangladesh, which were immediately blamed on Indian power suppliers, when the truth was more complicated.
Huge potentials for bilateral relations have been overshadowed by suspicion among politicians and bureaucrats in particular, and sections of the people in general, of the two countries for the last four decades. A section of people in Bangladesh believe that India, being a powerful neighbour, may dominate things in Bangladesh. Do you think that hegemony by India is a major reason for the rise of suspicion?
Whenever there is a relationship between a large country and a smaller one, there are mutual suspicions. Besides the political factors, we should not underestimate the power of some large Bangladeshi businesses to stall closer business relationship with India, because of fear that Indian businesses may dominate the Bangladeshi economy. The lesson we’ve learned from economics over the years is that whenever any economy is protected, consumers lose, because costs remain high. But in this Bangladesh isn’t alone; just as Bangladeshi companies fear Indian businesses, Indian companies too fear large western – and even Chinese – businesses. And the result is consumers lose – in India and in Bangladesh.
How can the two countries remove this suspicion?
Ideally that can be achieved through closer people-to-people contacts. Indians and Bangladeshis usually meet outside the region, unless they visit each other’s countries. They often go on official business, or to visit relatives. But there are relatively few tourists from Bangladesh in India – and vice-versa. I was amused when a young Bangladeshi woman asked me at a dinner at a friend’s place in Dhaka if I had ever eaten a mango. She thought the fruit was Bangladeshi (which it is) and a rarity in India. Likewise, Indians have no idea how beautiful the riverine landscape of Bangladesh is.
The two countries have decided at the highest political and diplomatic levels to stop border killing by the Indian Border Security Force. Indian authorities have also decided to use non-lethal weapon along the border. But BSF men have continued border shooting killing people almost everyday. Indian authorities have consistently failed to implement their decisions in this regard.
I don’t know why the BSF acts the way it does. I have heard horrendous stories; I’ve seen graphic videos on YouTube; and I’ve read the report by Odhikar. India’s civil society must hold the BSF to account to ensure that civilians are not harmed, regardless of their legal status. The BSF has a legitimate role in defending India’s border. But no army has the right to use disproportionate force at any time.
How would you assess the potential of SAARC?
For SAARC to succeed, India’s neighbours have to stop seeing India as a hegemony, and India should act with its neighbours with respect. Increasing people-to-people contacts, and improving and expanding trade will go a long way in making SAARC as critical as ASEAN.
What are the hindrances faced by SAARC when regionalism has emerged as a common feature in different parts of the world, ASEAN being an example?
In one word, politics. Suspicions, history, and leaving contact between the countries only in the hands of governments and politicians are responsible. Think how hard it is to get visas to travel within SAARC for SAARC nationals.



